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ABSTRACT 
Research into stress and illness is fraught with 
methodological and conceptual problems. These problems have 
slowed progress in research. Life stress variables are 
still conceptualized at a cruder simplistic and naive 
level. Research findings in life stressr either in terms of 
increasing the predictive power of life stress variables, 
or enhancing our understanding of the stress~disorder 
relationshipr have advanced little in the last ten to 
twenty years. 
A possible approach to this probJem is adopted in this 
thesis. By looking at how the ways in which the term stress 
has been used and developed in different areas of researchr 
the diverse uses of this concept can be distinguished. The 
background to stress and illness research can now be 
approached with a clear conception of these different uses. 
Although there is general evidence for the Jink between 
stress and illness, knowledge about the processes and 
mechanisms involved is sparse. Many of the insights made by 
early researchers in psychosomatic mediciner that disease 
causation is mullticausalr appear to have been forgotten by 
many researchers who use only a few variables in their 
research designs. 
The idea of 'mediators' of stress presupposes a certain 
model of stress, loosely based on a engineering analogy, 
where stress is pictured as an external forcer which the 
individual will resist, and moderating factors will reduce 
the impact of the force. This analogy is influential in 
life stress research, but little evidence exists to suggest 
it may be correct. 
Recent moves towards assessing daily stress and coping have 
been criticised as such variables are contaminated by 
others. An unresolvable difference exists between those who 
see stress varibles as objectively measurable, and those 
who view stress and health as part of a much larger 
ongoing interaction between the person and their 
environment, and coping and social support variables as 
part of a more general effort to adapt. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
~1-
1 o 1. Backg~C?._und o 
My initial interest in stress carne about through a much 
larger and basic concern with the ways in which the 
psychological environment can influence healtho Different 
research frameworks share this common concern. These 
include medical psychology, health psychology, epidemiology 
and behavioural medicine. 
From all the various factors involved in the relationship 
between psychology and health, I chose to look at stress. 
My third year undergraduate dissertation was about Hans 
Selye and his conception of stress. During the reading for 
this dissertation, I quickly realised that the whole area 
of stress was full of theoretical and conceptual problems 
that I found very interesting. There are a number of other 
reasons for this choice. First, the concept of stress is 
fundamental to all these frameworks, and related to my 
basic concerns in such a way as to allow for a broad and 
general approach to the issues involved. Second, the 
concept of stress attempts to explain how psychological 
experiences can affect physiological states, which may then 
have consequences for health. Third, the concept of stress 
is very problematic. These problems exist both on the 
theoretical and practical levels and provide an added 
interest and challenge. Lastly, the theoretical and 
-2-
conceptual problems encountered in stress research have an 
importance which goes beyond stress research itself. For 
example 1 the efforts made to demonstrate that measures of 
stress are causally associated with changes in health have 
implications for all medical research~ and our concepts of 
health and diseaseo 
When one looks at 'stress research 0 or those areas of 
research which use the term and idea of stress there are 
several striking aspects of these areas~ there are a huge 
number of publications and books about stress~ the 
definition and concept of stress varies enormously even 
within one particular focus of stress research~ increasing 
attention is being 
problems 1 although 
paid to methodological and conceptual 
researchers have been aware of such 
problems ever since the word stress was first used in a 
scientific sense in this context~ and despite a great deal 
of research, progress in this area is slowo An overview of 
stress research leaves the impression that the area is 
confused, messy, without clear direction 1 and unable to 
tell us much of real importance about the mechanisms 
involved in stress, illness and healtho 
Although such criticisms can probably be made about other 
research areas, one consequence of stress research which 
-3~ 
may not apply to other areasv is that it has, or should 
significant practical implications for medicine and 
health care. Hencev there is extra need to speed up 
progressv especially as stress-related chronic illnesses 
{such as heart disease) are now the major single cause of 
death in many Western countries. 
There have been a number of responses to this slow 
progress. Researchers have attempted to improve 
stress-disorder relationships 
stress (usually life events) 
by refining the measures of 
adopted in studies. Although 
such efforts have been going on for nearly twenty years the 
power of life events to explain variance in illness rates 
has not significantly increased. Other responses to speed 
up progress have been less concerned with proving or 
demonstrating that a relationship between stress and 
disorder exists. Instead, the focus for these researchers 
is to better understand the mechanisms involved in stress 
disorder relationships. Our knowledge of the causal links 
between stress and disorder is at a very low level. The 
research designed to improve our understanding of such 
mechanisms is more qualitative, and rejects the simple 
independent-dependent variable approach. These two 
experimental approaches to stress research represent two 
extremes. There are some researchers who try to find 
-4-
positive relationships between stress and disorder, but at 
the same time pay attention to the causal mechansims 
involved. 
On a theoretical Jevel the response to the slow progress in 
stress research is less noticable. This is perhaps due to a 
general bias against theory. However 1 in stress research 
in particular, the practical implications of findings means 
that there is extra urgency in the search for 'hard' facts 
which can be appJied. Research on theory, although seen as 
vitally important by nearly all researchers, is sometimes 
hard to justify in a positivist climate, and may seem 
inappropriate to individual researchers who are more 
concerned with making advances in very specialized research 
areas, than general gains in theory. 
This thesis is an attempt to look at some of the 
theoretical issues in stress research. I have taken a 
theoretical approach for two reasons. The first, as 
outlined above, is because I feel that a serious 
consideration of theoretical issues would speed up progress 
far better than any number of empirical studies, as such 
studies are developed from poor theory. Second, on a 
personal level, the problems involved in stress research 
are, for me, almost overwhelming. My desire to do some 
-5-
empirical work in the general area of stress, health and 
illness has lessened as I realised that I would not feel 
confident, or justified in undertaking empirical work, if I 
could not approach the work with some understanding of the 
considerable theoretical and methodological problems in the 
area as a whole. Whilst this thesis is by no means a 
comprehensive review of the theoretical problems in the 
stress area, it has given me more confidence, and made 
appreciate even more the lack of good theory in this area, 
and the importance of approaching empirical work from a 
sound, theoretical basis. 
I have tried to indicate the 
this section. However, I 
background 
hope that 
become clearer as each chapter develops. 
1.2 Theoretical orientation. 
to this thesis in 
the rationale will 
There are two issues I would like to discuss here. The 
first is my approach to the thesis, and the second is my 
theoretical approach to stress research. The two are 
closely related as I have tried, though my approach to the 
thesis, to give support to a particular contemporary 
perspective in stress research. This thesis is intended to 
provide a broad, general overview of some of the 
theoretical and methodological problems in stress research. 
-6-
It is aimed to give the reader a feel for the area, rather 
than lists of facts and research findings. Because of this, 
I have not spent much time in arguing my own particular 
point of view, at least not explicitly. I felt that it was 
very important to give as broad a view as possible to the 
diverse strands of stress research. Such a view allows one 
to clearly place any piece of stress research in a 
theoretical and historical context. Such a broad review 
does not exist in the literature. But in this thesis I have 
attempted to pull together these diverse strands, showing 
how they can be integrated, and more fully understood in 
comparative, historical and conceptual terms. 
The theoretical orientation used in the thesis leads to two 
different types of analysis. The first involves a review 
of the idea of stress, as it has been used in research, and 
where such ideas originated. The use of the term 1 Stress 1 
has caused a great deal of confusion in stress research. 
Although it has only been used in a technical sense to 
refer to psychophysiolgical phenomena for about fifty 
years, it has quickly assumed different, sometimes 
contradictory meanings. This is a problem as it makes the 
integration of research findings difficult, as different 
operational definitions are used. On the other hand, the 
use of the same term, 1 Stress• often seems to make 
-7-
researchers believe that the research they undertake must 
automatically have something to do with other research 
which uses the term vstress 1 • One of the results of this is 
that although little attempt is made formally to integrate 
research findings, 
into 1 Stress' is 
it is somehow thought that all research 
somehow compatible, and contributes 
generally to our understanding of the 'stress phenomenon'. 
The second analysis made in this thesis is conceptual and 
historical. As the central theme is the relationship 
between stress, health, and illness, I have looked at the 
historical origins of psychophysiological approaches in 
medicine, and how these have developed into stress 
research. The historical approach is particularly valuable 
in the analysis of an area which is large and diverse. 
Understanding the conceptualizations of stress is also 
valuable as such conceptualizations will determine the 
kinds of measures developed, although this relationship may 
also be the other way around. If measures of stress are 
adopted for their practical use, then the measures of 
stress themselves may well determine the conceptualization 
of stress. 
theoretical approach to stress re8~,r _.., i I 
rather na1ve an~ 
" 
--cc:·:-,·,c-;1--,,,,-; .. ,.-;_,;c-::· _---l n.F the reJationship between stressQ 
health, and illness is that it is very complicated. The 
level of complexity is not reflected in research methods. I 
am pessimistic about the abilty of traditional research 
to answer any but the most simplistic questions about 
the relationship between stress, healtho and illness. In 
general the ideas of stimulus and response, independent and 
dependent variables~ although applicable to experiments in 
the laboratory, have little place in research efforts aimed 
at understanding the relationships and mechanisms involved 
in stress, health, 
way of looking at 
and illness in peoples 1 lives. A useful 
the 
adaptation. Individuals 
processes involved is in terms of 
are constantly adapting to events 
anticipated) in the social, {past, present and 
psychological and intrapsychic environments. Adaptive 
efforts take many forms, including traditional concepts of 
coping. Adaptive outcomes also take many forms, including 
health and/or illness. One problem of traditional stress 
research is that stressful events, adaptive efforts, and 
adaptive outcomes have been conceptualised in a very narrow 
way. Stressful events are usually seen as major life 
events: adaptive efforts, when considered at all are often 
restricted to cognitive coping responses, and adaptive 
outcomes are seen only in terms of ill-health and are often 
assessed by simple general measures. 
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Although my approach does not easily lead to any particular 
ways of doing research or any studies, it does at least 
provide a critical background. Some recent research, 
discussed in chapter six, tries to take account of the 
complexity of the phenomena under study. This approach is 
transactional, in that it views stress as arising from a 
transaction between the person and the environment, and not 
simply as a passive, automatic response to external 
events/stimuli. Such studies accept that the factors they 
choose to measure are interwoven with many other factors 
and in this sense 'clean' measures of variables can not 
be obtained. The relationship between stress, health and 
illness is a consequence, or a result of the way in which 
people live, or adapt to their environments. Environment is 
used here in a wide sense, to include the cultural, 
psychological, social and political environments. 
The research methods needed to examine the processes and 
mechanisms involved are only beginning to be developed. 
There is no doubt however, that traditional research 
methods, many of which have been borrowed from laboratory 
situations, are inappropriate for the study of stress, 
health, and illness. 
-10-
As a wholev the theoretical orientation taken in thi.s 
thesis is intended to clarify and integrate the diversity 
of approaches to stress researcho This has been attempted 
on a smaller scale elsewhere (eogo Fleming et alv 1984) o 
From the basic assumption that the phenomena under study 
are very complex and interwoven, we can see why stress 
research is so diverse, as researchers have each looked at 
a small part of these complex adaptive processes and 
outcomes, and called what they found stresso By approaching 
this body of research with some idea of the complexity 
involved, and the historical background to the concept of 
stress, we can begin to understand how these different 
strands of research may, or may not, 
historical and conceptual wayo 
lo3 Overview of the thesiso 
fit together in a 
Given this background and theoretical orientation, I will 
now give an account of the thesiso This is not a summary, 
but will hopefully make clear to the reader the reasons for 
my selection of topics, and the order in which they occuro 
As said above, the focus for this thesis is the 
relationship between stress, health, and illness, and the 
theoretical and conceptual problems involved in studying 
this relationshipo One of the major problems, which is 
-11-
mentioned 
diversity 
in 
of 
virtually any 
definitions of 
book about stress, is the 
the word stress. Of course, 
there are reasons for this diversity, one of the main ones 
being that different definitions of stress are refering to 
truly different phenomena. However, a great deal of 
confusion has arisen out of these different definitions and 
uses of stress. Chapter two is a fairly comprehensive 
review of the origins and uses of the term and concept of 
stress. This covers some uses of the term which are not 
related directly to health and illness. However, it is 
important to look at the whole range of uses, as very often 
these do become confused, and without the entire 
usages, distinguishing between them becomes 
range of 
difficult. 
Chapter two also provides the reader with a framework on 
which to place the definitions and concepts of stress 
encountered later in the thesis. 
Chapter three looks at the background to stress and 
illness. This historical background is important as it 
shows that the idea of stress is not a new one, although 
it is often treated as though it is a new discovery. The 
origins of stress in recent history arose from the medical 
field where simple explanations of disease were rejected by 
some in favour of a more complex or holistic approach to 
health and illness. This complexity has often been 
-12~ 
overlooked by researchersv who are more keen to demonstrate 
that the relationship between stress and illness exists, 
than understand the mechanisms at work. The result of this 
tendency is that the mechanisms by which psychological 
information produces psychophysiological responses which in 
turn may lead to illness, are little known or understood. 
This chapter is intended to give an overview of the history 
of stress and illnessv and a little about what is actually 
known. 
Chapters four and five are concerned with recent 
research aimed at the assessment of life stress, and 
possible mediating variables. In these chapters I emphasise 
the simplistic way in which life stress, and other 
variables such as social support and coping, have been 
measured and conceptualised. The new approaches which adopt 
a more transactional view of stress and illness tend to 
make more frequent assessment of the variables involved, 
and use more complex 
variables. 
In conclusion I have 
and comprehensive measures of 
tried to offer support to my 
theoretical orientation by drawing on examples from the 
development of stress research. There are many problems 
associated with new transactional approaches. One of the 
-]3-
main ones is that although the theory it is based on may be 
acceptabler there are no practical ways of demonstrating 
this approach. In a senser the transactional approach is 
almost anti-empirical 
accept that dependent 
or anti-experimental as it does not 
and independent 0 clean' variables 
exist. In this way, the transactional approach may not be 
useful. However, research methods will be developed that 
are suitable for the phenomena under study. Once again I 
would emphasise that the concept of adaptation is a useful 
basis from which to integrate perspectives in stress 
research. I think it is important to integrate these 
perspecives as well as see the distinctions between them. 
I find the theoretical and conceptual problems in stress 
research of great interest and importance in themselves. 
Such problems have extra importance if they are slowing 
down progress towards a better understanding of stress, 
health, and illness. From my point of view, undertaking 
empirical research in the area of stress and illness 
without a sound theoretical and historical knowledge is 
very unwise. Ifr that is, the problems that have hampered 
stress research for some twenty years are to be avoided. 
Far too often, research has been approached from a narrow, 
almost atheoretical perspective, which can only be avoided 
with such background knowledge. 
-13a-
This thesis is intended to give a broad overview of some of 
the methodological and conceptual problems in this arcav 
their historical background, and some possible alternatives 
to traditional approaches. There are certainly points I 
would have liked to emphasise more stronglyv and issues I 
would have liked to include. Despite these omissionsf I 
feel that the framework presented here represents a useful 
integration of stress research and a sound basis for 
empirical work. 
-13b-
CHAPTER TWO 
THE ORIGINS AND USES OF THE TERM AND CONCEPT OF STRESS 
-14-
2.1 Introduction. 
Stress can mean a stimulus, a response and the interaction 
between the two. It can happen internally, externally and 
somewhere in between. It may be physiological, 
psychological, sociological and cultural. It can be noise, 
anger, heat, work, threat, conflict, lack of work, and 
crowding. It can operate over milliseconds, seconds, 
minutes, hours, days, months and years. It may produce 
hypertension, psychological strain, increase in heart rate, 
inefficiency, 'burnout 0 , fatigue, shifts in attention, 
hysterical reactions, depression, slower reaction times and 
relapse in schizophrenics. 
This list could be extended, but limited though it is, it 
still shows the huge number of ways in which the concept 
and word 'stress' have been used. It is no mistake, or 
accident that the idea of stress has captured the 
imagination of both researchers (from a large number of 
disciplines) and the general public. The word 'stress' 
sounds scientific, and indeed it's more recent history can 
be traced back to engineering and physics, where the word 
stress is used to describe the load placed on an object, 
and strain, the resultant deformation within the material. 
Also, the word 1 stress' has the quality of sounding like a 
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complete explanation for many different phenomena. For 
example, headaches can be caused by stress, crimes can be 
committed because someone was under stress. On a more 
scientific level, stress can contribute towards the 
development of certain illnesses, or stress can cause 
changes in selective attention. 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the idea of stress 
in relation to illness. However it is important to see this 
particular use of the stress concept as only one of many 
possible uses. In order to place stress and illness in the 
context (both historically and conceptually) of other 
'sorts' of stress, this chapter will attempt to trace back 
the various uses of the term 'stress'. Hopefully, a broad 
overview will help to clarify some of the problems now 
being encountered in this particular area. 
After a consideration of Hans Selye's concept of stress, 
and the background to it, the chapter will then go on to 
look at other concepts of stress by looking at the way in 
which researchers have used the term 'stress' and how such 
uses have developed and changed. 
2.2 Problems of definition. 
"If the word "stress" is to 
of biological science, 
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enter the language 
respons1bilities 
The 
concerning its meaning are entailed." (Wolff, 
1953. p. v) 
"There exists a widespread inconsistancy in 
defining stress, together with an inadequate 
concern for meaning." (Haward, 1960, p. 185) 
"Perhaps the single most remarkable historical 
fact concerning the term "stress" is its 
persistant, widespread usage in biology and 
medicine in spite of almost chaotic disagreement 
over its definition." (Mason, 1975, p. 6) 
"There are so many uses of "stress" that it may 
be more confusing than anything else." (Fleming 
et al, 1984, p. 939) 
quotes above show that same concerns for 
definitional and conceptual consistency in the use of the 
term 'stress 0 have existed for decades. Indeed, the 
definition of stress has itself been broadened to include 
the idea that the term can mean many different things to 
different researchers in the field (e.g. Corsini, 1984; 
Reber, 1985). Many people have proposed possible solutions 
to the problem of defining stress, as it has been felt that 
the lack of similarity in the working definitions different 
researchers use will only serve to hamper any real progress 
in stress research (Cofer & Appley, 1964; Fisher, 1984; 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Levine & Scotch, 1970; McLean, 
1972; Neufeld, 1982; Payne, 1978; Ursin & Murison, 1984). 
Possible solutions have included making a distinction 
between different types of stress (Appley & Trumbull, 1967) 
and between different types of stressor (Boward & 
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Scott, 1963), concentrating on the "su.bjective meaning"' of 
stress (Haward, 1960), and even abandoning the concept 
altogether (Hinkler 1973; f1cLean, 1972) o 
Howeveru the term 1 Stress 1 is so popular, and used so 
widely that it is unlikely that researchers in the field 
will be prepared to give it up easily, or make a clear 
distinction between different types of stress (as there is 
no commonly agreed definition with which to start 
classifying types) o There are many explanations as to why 
the term "stress" became so widely usedo 
"It is as though, when the word stress carne into 
vogue, each investigator, who had been working 
with a concept he felt was closely related, 
substituted the word stress for it, and continued 
in his same line of investigation" o (Cofer & 
Appley, 1964) 
Others have suggested that the word has acquired 
"attribution power in popular language" (Ursin & Murison, 
1984) such that it can 'explain' diseases and also perhaps 
objectify and so neutralize certain emotionso (eogo "I 1 rn 
just under a lot of stress at the memento") 
Another explanation for the confusion and popularity 
surrounding the word 'stress 1 is that despite all the 
disparity a common element does exist, and it is this 
common element which can account for the popularity of the 
term as it encompasses a fundamental process which can 
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operate on many Jevels. 
If progress is to be made in our understanding of stress, 
then it is vital that definitional and conceptual problems 
are cleared up. As shown above, many possible solutions 
involve the creation of different types of stress and 
stressor which would not be possible, as no common 
definitions of stress exist with which to begin 
classifying. Perhaps a better way of clarifying a very 
confused and muddled area of research would be to explore 
what the various uses and conceptions of stress have in 
common either historically or theoretically. In other 
words, attempt to integrate and search for unifying threads 
within the literature. (Fleming et al, 1984) 
2.3 Origins of the term 'stress 1 • 
It is generally acknowledged that Hans Selye was the 
originator of the modern 
& Scotch, 1970) model of 
that Selye experienced 
opinion" (Selye, 1956, 
biological or biochemical (Levine 
stress. It is interesting to note 
such "violently adverse public 
p. 30) to his use of the term 
vstress' around the time of his first publication in the 
field (Selye, 1936) that he stopped using it for several 
years. The objections raised were that it would be too 
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easily confused with popular words, such as unervous 
strain'o Similar objections continue to be voiced some 
fifty years latero 
Despite its biological nature, Selyes conception of stress 
has influenced research in many areas not directly 
connected with biochemical researcho Frank Engel describes 
Selye 1 s concept of stress in the following wayo 
"It has permeated medical thinking and 
in every land, 
intensely than any 
proposedo" (quoted 
influenced medical research 
probably more rapidly and more 
other theory of disease ever 
in MasonF 1975, Po 10) 
So although Selyeus conception of stress could be viewed as 
rather limited, as it does not take account of any 
psychological factors, its influence on Health Psychology, 
Psychosomatic Medicine, Human Performance, Clinical 
Psychology, Occupational Psychology and many other areas, 
is all pervasiveo It is important to note that many 
researchers implicitly suggest that their research is 
somehow connected to Selyeus concept of stress, but 
completely fail to substantiate these claimso Selye appears 
in many articles and books in the areas mentioned above, 
not only in reference sections, but often being asked to 
write introductory chapterso For example in Psychological 
Stress and Psychopathology (Neufeld,l982) 1 Stress research: 
Issues for the Eighties (Cooper, 1983) 1 Handbook on Stress 
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and Anxiety (Kutash et alv 1980) 1 H~ndbook of Stress~ 
Theoretical and Clinical Aspects (Goldberger & Breznitzv 
1982)' Human Stress and Cognitionu (Hamilton & Warburtonv 
l9'l9) 1 Stress and Psychiatric disorder (Tannerv 1960). 
"Researchers in the field had no accepted 
definition of their stress variables and werev in 
factv often assuming that the concept of stress 
advocated by Hans Selyeu which was based on a 
physiological response patternv was related to 
the psychological assessments they were making." 
(Call to the Conferenceu l979v p.5) 
A broad way of describing his notion of stress is with the 
following definition. "Stress is the common denominator of 
all adaptive reactions in the body" (Selye, 1956). A 
detailed account of Selye 0 s formulations concerning the 
nature and meaning of stress will follow later. For the 
moment howeverv his concept will be considered historically 
by looking at earlier research into 'adaptive reactions' v 
which are the antecedents to his ideas. What Selye means by 
adaptive reactions are those which occur in the General 
Adaptation Syndrome, outlined in "A syndrome produced by 
diverse noxious agents" published in 1936. 
2.4 Background to Selye's discoveries. 
It is recognised by Selye himself (1956, 1973v 1975, 1976 
etc) and by many others (Cox, 1978; Fleming et alv 1984, 
Frankenhaeuserv 1980, Gatchel & Baum, 1983; Kessler et alv 
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J985p Lazarus & Folkman, 1984p Mason, 1915) that the 
pioneering work of Claude Bernard and Walter Cannon laid 
the foundations upon which Selye built his theory of 
stress: Bernard developing the idea of the internal 
environmentf and its tendency to remain constantf Cannon 
giving a name to this steady state, homeostasis, and 
outling some of the mechanisms by which it is maintained. 
These findings are crucial as, in a sense, Selye's theory 
of stress outlines the maladaptive 'side-effects' of 
homeostatic mechanisms, the "diseases of adaptation" 
(Selye, 1956). 
2.5 A wholistic approach to the organism. 
"All the vital mechanisms, varied as they are, 
have only one object, that of preserving constant 
the conditions of life in the internal 
environment." (Claude Bernard, as quoted in 
J.M.D. Olmsted (1939) p. 290-2S1) 
ClauCle Bernard (1813-1878) could he th~ug~t of as an 
in that be made important 
discoveries in digestion and carried out many experiments 
on the production of sugar in animals. However, the 
contribution he made to physiology extends beyond the 
findings, though important, produced directly by 
experimentation. Physiological research during the 19th 
century was heavily influenced by mechanistic ideas and by 
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a scientific method borrowed from the physical scienceso 
This involved the breaking down of the complex living 
organism into its partsv studying these in isolationv and 
then 'restructuring' the whole (Masonu 1972) o Such a method 
was compatible with a mechanistic conception of the 
organisation of living thingsu and techniques for studying 
the integrative processes were not yet availableo Despite 
thisu Bernard developed a view of the organism as an 
integrated wholeo 
"In spite of the fact that (vital) phenomena are 
connected with physio-chemical manifestationsu 
the question in its essence is not thereby 
clarified; for it is not a fortuitous encounter 
of physio-chemical phenomena which fashions each 
living being according to a plan and after a 
design fixed and foreseen in advance, and gives 
rise to the admirable subordination and 
harmonious concert of the acts of lifeo There is 
in the living body an arrangementu a sort of 
disposition which cannot be slurred overu because 
it is really the most striking character of 
living beings. That the idea of this arrangement 
is poorly expressed by the word force we agree~ 
but here the word makes little difference, it is 
enough that the reality is indispuitable." 
(Claude Bernardu as quoted in J.M.D. Olmsted 
(1939), p. 287-288) 
Here Bernard is clearly saying that although living things 
can be considered to be a seriesu or collection of chemical 
and physiological reactionsu the 'essence' of what living 
things are can not be explained in this way. 
2.5.1 The stability of the 'milieu interieur'. 
Also Bernard considers that the essenceu the most striking 
~23-
feature of living things, is their harmonious arrangement. 
The idea of harmony and integration within organisms, 
combined with another feature of Bernard 0 s theory give rise 
to his notion of the internal environment or the 0 milieu 
inter ieur a • 
HThat an exterior environment was necessary to 
the life of the organism has always been 
recognised. But I have not observed that anyone 
before myself has distinguished an exterior and 
an interior environment. I think that I have been 
one of the first to propose and develop this idea 
of the considered as an interior environment of 
the organic elements." (Claude Bernardr as quoted 
in J.M.D. Olmsted (1939) p p. 290) 
So, this other feature of Bernard's theory represents a 
clear distinction between the internal and the external 
environment. Given his ideas about harmony and integration 
within the organismr a third feature emerges. If the 
organism is to function in a harmonious way, then the cells 
within organisms must be shielded and protected from the 
fluctuations in the external environment. Bernard was aware 
that higher organisms are 1 to a degree, independent of 
their external environment when he wrote that "the 
perpetual changes of the cosmic environment do not reach it 
(the higher organism) 1 it is not chained to them; it is 
free and independent." (Quoted by J.M.D. Olmsted (1939), p. 
291) This important step in understanding the ability of 
organisms (higher organisms in particular) to regulate 
their internal environment produced a number of vital 
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changes. First, it created an area of research which later 
became an important influence on modern Physiological 
Psychology (Blundell, 1975). And second, it was to lead 
directly to the idea of homeostasis developed by Walter 
Cannon (Blundell, 1975; Carlson, 1981; Cox, 1978). Without 
Cannon's work, and the development of the concept of 
homeostasis, the modern notion of stress and the "diseases 
of adaptation'', as developed by Hans Selye, would not exist 
(Selye 1956). 
2.6 Homeostasis and Cannon. 
The linK between Bernard and Cannon was clearly seen during 
the 1930's when Cannon was a prominent physiologist having 
published his book "The Wisdom of the Body" in 1932. J.M.D. 
Olmsteds biography of Bernard, written in 1939, states that 
"Cannon has shown how his many years of experimentation 
have all been directed to the demonstration of the validity 
of Bernard's conception of the internal environment." (p. 
293) 
Cannon°s concept of homeostasis was to have a profound 
effect on many areas of psychology and physiology. A direct 
effect on some personality theorists (e.g. Stagner, 1951; 
Mace, 1953; Hartman, 1958; Menninger, 1954a), an indirect 
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effect on theories of emotion {Cannon-Bard) and, as stated 
above, a major influence on the modern conception of stress 
devised by Hans Selye. 
2.6.1 Homeostasis as a state. 
"The coordinated physiological processes which 
maintain most of the steady states in the 
organism are so complex and so peculiar to living 
beings •...•.. that I have suggested a special 
designation for these statesv homeostasis. The 
word does not imply something set and immobile, a 
stagnation. It means a conditionv a condition 
which may vary, but which is relatively 
constanL" {Cannon, 1939, p. 22) 
It is clear from this quote that Cannon intended the term 
'homeostasis' to refer to the steady state. Other 
references describing homeostasis as a state do exist. For 
example, "I have suggested that the stable state of the 
fluid matrix be given the name homeostasis." (Cannon, 1935, 
p 0 2) Despite this, many think that the term homeostasis, 
as coined by Cannon, refers to the process by which a 
steady state is maintained rather than the steady state 
itself. For examplev Cox {1975) says about the steady state 
that "it's maintenance was referred to by Cannon as 
homeostasis." {p.54). However, there are some who interpret 
Cannon correctly. "Cannon proposed the (former) meaning in 
which homeostasis is synonymous with the dynamic 
steady-state of the physiological system." (Blundellv 1975, 
p 0 6 2) Probably the most important misinterpretation of 
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CannonDs idea was made by Hans SeJye, who v~ews homeostasis 
not as a state u but as the "power to rna inta j_n constancy". 
(1956u p. 12) 
2.6.2 Homeostatic mechanisms. 
An important distinction can be made when considering the 
operation of homeostatic mechanisms. Some readjustments 
which are made to restore homeostasis take place 
internally and on a physiological and biochemical, 
1 under-the-skinD levelf whilst others require some change 
in behaviour, or some adaptive reponse on the part of 
the organism. Cannon however, saw both types of response as 
important in maintaing homeostasis. 
"If water is needed, the mechanism of thirst 
warns us before any change in the blood has 
occurredv and we respond by drinking. If the 
blood pressure falls and the necessary oxygen 
supply is jeopardisedf delicate nerve endings in 
the carotid sinus send messages to the vasomotor 
center and the pressure is raised. If by vigorous 
muscular movements blood is returned to the heart 
in great volume •..••••• delicate nerve endings are 
affected and a call goes from the right auricle, 
that results in speeding up the heart rate and 
thereby hastening the blood flow." (Cannonf 1939f 
p. 288) 
According to Cannonv homeostasis is maintained by both 
internal mechanisms (autonomic nervous system) and 
actions by which "we move from place to place and strive 
to alter the world about us as we wish." (Cannonv l935v p. 
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~) So while homeostasis itself exists only internally as 
the stable state of the fluid matrix~ those mechanisms 
which maintain homeostasis operate both internally and 
externallyo 
2o6o3 Interpretation of homeostasiso 
If homeostasis 
mechanisms; then 
is misinterpreted as meaning homeostatic 
inevitably homeostatic mechanisms will 
come to be regarded primarily as those which operate 
internally 1 to maintain the internal steady stateo Although 
Cannon recognised that a wide variety of mechanisms would 
operate to maintain homeostasis~ those who confused the 
state of homeostasis with the mechanisms of homeostasis 
tended to emphasise the biochemical and physiological and 
internal homeostatic mechanismso While 1 as noted above 1 
Cannon gave examples of external homeostatic mechanisms 1 
those which maintained homeostasis by in some way operating 
on the environment 1 he was particularly interested in the 
action of the sympathetic nervous systemo Indeed he made an 
extensive study of the emergency or ''fight or flight" 
reactiono 
These two factors 1 the interpretation of the term 
'homeostasis' as homeostatic mechanisms, and Cannon's own 
interest in the role of the sympathetic nervous system as 
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one particular type of homeostatic regulator, combined to 
give an impression of homeostatic mechanisms as being 
essentially internal and autonomic. This impression was 
picked up by Hans Selye who defines stress as "the common 
denominator of all adaptive reactions in the body." 
(Selye, 1956, p. 54) Cannon's influence is clearo Selye 
concentrates his attention on adaptive reactions in the 
body and the key adaptive, or homeostasis-maintaining 
mechanism he identified was the General Adaptation Syndrome 
(1936), the first stage of which (called the alarm 
reaction) is basically Cannon's fight-or-flight response. 
So in this way, the concept of stress became firmly fixed 
as an internal physiological response, the "common 
denominator of all adaptive reactions in the body."(Selye, 
1956, p. 54) Adaptation to stress, became autonomic and 
located internally. 
2.7 A formal definition of stress. 
Selye gives an account of how he 'discovered' the concept 
of stress in his book "The Stress of Life" (1956). He 
found, by accident that the injection of any toxic agent 
produced a triad of changes in rats he was testing. These 
changes were the enlargement of the adrenal cortex; intense 
shrinking of the thymus, lymph nodes and spleen, and 
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bleeding, deep ulcers in the lining of the stomach. At 
first, and to his initial ~great disappointment'', Selye 
did not think that such changes produced by any toxic 
substance could be important, as most medical research was 
concerned with the particular, specific biological response 
to a particular harmful agent, such as a virus, so that 
particular treatments could be found. However, Selye 
remembered his days as a medical student and how he 
observed the ''syndrome of just being sick". He noticed that 
although all illnesses produced reactions particular to 
that illness, there were a number of reactions which seem 
to be produced by all illnesses. Such as general aches, 
loss of appetite and intestinal disturbances. In other 
words, there were specific, and non-specific reactions. 
This step was probably the most important in Selye 1 s 
reasoning. "All the actually observed biologic effects of 
any agent must represent the sum of its specific actions 
and of this non-specific response to damage that is 
superimposed upon it."(Selye, 1956, p. 26) In other words, 
any harmful agent (an illness, a toxic substance, etc) has 
both specific and non-specific biological effects. The 
triad of morphological changes observed were nonspecific to 
any particular toxic agent. Selye then proceeded to show 
that he could produce these changes by exposing rats to a 
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great variety of substances or situationsu from purified 
hormones to x-rays, forced exercise and heat. Selye stated 
"I coulc'l f:ind no noxious agent that did not produce the 
syndrome." (Selye, 1956, p. 30) 
2.7.1 Selye's definition of stress. 
Selye then considered how this response would unfold over 
time and called this process the General Adaptation 
Syndrome (G.A.S.). (Selyev 1936) This syndrome passes 
through three stages. The alarm stage, the stage of 
resistance, and the stage of exhaustion. "The G.A.S. had 
been recognised and named, but we still had no precise idea 
of what produced it. 11 (Selye, 1956, p. 37) Selye has 
previously called the agents which produced it noxious, but 
he felt that this word was not adequate to describe the 
varied conditions and substances which produced the G.A.S. 
11 In search of one, I stumbled upon the term 'stress' . 11 So 
Selye's definition of stress is produced. 
11 Stress is the state mainifested by a specific 
syndrome which consists of all the 
non-specifically induced changes in a biologic 
system. Thus stress has its own characteristic 
form and composition but no particular cause ... 
(Selye, 1956, p.54) 
2.7.2 Problems with Selye's model. 
A contradicton can be observed in Selye's use of the word 
stress. In the first quotev he claims to be using stress to 
mean the conditions which produce the G.A.S. response, and 
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in the second~ to mean the state (G.A.S.) produced by these 
conditions. Mason (1975) suggests that Selye was "inclined 
towards defining "stress'' variously in terms of either 
stimulus, response~ or interaction between stimulus and 
response." (p. 9) It is not only Selye who uses the word 
in different ways. Pickering (1961) writing about the word 
stress as an example of ''jargonese" states "I find it 
difficult to express my surprise and horror that 
contemporary science should tolerate this confusion of 
stimulus and response." (p. 116) More recently, this 
problem has expressed itself in a debate about antecedent 
and outcome variables used in stress research (see 
Dohrenwend et al, 1984, Dohrenwend & Shrout, 1985, Lazarus, 
1984, Lazarus et al, 1985). 
Generally though, Selye's model of stress can be considered 
to be a response-based model, as Selye, more recently 
wishes to make clear (e.g. Selye, 1975a, 1980, 1983). There 
are a number of criticisms that can be made of this model. 
Probably the most important group of criticisms are those 
which point out that the model Selye proposes is unworkable 
for testing relationships between stress and physical 
illnesses, and the factors which mediate betweeen the two. 
These problems will be discussed in later chapters. For a 
general critique of Selye's model, see Mason (1975), 
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Seyffarth 
concept of 
(1960) u Hinkle (1973) and in partj_cular the 
non-specificity see Mason (197lu 1975a) v Mason 
e t a 1 ( 19 ·16) o 
The crucial points to bear in mind about Selye 1 s concept 
are that it is a response-based ideav adaptive mechanisms 
are a response to 1 stressors 1 and operate internally on a 
physiological levelv and that stress is the "common 
denominator of all adaptive reactions in the bodyo" (Selyev 
1956v Po 54) 
Whilst Selye was one of the first to use the idea of 
stressv and probably did more to popularise the term than 
anyone else, many other areas also make use of the idea of 
stresso Selye's ideas have received so much attention 
partly because of the forceful 
presented his notion of 'stress' o 
the term, they tend not to use it 
and bold way he has 
Although many others use 
in a precisely defined 
way, as Selye dido However, by looking at the way that the 
term 1 stress' has been usedv we can perhaps begin to 
understand why the idea of stress is popular, and what 
apparently incompatible perspectives have in commono 
2o8 Psychoanalytic ideas and stresso 
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Although Freud probably never used the word 0 StreSS 0 u the 
"dynamic conception of mental life'1 (Freudu .l9L.l3u p. 53) he 
proposed meant that it was almost jnevitable that 
Freudians, or those influenced by psychoanalytic ideas, 
would use the term. 
Freud does refer to tension, forces and energy that exist 
between the component parts of the personality, or, 
anatomy of the personality". (Freud, 1946, p.78) 
"In this way, goaded on by the id, hemmed in by 
the super~ego, and rebuffed by reality, the ego 
struggles to cope with its economic task of 
reducing the forces and influences which work in 
it and upon it to some kind of harmony.~~ (Freud, 
1946, p. 104) 
11 the 
So Freud speaks of the relations between the id, ego and 
super-ego in a dynamic, physical sense. Also he views an 
imbalance or lack of harmony between these components as 
the cause of illness. "Men fall ill owing to the conflict 
between the demands of their instincts and the internal 
resistance which is set up against them." (Freud, 1946, p. 
7 8) 
The similarities between this and the concept of 
homeostatic mechanisms are clear. Although the level on 
which the mechanisms are operating are very different. In 
the case of Cannon and Selye these mechanisms operate to 
restore the 'harmony 0 of the internal environment. But 
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Freud envisages harmony and a sort of homeostasis between 
the id and the super-ego, being maintained by the ego. 
Howeverr Freud does accept that the internal physiological 
state can be a sign of either internal conflicts or an 
external danger. In describing one of the types of anxiety 
he identifies (objective anxiety) u he mentions the 'flight 
or fight' reaction (Freudr 1943, p. 330) as outlined by 
Cannon (1929). Such signals of tension would then alert the 
individual and allow them to respond in adaptive ways to 
threatening situations. (Hjelle & Ziegler, 1981) 
Freud paid little attention to the ego, compared with the 
study he gave to the id and the super-ego. (Pervin, (1970); 
Wollheimv 1971) "Pathological research has directed our 
interest too exclusively to the repressed. We should like 
to learn more about the ego.''(Freud, as quoted in Wollheim 
(1971) p. 175) This was written in 1 The Ego and the Id' 
published relatively late in Freud's career. 
As Janis (1958) points out, objective anxiety was seen as 
intelligible by Freud and his followers, compared to 
neurotic anxiety which originated in the unconscious mind. 
So Freud was not greatly concerned with 'everyday' 
objective anxiety, nor was he particularly interested in 
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the ego, and its attempts to deal with external reality 
and organise adaptive responses to objective anxiety on a 
fairly conscious level. Indeed Freud writes of the ego that 
it "seemed to need so little explanation" (19l1,6, p. 79). 
So although Freud didn't use the term 'stress' nor did he 
really study those phenomena which would lead to 'stress' 
(in most of the current definitions of that term), he did 
however provide a framework for later researchers, who did 
use the term and idea of 'stress' . :: . .., r-·~. ' •• - .-! 
~:l3c::.:c~ nore em:Jbasis on the ego (Flro'.ln, 1 ~··:~::}. 
As many of the first ego-psychologists were German, and 
wrote in German (e.g. Hartman, 1958 (written around 1938)), 
they did not use the word 'stress'. Selye points out that 
he began to use expressions such as 'le stress' in France, 
'el stress' in Spain, and 'der stress' in Germany, so it 
would appear that there was no equivalent in these 
languages (1956, p. 42). But they looked at a strongly 
related concept, that of adaptation. Heinz Hartman in his 
monograph "Ego psychology and the problem of adaptation" 
(1958) identifies and names for the first time the 
"conflict~free ego sphere for that ensemble of functions 
which at any given time exert their effects outside the 
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region of mental conflicts.» (Hartman~ l958v p. 8) The 
attention given to the conflict-free ego sphere reflected a 
desire amongst psychoanalytic psychologists to understand 
the total personality~ rather than the abnormal personality 
(Hartmanv 1958, p. 3) or just the unconscious parts of the 
personality. Alsov these psychologists were interested in 
how people coped with or adapted to 1 real 1 
perhaps stresses) that were outside the 
tensions (or 
intrapsychic 
conflicts between the id, ego and superego. Any theory of 
personality would be incomplete if it could not explain and 
include the adaptive responses made to external 0 rational' 
dangers (Janis, 1958) as well as threats and dangers posed 
by, for example, the fear of castration during the phallic 
phase (Freud, 1946, p. 116). 
So during the fifties and sixties, papers appeared with 
titles such as "Regulatory devices of the ego under major 
stress" (Menninger, 1954) and "Experimental reduction of 
stress based on ego-defense theory" (Speisman et al, 1964) 
and books which used the term stress in a psychoanalytic 
context, for example "Psychological stress: Psychoanalytic 
and behavioural studies of surgical patients" (Janis, 
1958) 0 
These researchers used different definitions of stress, 
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Janis (1958) using the term to mean both the situation 
(stimulus) and the response (reaction) and Menninger (1954) 
mainly referring to stress as a stimulus. Also the 
situations they referred to as stressful were rather 
different. Janis (1958) was mainly concerned with "severe 
stresses, the effects of which last for weeks, monthsv or 
even years" (p. 13). Menninger (19':J4) considers the whole 
range of 'stressors' from those which produce an "increase 
of alertness, irritability 11 (p. 160) to those which produce 
complete disorganisation of the personality. Speisman et al 
(1964) on the other hand, use a controlled short-term 
stressor generated from watching a motion picture film. 
The link in these studies 
psychological response 
is that they all considered the 
of the individual to be an 
important indication of the stressful nature of the 
situation or stimulus. Previous definitions, and 
definitions which were physiologically based, took the 
physical or biochemical response of the individual or 
organism as the best judge of the 'stress' an organism was 
experiencing. If no physiological response was present, no 
stressors could be present. For example 11 a stressor is 
naturally that which produces stress 11 • (Selyev 1956, p. 64) 
This did a number of important things. First it helped to 
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re-define stress as a psychological as \'Jell as a 
physiological concepto Second, it created a general notion 
of 1 coping 1 o That is, the individual attempting to adapt to 
changes occurring in their environrnento The environment in 
this sense means both physical and psychologicalu internal 
and external phenomenao Third, the notion of coping helped 
to introduce the idea of "mediating processes" (Janis u 
1958) o That is, processes that mediate between stressful 
events, and the reactions to those eventso Although coping 
processes in themselves could be considered to be reactions 
to stressful events, the mediating role of coping, as 
indicated by Janis (1958) is between the stressful events, 
and the long-term outcome, or consequence of a stressful 
event in terms of, for example, illness or changes in the 
level of neurotic symptomso (Brill & Beebeu 1955) 
Coping is a crucial part of the idea of stresso In order to 
study coping, some kind of repertoire or taxonomy of 
various coping strategies or behaviours is requiredo This 
was provided by ego-psychologists such as Anna Freud who 
wrote "The ego and the mechanisms of defence" (1937) 0 
Although Freud did establish the idea of 'mechanisms of 
defence 1 it was only later that a clear description and 
categorisation of these defences emerged (Mowreru 1940) o 
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A psychoanalytic taxonomy of defence mechanisms (or coping 
mechanisms) was used by Janis (1958) to describe the 
reactions 
operation a 
describe 
of patients as they prepared for a surgical 
Also a psychoanalytic approach was used to 
soldiers' reactions to war in "Men under stress" 
(Grinker & Spiegel, 1945) and "livar Neuroses" (Grinker & 
Spiegelu 1945a)o 
2o8o2 Stress in the laboratoryo 
A psychoanalytic taxonomy of coping strategies was used in 
some of the first laboratory studies into 'stress' (Lazarus 
et al, 19621' Speisman et alv 1964) o Those laboratory 
studies of stress which did not look at coping responses 
still had a psychoanalytic, ego-psychology 'flavour' about 
themo Berkun et al (1962) as part of a project called "Task 
FIGHTER" set up to "study the causes of behavioural 
degradation under psychological stress" ( p o 1) used the 
terms denial, projection and suppression as descriptions of 
some of the "categories of defensive functioning" (Po 16) o 
Beier (1951) defines stress as "the perception of threat, 
with resulting anxiety" (Po 1) in a study which examined 
the effects of perceived threat on the flexibility of 
intellectual functioningo Eriksen et al (1952) related 
performance under stress to various personality measures 
such as the Rorschach testo Many other studies concerned 
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with the effects of stress on performance were not at all 
psychoanalytic and took as their starting point a basic 
interest in human efficiency under stress and the 
implications of this for the selection and training of 
personnel. These studies will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
2.8.3 Ego psychology and adaptation. 
More recent ego psycholgists have used classifications of 
ego processes (or coping mechanisms) to look at a broad 
array of naturally occurring psychological stressors and 
the way in which people adapt to these using ego 
mechanisms. Vaillant, in ''Adaptation to Life" (1977) looked 
at the development of a group of men over some thirty 
years. These subjects were part of the Grant Study set up 
in 1937 to examine the lives of healthy individuals rather 
than those who had in some way become ill. This represented 
a view that the study of disease had focused too narrowly 
on those who already suffered from disease or ill-health 
and did not include a study of those apparently healthy 
people who did not show signs of illness. It also 
reflected a view that health and illness should be 
considered as existing on a continuumv rather than as 
mutually exclusive states.This study became an inquiry into 
how people adapted to life. Vaillant states that "most of 
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what is called illness in textbooks .•••.•.•••.•. are merely 
outward evidence of inward struggJ.es to adapt to life.~ 
(Vaillant, 1977v p.369) Ego mechanisms are employed to keep 
affect in bearable limits during life crises, to restore 
emotional balance by controlling biological drives, to 
obtain a 0 time-out' to master changes in self-image, to 
handle unresolvable conflicts with peopleu and to survive 
conflicts of conscience" These categories of events and 
situations can be considered as stressful, in that they 
result in the deployment of ego mechanisms" 
Another ego~psychologist who has studied ego mechanisms in 
relation to stress is Norma Haan. In "Coping and defending: 
Processes of self-environment organization" (1977) she 
outlines the function of the ego in coping with stress, and 
adapts her coping or ego repertoire much more to a full 
range of stress situations" Whereas Vaillant (1977) 
concentrates on long-termv fairly intrapsychic stressors, 
which require long-term adaptation, in contrast, Haan 
attempts "to describe a psychology of how people process 
stress, irrespective of contentv and to do so in 
sufficiently general terms to encompass the stress effects 
of deprivation, overloadv intensity, and complexity; and to 
make the description applicable to acute, chronic, and 
developmental stress phenomena"" (Haanv 1977, p" 167) Also 
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she states thnt ~stress can be defined only in a circular 
fashionn (Haan, 1982, p. 257). From these two statements, 
it can be seen that Haan takes a broad and general view of 
stress processes and so her view of ego processes is rather 
more sophisticated. A major division in her classification 
of ego processes is between coping and defence. Coping is 
classified as an attempt to overcome difficulties on equal 
terms, as contrasted with defence which is a way of 
protecting the ego and preventing any straightforward 
'tackling' of the problem. 
These researchers, along with Hartman (1958) are primarily 
concerned with long-term adaptations. Because of this, the 
term 'stress' is not always used, as it almost implies a 
special cJ.ass or group of situations or events. Such ego 
psychologists are however concerned with, as Vaillant 
(1977) describes it, adaptation to life, and so adaptation 
to all kinds of situations and events, not just those which 
must necessarily be described as stressful. Also they 
are concerned with the adaptation of the 'whole' 
personality (or person) while others limit their 
observations to the adaptation of particular systems within 
the individual (e.g biological systems) or particular 
environments the individual 
work) • 
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experiences (e.g. social, 
Sou on the wholeu those psychologists who use the idea of 
ego-rnechanismsu adaptation, and stress use circular or 
interactive definitions of stress. Howeveru it could be 
said that they tend to use a response-based definition of 
stress as there is an emphasis on a classification of ego 
mechanisms as 'responses' to stresses placed on the 
individual, originating either from external, objective 
sources or from internal, intrapsychic conflicts. More will 
be said in later chapters on coping in relation to ego 
mechanisms. 
2.9 Man as machine. 
Another major 
frequently is 
area where the term 'stress 1 is used 
in relation to human performance. This area 
looks at an individual in terms of their various abilities 
and functions as operators or workers 
tasks or situations. Stress is used as 
in very particular 
a variable which 
usually decreases the subjects ability to perform the task 
efficiently. So stress is nearly always considered to be an 
external stimulus which interferes or distracts the 
subject, preventing them from performing as well. This 
perspective on stress and human performance has arisen 
mainly from military and industrial needs. 
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2.9.1 The \·7ar-·machine and the work--machine. 
- ---=- --- - --: ---·-- - p 
Bartlett (1927) in "Psychology and the soldier 11 identifies 
three groups of problems related to the army which the 
psychologist can attempt to solve. Two of these three are 
related to what we might describe as 'stress'. 
The first relates to the prediciton of "mental collapse or 
disorder if he is subjected to the strain of trench warfare 
under normal modern conditions." (Bartlettvl927u p. 11) In 
other words, how far the soldier can be pushed before they 
"crack and break under certain conditions". (p. 10) This 
very clearly uses the 'engineering analogy 1 of stressv 
mentioned above and elsewhere (e.g. Cox, 1978: McLeanv 
1972). Stress is viewed as an external force which produces 
strain in the individual, such strains then produce 
1 cracks 1 and 'breaks'. However, these breakdowns usually 
result in long-term "conversion hysteria and anxiety 
neurosis" (Bartlett, 1927, p. 189) and this use of the idea 
of stress will be discussed in the next section on stress 
and illness. 
A second type of problem is that of "choosing and training 
the recruit" (Bartlett, 1927v p. 11). This means testing 
recruits for intelligence and particular abilities, but 
also looking at how those abilities and skills will be 
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nffected by various conditions met in the field. Freeman 
(194S) describing the applications for the ~standardized 
0 Stress 0 test~ (p. 3) says that the test ~now requires 
validation in connection with combat flight success.~ (p. 
ll) The test requires the subject to perform two 
simultaneous sensory-motor tasks which are difficult to 
perform together. In the stress condition, subjects were 
required to perform these tasks whilst being distracted by 
sounds. In this study, stress was seen as the distracting 
sounds produced in the stress condition. Berkun et al 
(1962) also observed the effects of stress on performance. 
The stress situations were generated by 
recruits. They were told that they had 
deceiving new army 
accidently injured 
someone by wiring a detonator wrongly or that they were in 
the middle of an nuclear fallout shower, due to an accident 
or any one of a number of other situations. The performance 
measures taken were, for example, the time taken to follow 
an emergency procedure involving the rewiring, or operation 
of a complex piece of machinery. Other studies which used a 
stress-performance model were not motivated solely by an 
interest in the military and industrial applications of 
research. 
"Not only does this general problem (performance under 
stress) have important applied implications •••••.•• but it 
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is of considerable theoretical importanceo" (Lazarus f.:, 
~riksen, 1952, Po 100, my brackets) Stopol (1954) in a 
study which looked at subjects 1 ability to tolerate stress, 
used distraction stress (loud bell and flashing light) and 
failure stress (critical or encouraging remarks before each 
trial) while subjects performed a digit-symbol testa 
Lazarus & Eriksen (1952) also used a digit symbol test 
whilst subjects experienced 'failure stress', imposed by 
giving subjects impossibly difficult trialso The subjects' 
failure is followed by the experimenter telling them that 
they should have finished that trialo Pronko & Leith (1956) 
present the first review of stress to appear in the 
psychological literaturea They state that: 
"the recent profusion of experiments on "stress" 
have a striking novelty about themo They almost 
suggest that a new behaviour has been discovered 
in the psychological laboratoryo Indeed one 
searches in vain for "stress" in issues of 
Psychological Abstracts of 20 years ago or soo" 
(Pronko & Leith, 1956, Po 205) 
They go on to identify three main sources of the work on 
stresso These are experiments on stress and perception~ 
stress and performance~ and stress and personality 
variablesa They also point out definitional problems that 
existed even thena Showing that "stress" was used variously 
to refer to behaviour in an individual (to induce stress), 
the stimulus, or the situation (behaviour under stress) a 
Within stress and performance research, 'stress 0 is nearly 
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always used to refer to some aspect of the experimental 
situation which somehow interferes withv or disrupts the 
task or activity the subject is performing. 
This traditional model of stress and performance is still 
going strong today (e.g. see Hamilton & Warburton, 1979; 
Hockey, 1983) but with a greater degree of sophistication 
in both the tasks used and models and explanations produced 
(e.g. Sanders, 1983, Thayer, 1978). Also, many areas of 
ergonomics have developed out of early work on stress and 
performance, and examine many environments and situations 
as 'stressors' (e.g. Welford, 1974). It should also be 
noted here, in the context of stress and performance, that 
very often the concepts of activation and arousal are used 
in a very similar way. So, for example, Broadbent (1971) in 
''Decision and Stress" talks about the arousal theory of 
stressv in other words, stress producing an increase in 
arousal. This can be combined with the Yerkes~Dodson law, 
or the inverted-U shaped relationship between arousal and 
performance. For any task, there will be an optimum level 
of arousal which produces the best performance. Any 
increase or decrease in the level of arousal will result in 
a degradation 
surprisingly, an 
of performance 
oversimplification 
level. 
of 
This is, not 
the relationship 
between performance and arousal, as has been pointed out by 
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a number of theorists (Hockey & Hamilton, 1983; Eysenck, 
1984). Despite the inadequacies of the Yerkes-Dodson law, 
it is an important part of the idea of stress as it is used 
by researchers in this area, as other uses of the idea of 
stress often assume that any level of stress is 'bad 1 and 
places demands on the individual. In this areav stress is 
used more along with ideas such as activation (Thayer, 
1978) and arousal which are assumed to be necessary for 
normal functioning. However it should be emphasised that 
notions such as stress and arousal are by no means 
synonymous as recent research indicates (Cox & Mackay, 
1985~ Mackay et alv 1978). 
The important aspects of the way in which researchers from 
this area use the concept of stress can be extracted from 
the early experimental models this work is based on. These 
view the individual as a skilled performer, in a particular 
environment. Stress operates to interfere with or disrupt 
the performance of the task. However, as said abovev when 
stress is linked with the more physiological concepts of 
arousal and activation, stress only becomes a disrupter of 
the task when there is too much (overstimulation) or too 
little (understimulation, boredom). 
2.10 Disease and health. 
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The idea that psychological and emotional factors can 
contribute to physical illness is not a new one (Lipowskiu 
1984). Howevcru the use of the term istress' to describe 
the processesu statesF and conditions which may cause 
illnesses in this way is relatively new. It is this use of 
the term stress I shall be most concerned with in the 
thesis, but I also hope to show the relationship between 
many different uses of the term. 
Hinkle (1973) quotes Sir William Osler speaking in 1910 
about "Angina Pectoris" and its causes, saying that "stress 
and strain •.•.. seems to be a basic factor in so many 
cc.ises." ( p. 3 3) Although this source might seem relatively 
oldF it was not really until the 1950s that the word vas 
used again in the saiTle 11ay. 'l'be rise in psyc11osoma.tic 
medicine, marked by the emergence of the journal 
"Psychosomatic Medicine'' in 1939, one of the aims of which 
was to look in detail at the relationships between 
emotional life and bodily processes (Lipowski, 1984), 
indicates that more interest was being paid to 
psychological factors in illness. Also, a more multicausal 
model of health and illness was being adopted around this 
time (Weiner, 1982; Lazarus & Folkmanu 1984). A series 
of papers published by Harold Wolff and others (e.g. Wolff 
et al, 1948, Wolff, 1950) used the term 'stressi to 
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indicate extreme situations and the physiological reactions 
they produced. These preceded the publication of the book 
llStress and Disease'~ (Wolff u 1953) which had a large effect 
on psychosomatic research (Lipowskio 1977 1 1977a). 
Psychosomatic concepts before this had been influenced 
largely by the work of Freud and other psychoanalytic 
theorists who used the idea of conversion to explain many 
of the relationships between mental phenomena and physical 
symptoms (Wittkower, 1977). 
psychophysiological approach 
Wolff presented a more 
which emphasised the 
interaction of the individual with their cultural or social 
environments, as opposed to their intrapsychic environments 
(Macleod et al, 1954). 
Wolff (1953) defines stress as "the internal or resisting 
force brought into action by external forces or loads'~ {p. 
v). Although this definition appears at first to be a 
response-based type 1 Wolff goes on to say that "the stress 
becomes the interaction between external environment and 
organism~' (p. v). This apparent confusion was cleared up 
some years later when Wolff wrote: "I have used the word 
stress in biology to indicate that state within a living 
creature which results from the interaction of the organism 
with noxious stimuli or circumstances; i.e. it is a 
dynamic state within the organism; it is not a stimulus, 
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assault, load, symbol, burden, or any aspect of the 
environment, internal, external, social or othervJ.i.se"" 
(~"Vol f f, (personal communication), quoted in Hinkle, 1973) 
It is clear then, that Wolff intended the term 0 stress 0 to 
mean an internal state, but a dynamic one, and one which 
was a result of an interaction between the organism and the 
environmenL 
The use of the term 'stress 0 in relation to both physical 
and psychiatric illness is still widespread today. Although 
researchers within this field use the term in different 
ways, they still tend to use terms such as 0 life stress 0 
(e.g. Gunderson & Rahe, 1974; Susser, 1981; Menaghan, 1983) 
and 0 life experienceS 0 (eog. Kasl, 19831 Sarason et al, 
1985). These terms emphasize an important aspect of Wolff's 
original concept in which stress is a dynamic state brought 
about by an interaction betwen the organism and the 
environment, an environment which includes cultural 
factors, family influences, work factors etc (Wolff, 1953). 
By talking about 0 life stress 0 and 0 life experiences', the 
broad sense in which Wolff refer red to the environment, (an 
environment which includes many varied experiences), is 
preserved. 
"The stress accruing from a situation is based 
in large part on the way the affected subject 
perceives it; perception depends upon a 
multiplicity of factors including the genetic 
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equipmentv basic individual needs and longingsv 
earlier conditioning influencesv ~nd a host of 
life experiences and cultural pressures.~ (Wolffv 
1953v p. 10) 
Although stress as a state is a psychophysiological 
conceptv the causes of stress are social and cultural as 
well as individually psychologicalu as the above quote 
shows. 
The term 0 stress' as it is used in research on health and 
disease is essentially a broad conceptv moving from the 
physiological to the psychological to the social and 
cultural. This broad sense of the term 'stress' has not 
come about because of inaccuracy or imprecision on the part 
of researchers in the area. It is merely a result of the 
idea that illness and indeed health come about through a 
complex interaction or transaction between the organism and 
all environments (e.g. socialv physical etc) that organism 
deals with. 
2.11 Summary and conclusions. 
There are many definitions of stress. Indeed so many that 
some feel that the wide range and diversity of definitions 
inhibits any real advancement in areas of stress research. 
Solutions advanced by various theorists include clearly 
segregating the different meanings and abandoning the use 
of the term altogether. However, a different solution to 
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this problemv and one which also helps to put research into 
a contextr is to examine the historical and conceptual 
roots of the various uses and definitions of the term 
1 stress~ o 
In this chapter, four main origins of the idea of stress 
were discussed:-
lo Biological or biochemical ideas of homeostasis and 
homeostatic mechanisms in the work of Bernard, Cannon and 
Selyeo Bernard conceived the idea of the 'milieu interieur 1 
to explain the internal stability of the organism despite 
varied environmental conditionso Cannon introduced the 
notion of homeostasis as the dynamic steady state of the 
organism and homeostatic mechanisms as any process by which 
the organism attempts to maintain this dynamic equilibriumo 
In Selye's work, stress is a non-specific physiological 
adaptive response to demands placed on the organism by any 
1 noxious' stimulio In other words, stress is the common 
denominator of all adaptive reactions in the bodyo 
2o Psychoanalytic ideas from Freud led other researchers 
such as Hartman and Menninger to consider the role of the 
ego as a homeostatic regulatoro Maintaining some sort of 
dynamic 'harmony 1 between the id, super-ego and external 
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reality. The dynamic conception of mental life proposed by 
Freud made it almost inevitable that the idea of stress and 
strain would enter the vocabulary of those who followed 
psychoanalytic ideas. Also; ego=psychologists concerned as 
they were with the adaptive role of the egor developed the 
first ideas of ego or coping mechanisms. These mechanisms 
were examined experimentally in the laboratory as well as 
through long-term studies looking at the adaptive role of 
the ego over the life-span. Stress is defined variouslyv 
but is closely linked with the idea of ego mechanismsv in 
that they are used in response to stressr and operate in 
situations of stress. 
3. A third use of the idea of stress comes from a tradition 
in applied psychological research. The impetus for this 
research came from military and industrial sources where 
information about the abilities of soldiers and workers to 
'perform' certain activities was required. This involved 
not only the question of 'how much' an individual could 
take in terms of extreme demands being placed upon them, 
but also in what ways task demands could be altered and 
tailored to facilitate the most efficient performance 
possible. Stress is usually viewed in an experimental 
context as a stimulus which somehow interferes with or 
disrupts an ongoing activity and which will have an effect 
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(usually detrimental) on measures of performance such as 
reaction timesv and number of correct responses. 
4. One of the major uses of the idea of stress is in 
connection with illness. Although it has been recognised 
for a very long time 
have an effect on 
recent development 
that social and emotional life can 
peoples' healthu 
to use stress 
it is a relatively 
to explain this 
relationship. It is used by many researchers in areas such 
as occupational psychology, psychosomatic medicinev health 
psychology and epidemiologists as a construct to relate an 
individual's experiences to their health. In this context 
then, stress has a fairly broad usage and refers to 
lifestyles, occupations, particular eventsv the condition 
of the individual and so on. 
These four uses of the term 'stressv represent the 
historical and conceptual origins of the term as it is used 
today. In some areas, this concept still remains popular, 
whilst in others its use has declined. Mason (1975) states 
that "the popularity of stress concepts has gradually 
dwindled away in the physiological field during the past 15 
years, while the use of stress terminology and concepts has 
continued to flourish in the psychological and social 
sciences." (p. 11) One psychological area where the term 
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has not flourished so well is in psychoanalytic thinking. 
This is because the concept was adopted in the context of 
functioning ego or defence mechanisms. Stress was assumed 
to precipitate the use of ego mechanisms, and hence the 
function of the ego was to regulate or maintain homeostasis 
in the face of stress. The central concern of ego 
psychologists was in the function and mechanisms of the 
ego. The acceptance that stress was a sufficient cause to 
set such mechanisms in motion is relatively unproblematic. 
Those research areas which still use the idea of stress, 
(mainly the performance and psychosomatic areas), tend to 
view the definitional and conceptual problems mentioned at 
the beginning of this chapter in very different ways. The 
stress and performance area does not really face conceptual 
problems in interpreting stress as it uses laboratory based 
'stressors' to affect performance on a clearly defined task 
which can be neatly scored and rated. Changes observed 
between stress and non-stress conditions then can give 
information about presumed cognitive processes and how they 
may be affected or not by this 'interference'. For these 
researchers, stress becomes an experimental tool or 
manipulation, it is generally a condition of the 
environment set up by the experimenter to find out about 
performances on tasks which may use motor skills, 
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information processing skillsv cognitive skills or any 
combination of these. Hence, the idea of stress in this 
context is not one which requires careful consideration by 
most researchers in this field. 
The stress and illness research area, on the other hand, 
faces serious difficulties in conceptualizing stress and 
obtaining measures of stress to correlate with various 
illnesses. For this group of researchers, stress takes on a 
very different meaning. They are not using it only as a 
peripheral constructv as just a stimulus or a sufficient 
cause to precipitate the phenomena of real interest 
(performance skills and ego processes) v they use it in a 
substantive sense. Although stress can be thought of as 
precipitating illness, and therefore used in a similar 
sense to the other areas indicated above, there is not 
considerable interest in illness itself, but the link 
between the two. The interest lies in the relationship 
between stress and adaptational outcomes such as 
psychological symptoms and illness. Concerns for 
understanding the nature of stress (as it affects health) 
are expressed through issues of measurement. Such concerns 
can be seen in the number of papers which propose different 
ways of assessing or measuring stress as it relates to 
health outcomes (e.g. DeLangis et al, 1982; Dohrenwend et 
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al, 1984; Bckenrode, 1984~ Monroe, 1983). Such issues will 
be discussed further in the following chapters. It is this 
use of the idea of stress in the context of stress and 
health, that will be discussed in this thesis. This 
particular use of the idea of stress has been chosen mainly 
because it is the only area in which the nature of stress 
is seriously considered, mainly because of the reasons 
stated above. 
Despite the 
of the idea 
differences in the various conceptualizations 
of stress indicated above, there is a way in 
which the different meanings can be understood within one 
broad framework. This framework will be discussed at length 
in the concluding chapter, but a brief description of it 
here may help to integrate the confusing and disparate 
range of areas which use the term and idea of stress. 
Although this thesis will deal mainly with only one or two 
areas which use the idea of stress, it is nonetheless 
important to have a broad perception of where such ideas 
originated, and to be able to place those ideas 
historically and conceptually. 
All researchers who use the term stress, even though they 
may be referring to a stimulus, response or interaction, 
are examining a crucial common process, that of adaptation. 
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All research into 0 stress 0 can essentially be seen as 
research into how organisms adapt. 
This could mean adaptation to a huge range of situationsu 
stimuli and eventsu and could take place over any kind of 
time frame, and could be psychological adaptationu 
physiological adaptation or even perhaps social adaptation. 
It is not surprising that so many researchers use the term 
'stress'. Adaptation is generally defined here as any 
attempts made, on any level in response to characteristics 
of the environmentu to restore a previous level or move to 
a new level of functioning. Such adaptive reponses can be 
automatic readjustments, or conscious thoughts and actions, 
and can operate on many levels, from the molecular to the 
social. Researchers usually look at a small part of the 
general process of adaptaion, and usually only look at 
adaptation on one very particular level. This theme will be 
greatly expanded in later chapters. But what 0 Stress' means 
for all researchers is some part of the adaptive process. 
It this chapter I have attempted to show the origins of 
some of the various research traditions which use the idea 
of stress. 
they have 
understand 
Although such traditions have many differences, 
important similarities which can help us to 
why the term and concept of stress is popular 
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despite the many problems the use of this concept can 
entailo These similarities can also help us to disentangle 
some of the problems experienced within a particular 
tradition of stress research, that of relating illness to 
stresso 
-61-
CHAPTER THREE 
STRESS AND ILLNESS 
-62-
3.1 Introduction. 
This chapter is concerned with the way in which the idea of 
stress has been conceptualizedu developedf and applied in a 
very broad range of research which has explored the 
relationship between psychological factors such as 
personality and the psychosocial environment, and illness. 
Whether stress is implicated or not as a factor in any 
particular illness will depend to a large extent on the 
particular theory of illness proposed, and if specific or 
multicausal models of disease are adopted. In relation to 
this a brief discussion of some theories of disease 
causation will be included in the first section of this 
chapter. 
It is important to note at this point that throughout this 
chapter the terms disease, illness and symptoms will be 
used to refer to both physical and psychological symptoms 
as much of the work in this area uses rather general 
measures of health which include both 'types 1 of symptoms. 
Such general measures of illness or disorder have been 
criticized because many researchers claim that 
stress-illness relationships vary across particular 
disorders and so must be studied within specific disorders 
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(e.g. Deupe & Monroe, 1986J Hinkle, 1917). 
After n brief discussion of some theories of disease and 
the origins of psychosomatic medicine, the chapter will 
then continue to explore the background to stress-illness 
research and examine the efforts that have been made over 
the years to measure and assess life stress. 
In contrast to the previous chapter which looked at the 
wide range and diversity of stress concepts, this chapter 
will be concerned with the stress concept within a 
particular range of research, where debates about the 
meaning and measurement of stress take on a degree of 
importance not found in other areas. It is vital that a 
causal link can be established between stress and illness 
rather than just correlations between measures of stress 
and measures of illness. To do this requires theoretical 
advances in research as well as the refinement of measuring 
instruments (Brown, 1974). There has been increasing 
interest in theoretical issues in this area. Two books on 
stress and illness (Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend, 1974; 
Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend, 1981) which represent current 
research interests in the area, showed a marked increase in 
theoretical interest, with the second book devoting almost 
all its chapters to theoretical and methodological issues 
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(Ki.lSlr 1983). 
3.2 Theories of disease causation. 
As mentioned abover the particular theory of disease 
adopted will dependr to an extentr on the particular 
condition being examined. Howeverr there is also a sense in 
which explanations for disease are independent of the 
particular illness under consideration. 
Dubos (1970) uses the example of the common cold. Theories 
to explain the cold are varied. The cold weatherr exposure 
to a virus and the state of receptivity have all been put 
forward as explanations of why people 'catch' colds. 
However, tests have shown that none of these is sufficient 
to produce cold symptoms. This is not because any one of 
these explanations is wrong 
that there must only be 
incorrect. Exposure to a 
as suchr it is the assumption 
one causal agent which is 
particular virus is only a 
necessary condition and not a sufficient one. In order for 
a cold to develop, a large number of factors, including the 
weather and receptivity must be present. This example shows 
that many factors must be taken into account when 
explaining the cause of any particular illness. 
"Multifactoral etiology is the rule rather than the 
exception" (Dubos, 1970, p. 105). So the first point to be 
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made in relation to theories of disease is that they should 
be multifactoralu or rnulticausal. 
3.2.1 Historical background. 
This multicausal approach to disease has not always beenu 
and still is not accepted fully by many medical 
practitioners. A brief look at texts on the history of 
medicine (e.g. Guthrieu 1945~ Major, 1954) shows that a 
great variety of explanations have been put forward for 
disease causation. Many of these have tended to be rather 
specific in nature. This well recognized (Dubas, 1959, 
Lazarus & Folkmanu 1984, Selye, 1956, Zegans,l982) feature 
of medical research and practice is relatively new, 
originating with the discoveries of Virchow and Pasteur. 
Virchow (1821-1902) undertook many investigations of 
pathology in cells. He located disease on the cellular 
level, but before this, it had been thought of as occurring 
on the level of partic~lar organs or tissues (Major, 1954). 
This change in emphasis led the way for Pasteur. 
Pasteur (1822-1895) made a major breakthrough \lhen he 
implicated bacteria and microbes in the causation of 
disease on the cellular level. This idea came to be known 
as the germ theory of disease. The notion of selectivity in 
~66-
chemical and biological reactions was always central in 
Pasteur 1 s research (Dubosv 1961) u and lhe germ theory of 
disease encouraged the search for single specific causes 
for every disease (Lipowskiv 1984). The great success of 
vaccines and antibiotics in preventing disease and 
infection in humans, animalsv and plants did two things. 
First it estabilshed the idea of specificity in disease 
causation, that for each disease there is one cause. 
Second, as the single cause Pasteur, Virchow, Koch and 
others identified was bacteria or microbes, the focus for 
thinking about disease became external to the organism. 
Many factors which affect the organism 1 s resistance to 
disease were ignored as attention was paid to the 
characteristics of the infective micro-organisms themselves 
(Dubos, 1961). Although Pasteur was criticised for paying 
too little attention to factors within the organism itself, 
he was aware of the organism's abilty to resist disease and 
the conditions which might lower resistance (Selye, 1956). 
These environmental conditions were referred to by Pasteur 
as the ''terrain" (Dubos, 1961) o He also suggested that the 
mental state of the patient may affect the course of an 
illness (Dubas, 1961) o So although Paster's discoveries 
encouraged a single cause theory of disease, he was 
personally aware of the great number of factors that come 
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together to produce illness and disease. 
It is interesting to note that in many other cultures and 
societies a multicausal approach to disease causation is 
adopted. The causes cited include not only supernatural 
forces but also theories of stress in terms of strain and 
overexertion (Murdockp 1980). 
From the earliest records of medical practice it can be 
observed that medical practitioners looked for many causes 
of disease and were not limited by single-cause 
conceptions of disease. For examplep 
B.C.) considered such factors as the 
Hippocrates (460~355 
water supplyp the 
soilp the habits of the people and the climate to be 
important (Guthrie, 1945). Obviously a large number of 
factors can and should be taken into account when 
considering the cause of a disease. One of these factors is 
the psychological characteristics of the individual or 
their environment. The idea that psychological factors can 
contribute to disease (the psyche affecting the soma) is 
the assumption made in all stress-illness research. The 
idea of 'stress' is a shorthand way of assessing and 
describing some of the psychological factors involved. 
3.3 Psychosomatic influences in medicine. 
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A definition put forward by Lipowski (1977) of 
psychosomatic medicine contains three partso Firstv it is 
the scientific study of the relation among psychological, 
social and biological factors in determining disease. 
to the practice of Second, it takes a holistic approach 
medicine. And third, it practices 
psychiatryo Whilst only the first 
consultation-liason 
element of this 
definition will be considered, it is important to see that 
psychosomatic medicine is part of a broader movement which 
also includes health psychology (e.go Gatchel & Baum), 
clinical health psychology (e.go Millon et al, 1982; 
Karoly, 1985), and behavioural medicine (eogo Davidson & 
Davidson, 1980) which attempt to relate psychology to 
medicine, health and illness both in theory, research, and 
in medical practices. 
Historical surveys of psychosomatic medicine reveal that 
there have been many developments in the ideas and concerns 
of workers in this field (Lipowski, 1984; Wittcower, 1977). 
Therefore a brief history of the role of psychosomatic 
ideas in medical thinking will clarify the position of 
psychosomatic medicine today, and more importantly the 
place and origins of ideas of stress in medicine. 
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Although much of the research into the relationshjp between 
stress and illness is not 1 psychosomatic 0 in that it is not 
part of the modern psychosomatic movementv (stress research 
can be seen as a movement in itself) v the goals it pursues 
are very similar to those in psychosomatic medicine, and it 
shares many of the assumptions developed by those who 
shaped and created psychosomatic medicineo As I will try to 
indicatev some knowledge of the history of psychosomatic 
medicine is essential if we wish to understand the nature 
of stress~illness research todayv and the problems it 
faceso 
3o3ol A brief history of psychosomatic medicineo 
One of the basic premises of psychosomaticsv that 
psychological factors will influence health, is a very old 
ideao For example, Socrates (496-399 BoCo) and Galen 
(131-201 BoCo) made reference to this premise (Wittkower, 
1977) o This premise arises from a consideration of the way 
in which the mind and body interact (Lipowski, 1984; 
Margettsv 1954; Millonv 1982) o 
"Writers on psychosomatics have traditionally, if 
not always logically and consistently, affirmed 
their antidualistic stance and tended to opt for 
some sort of monism, arguing that mind and body 
are onev or are merely separate aspects of a 
person, or of the organism as a wholeo" 
(Lipowskiv 1984, Po 154) 
As said abovev the idea that the mind and the body can not 
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be separated when considering the cause and cure of disease 
is a very old one, 
gradually dwindled, 
recent history. The 
but its role in medical lhinking 
only to surface again in relatively 
reasons for this are varied and 
complex, but some developments in philosophical thinking 
can be identified as having a large effect on medical 
thinking. Descartes (1596-1650) introduced two related 
ideas that helped to reduce the importance given to 
psychological factors in medicine. 
The first of these was mind-body dualism. Descartes 
considered that the only two types of substance that exist 
are thought (self-conscious) and material things. These two 
substances were so different in nature that he could not 
see how one could affect the other (Speake, 1979). From a 
dualistic point of view it is very difficult to imagine how 
thoughts (as abstract, non-material entities) could have an 
effect on physical things such as the body. Although this 
relationship may seem unproblematic, (it is 'obvious' that 
the mind can affect the body), it still exists today, but 
in a much more sophisticated sense. (For example, see Biro 
& Shahan (1982) and Dennett (1979) where debate on 
mind-body problems are discussed in terms of the 
interrelations between mind, brain, internal 
representations and behaviour.) 
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The second idea introduced by Descartes was mechanism 
applied to the human body. Descartes in his 'Discouse on 
Method' describes the human body as "a machine made by the 
hand of god." This view of the human body had a great 
influence on medicine (Guthrie, 1945) and encouraged the 
view that for every disease there is a single specific 
cause ( L i pow ski , 1 9 8 4 ) . 
These two ideas combine together to give a picture of the 
human body as a complex machine where the mind or soul is 
distinct from the physical machine-parts of the body. Given 
this, the concern of medicine was to understand the 
mechanisms of the body by looking at individual parts and 
their relations. Within this framework, there is little 
room for the mind, which after all was not 'physical', and 
so did not contribute to the workings of the body. 
"If I consider man's body as being a machine, so 
built and composed of bones, nerves, muscles, 
veins, blood and skin, that although it had no 
mind in it, it would still move in the same ways 
that it does at present." (Descartes, Sixth 
Meditation.) 
For Descartes, the body would continue to function normally 
without the mind. The influence of this idea on medicine 
means that disease and illness can be looked upon as almost 
mechanical faults which are distinct from and not 
influenced by mental events. 
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Such philosophical ideas are only part of the reason for 
the rejection by medical thinkers of psychsomatic ideas. 
As mentioned in the previous section discoveries made by 
cellular pathologists such as Pasteur had a large effect 
on medical thinking. R.J. Ratherv writing on the mind and 
body in medicine, states that the advent of cellular 
pathology resulted in: 
"wiping out recollection of the attention 
accorded to mind-body relationships. Hencev 
pschosomatic medicine in our time has appeared 
to many as a new and almost unprecedented 
movement in medical thought." (R.J. Rather, as 
quoted in Z.J. Lipowski (1984) v p. 160) 
Two factors have now been identified as the reasons for 
the decline in psychological thinking in medicine. First, 
medical discoveries made by cellular pathologists drew 
attention away from both a multicausal and psychosomatic 
approach to disease. Second, the philosophical positions of 
dualism and mechanismv outlined by Descartes. 
As the above quote by Rather suggests, the recent 
resurgence of psychosomatic ideas has been viewed as a new 
area of thought, whereas in fact such ideas are very oldv 
and examples of medical writings where psychological 
factors are implicated in the etiology of disease are 
common. For example Osler (1898) recognises that the 
emotions can play a part in causing disease. In a book 
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first published in 1807 called ~or Buchan 1 s domestic 
medicine, or a treatise on the prevention and cure of 
diseases" there is a section titled "of the passions"" In 
this Buchan writes~ 
"The passions have great influence on both the 
cause and cure of diseases" How the mind acts on 
the body will in all probability ever remain a 
secreta It is sufficient for us to knowv that 
there is established a reciprocal influence 
between the mental and corporal parts, and that 
whatever hurts the one disorders the other"" 
(Po 135-136) 
Although many individual medical practitioners were well 
aware of psychological factors in disease and illness such 
knowledge did not, (and perhaps still has not), become part 
of scientific medicine" It is difficult to 1 prove 1 in a 
scientific sense that psychological factors influence 
disease, so although psychosomatic thinking may implicitly 
be accepted by medical practitioners it does not have the 
legitimacy of other sorts of medical knowledge" It 
remains, as Lipowski (1977a) describes it, part of "medical 
folklore". Another important factor in this respect is 
that for the most part medical practitioners are required 
to cure and treat illness. Psychosomatic medicine is more 
about prevention than cure, searching for the causes 
of chronic disease rather than removing the symptoms of 
acute illness. 
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It was not until psychosomatic medicine could appeal to 
0 harder' facts about the relationship between psychological 
states and physiological reactions that it began to take 
off as a discipline in its own right. 
3.3.2 Recent developments in psychosomatic medicine. 
The last section was concerned with the general background 
to psychosomatic ideas. This section deals with discoveries 
made by particular individuals which helped to establish 
psychosomatic medicine. The 1920s and 1930s have been 
identified as the beginnings of modern psychosomatic 
medicine (Macleod et al, 1954; Lipowskiv 1984). 
According to Lipowski (1977a) from the 1920s onwards the 
psychosomatic field followed two major. directions. The 
psychodynamic or psychoanalyticv and the 
psychophysiological. These two strands of research will be 
discussed in turn. 
3.3.3 Psychoanalytic approaches. 
Psychosomatic ideas followed from Freud who postulated that 
hysterical symptoms would appear if prolonged inhibition of 
libidinal and sexual energy occurs (Macleod et al, 1954). 
This was explained in terms of 'conversion' whereby 
repressed psychic excitations are converted into somatic 
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symptoms (Nemiah, 1971). The type and location of symptoms 
so produced are, according to Freud, highly symbolic as 
they can indicate the nature of the subconscious conflict. 
However, Freud did not extend these ideas to organic 
disease (Lipowski, 1984). 
Dunbar (1938) extended Freud's ideas to include somatic 
illness by subjecting a large number of patients who had 
organic diseases to psychodynamically oriented examination. 
From this examination she then attempted to relate certain 
personality characteristics to particular organic diseases. 
She related the two by describing the ulcer personality, 
the coronary personality, the arthritic personality along 
with many others (Wittkower, 1977). 
Another important figure in this area who followed 
psychoanalytic ideas was Alexander (1950). He suggested 
that unconscious conflicts played a role in the development 
of organic diseases such as bronchial asthma and peptic 
ulcer. According to Lipowski (l977a), most of Alexander's 
hypotheses proved difficult to validate. 
"Yet this (Alexander's) approach had weaknesses. 
It causally linked variables on very different 
levels of abstraction, e.g., conflict and peptic 
ulcer, without due regard to the intervening 
psychophysiological mechanisms." 
(Lipowski, l977a, p. 235, my brackets) 
The problems with other psychoanalytic approaches to 
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psychosomatic medicine were the same as those faced by 
Alexander. There was little psychophysiological input into 
these approaches and so they tried to relate abstract ideas 
of unconscious processes to concrete somatic symptoms in a 
way that proved to be unconvincing. According to Lipowski 
(1977a) the psychoanalytic approach suffered a large drop 
in popularity around 1955. This was perhaps because of the 
increasing success of the psychophysiological approachu 
which in contrast to the psychoanalytic approachu used the 
experimental methodu quantified variables and focused on 
the effect of conscious processes on somatic functioning. 
"Just a description of personality traits and 
conflict situations is not enough to draw 
conclusions about the existance and nature of 
psychosomatic relationships in various diseases. 
The formulation of such a relationship must be 
supplemented by experimentalv reproducable 
evidence before it can graduate from an 
indication to a proof." (Groen v 1950 v p. xvii) 
This comment appeared in the foreword of a book of the 
proceedings of a conference with the title "life stress and 
bodily disease" which reflected the interest around that 
time in moving away from purely symbolic or psychoanalytic 
explanations in psychosomatic medicine. 
In addition, psychosomatic medicine as a whole was 
starting to increase in popularity. Many new books appeared 
(e.g. Alexander, 1950; Grinker, 1953; Weiss & English, 
1949; Wittkower & Cleghorn, 1954) on the subject of 
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psychosomatic medicineo So the decline in psychoanalytic 
ideas in psychosomatic medicine was not due solely to the 
increase in popularity of psychophysiological approachesu 
but also due to the general expansion of the fieldu with 
alternative ideas and approaches pushing the once dominant 
psychoanalytic approach into the backgroundo 
The psychoanalytic approach in psychosomatic medicine still 
exists today (e.g. Musaph, 1977). However, unconscious 
tensions and motives are viewed as only one of a huge range 
of factors which play a part in the causation of disease. 
If we compare two vstate of the art' books about 
psychsomatic medicine (Wittkower & Cleghorn, 1954: Lipowski 
et al, 1977) we find that in the earlier book by Wittkower 
& Cleghorn (1954) the number of times Freud is indexed is 
six times greater than in the later booko Also while 
psychoanalysis appears in the index of the earlier book, it 
does not appear at all in the later one. 
As well as 
different in 
this distinction, the two books are very 
that the earlier one puts much less emphasis 
on environmental, ecological and social factors in disease 
causation (Lipowski, 
individualistic and 
books about psychology 
1977a). It is much more 
clinically oriented. Two early 
and health (Banister, 1935) and 
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medical psychology (Zilboorg & Henryv 19~1) concentrate 
almost entirely on mental illnessv which suggests that the 
only relationship then considered between psychology and 
medicine came from abnormal psychology and psychiatry. 
Indeedu this tendency for early psychosomatic medicine to 
concentrate on individualv clinical and in some cases 
psychopathological causes of disease must have discouraged 
both the medical profession and the public at large from 
accepting many of the ideas of psychosomatic medicine. A 
psychosomatic illness is not a 'real' one to many people. 
This is undoubtedly due to the perception of psychosomatics 
as a psychoanalytically oriented discipline. The general 
scepticism many people have towards psychoanalytic ideas 
also extends to psychosomatic illness. A psychosomatic 
illness is somehow 'not serious' u it is 'only' 
psychosomatic after all. Having a psychosomatic illness 
implies that the ill person is somehow feigningv or is a 
malingerer. 
These perceptions of psychosomatic illness are very 
important as they shaped the changes that were to come in 
the fieldv and hadv and still have a profound effect on the 
kind of research carried out into stress and illness. The 
psychophysiological approaches became important as they 
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provided the 0 missing link 0 between psychological and 
physiological events. 
3.3.4 Psychophysiological approaches. 
Claude Bernard 0 s ideas (see chapter l) played an important 
part in psychophysiological approaches to psychosomatic 
medicine. His notions of the 'mileau interieur 1 and his 
holistic approach to the functioning organism were an ideal 
basis from which to study psychophysiological interactions. 
It has even been suggested that "Bernard was the first 
prominent physician 
psychological factors 
Baum, 1983, p. 3) 
to emphasis 
to physical 
the contributions of 
illness." (Gatchel & 
Walter Cannon who introduced the idea of homeostasis (the 
dynamic steady state of the 1 mileau interieur') wrote two 
books which marked the beginning of modern psychophysiology 
as it applies to psychosomatic medicine. These were "Bodily 
changes in pain, hunger, fear and rage" (1929) and "The 
wisdom of the body" (1939). Cannon identified for the first 
time physiological reactions to psychological states such 
as fear and rage. Also he outlined the 'fight or flight' 
response of the body to the perception of danger. This is 
the basis of what later came to be known as the alarm stage 
of the general adaptation syndrome (Selye, 1956) which is a 
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stress response. Cannon also extended the idea of 
homeostasis to psychological and social domains as well as 
the physiological. 
Harold Wolff took as his starting point the physiological 
reaction to threat outlined by Cannon. He extended this 
idea to explain psychosomatic illness in terms of the 
adaptive response of the body to symbolic threats (Wolff, 
1953). In other words, a 'fight or flight' response to 
symbolic threat. 
"It is suggested that man, confronted by threats, 
especially as they involve values and goals, 
initiates responses inappropriate in kind as well 
as magnitude. Such reactions, integrated for one 
protective purposev and thus inappropriately used 
for another, can damage or destroy him." 
(Wolffv 1953 1 p. vii) 
It is at this pointv in the history of psychosomatic 
medicine, that the idea of stress became implicated as a 
factor in disease causation. Although in the past, as 
stated previously in this chapter 1 general notions of 
'emotion' or 'passions' were used in relation to disease 
causation (e.g. Stratton, 1926), no psychophysiological 
mechanism had been discovered which linked psychological 
and physiological states. 'Stress' provided this link. 
It is also at this point that stress and illness research 
started to take off on its own. Although still linked to 
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psychosomatic medicineu it became an area of study in its 
own right. Also, as outlined above, psychosomatic medicine 
started to diversify to include many other areas that fall 
within a more general framework of the interrelations 
between psychology, medicine, health, and illness. Such a 
diversity meant that stress became only one of many factors 
which contributed to health and disease. 
The beginnings of stress and illness research will be 
considered in the next section. Psychophysiological 
approaches in psychosomatic medicine did not stop with 
Wolff and the idea of stress. They also considered other 
aspects of the psychosocial environment which contributed 
to disease. 
Halliday (1948) took a cultural, anthropological and 
epidemiological approach to disease causation. He 
considered that sociocultural changes could have an effect 
on the prevalence and incidence of certain chronic diseases 
such as peptic ulcer, rheumatism, and angina pectoris. 
His interest was in psychosocial medicine which he defines 
as "the application of the concepts of psychosomatic 
medicine to the illnesses of communities and social 
groups". (Quoted in Galdston, 1954, p. 455) 
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Wide ranging social and economic changes have their effect 
on disease by changing important details of personal and 
family lifeo For exampleu the mother~child relationship may 
be altered because of economic conditionso Such a changeu 
if widespreadu will result in children born around that 
time developing personalities generally different from 
their parentso As a basic psychosomatic assumption is that 
particular personality profiles are associated with 
particular illnesses (eogo Dunbar, 1938), it follows that 
changing personalities within a society or community will 
result in a changing patterns of diseaseo However, Halliday 
did not view the relationship between personality and 
disease in a psychoanalytic or symbolic sense, but drew on 
psychophysiological mechanisms in his explanationo 
Other important 
psychophysiological 
figures in 
approaches 
the early history of 
to psychosomatic medicine 
studied the relationship between particular diseases and 
the life histories of people with those diseaseso Lawrence 
Hinkle (eogo Hinkle & Wolfu 1950; Hinkle et al, 1951) 
looked at subjects who had diabetes mellituso He postulated 
that life experiences which were interpreted either 
consciously or unconsciously as threats to security may 
cause the diabetic's condition to become unstableo He also 
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suggested that early conditioning and constitutional 
predisposition may also contribute to the development of 
diabetes mellitus (Hinkle & Wolf, 1950). Hinkle 0 s approach 
was similar to that of other workers around this time in 
that the psychological and social background of subjects 
with particular illnesses was examined, but in a more 
experimental way that earlier psychoanalytic approaches. 
Many factors were taken into account 1 stress being only one 
of them. 
This section on psychosomatic medicine is an attempt to 
show where the current interest in stress and illness 
originated, both conceptually and historically. It is 
important to remember these origins, as much of the 
criticism now directed at stress and illness research is a 
response to what critics 
complex phenomena (e.g. 
1982). Such criticism 
see as the oversimplification of 
Kessler et al, 1985: Monroe, 
is ironic given that stress and 
illness research started in an area which has always been 
at pains to point out the complexity of the 
interrelationships between psychosocial factors and illness 
(e.g. Wolf, 1954), and encourage a holistic approach in 
medicine (Lipowski, 1984). 
As stated above, the idea that emotions or adverse life 
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situations can cause and prolong disease has been around 
for a very long time. This should be remembered as it 
often appears lhat the idea thal stress can cause illness 
is a 1 new 1 discovery. It is not. What is (or was) new is 
the attempt made by researchers to quantify and qualify the 
relationship between some of the emotions experienced and 
the short and long term bodily effects of such emotions. As 
the idea of stress (reflecting both the physiological/ 
bodily state and psychological/emotional life) became 
adopted, efforts were made to quantify the measures of 
stress adopted so that a clear picture could be built up of 
the nature of the relationship between stress and illness. 
The following section of this chapter examines these 
efforts. 
3.4 The mechanisms of stress and illness. 
Wolff (1953) was probably the first well known researcher 
in the psychosomatic field to use the term 1 stress' in a 
technical sense to explain the incidence of disease. In 
1950 the proceedings of a conference entitled "Life stress 
and bodily disease" were published (Wolff et al, 1950). 
These publications probably represent the first widespread 
use of the term stress in connection with disease. 
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There are however some other examples of the term stress 
used in the context of disease before Wolff. These 
exceptions do not come directly from psychosomatic research 
and are important in as much as they show that other 
workers slightly outside the psychosomatic field were 
corning to similar conclusions regarding the role of stress 
in disease. 
Earlier uses of the term stress in relation to illness give 
a clue as to why the term became popular in many different 
disciplines. The popularity of the term has caused a great 
deal of confusion (see chapter 1) u which a short historical 
exploration might help to clarify. 
3.4.1 Earlier uses of stress to explain illness. 
Cannon (1935) in "the stresses and strains of homeostasis" 
suggests that: 
"We should have to learn how steady are the 
steady states and where the critical stress is 
found, not only in normal individuals, but also 
in individuals at various developmental epochs 
and during various disorders. Childhood, 
adolescence and old age, the exacting periods of 
puberty and the climacteric, prolonged labor, 
fatigue, the demands of school, the values of 
different sorts of training - all these and many 
other conditions (besides infection and insornnia 1 
worry and dissapation, already mentioned) could 
be made to tell their influence on the agencies 
which maintain uniformity in the fluid matrix. 
Indeed, the whole gamut of human diseases might 
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be studied from this point of view." (p. 14) 
Herev Cannon is clearly using the term stress in connection 
with illness. He also sees the possibility of research into 
stress and illness when he says that "the whole gamut of 
human diseases might be studied from this point of view." 
(Cannonf 1935u p. 14) 
Selye (1950v 1956) used the term stress to refer to the 
conditions which would elicit the general adaptation 
syndrome (Selye, 1936). Which in turn produce diseases of 
adaptation. 
"We feel that the main results of this work were 
to show that: 
l. Any systemic stress elicits an essentially 
similar syndrome with general manifestations. 
2. This syndrome helps adaptation. 
3. Adaptation can cause disease." 
(Selye, 1950u p. 5) 
So indirectlyf Selye too used the term stress in relation 
to disease although most of the experimentation he carried 
out was concerned with particular biochemical changes 
during the general adaptation syndrome mainly in animals. 
Even though Selye was not interested in stress from a 
psychosomatic or epidemiological standpointu he realised 
the value of his findings for medicine. "The significance 
of this kind of research is not limited to fighting this or 
that disease. It has bearing upon all diseases and indeed 
upon all human activities." (Selyeu 1956f p.305) 
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Both Selye and Cannon used the term stress in relation to 
illness because their ideas formed the basis of stress and 
illness research. Selye took Cannon's ideas of homeostasis 
and the 'fight or flight' response (emergency reaction) to 
form his more technical notions of the general adaptation 
syndrome and the diseases of adaptation. These ideas form 
the core of stress and illness research and are still 
extensively referred to in introductions to stress and 
illness research (e.g. Cox, 1978, Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend, 
1974a, Levine & Scotch, 1970; Totman, 1979). 
3.4.2 Physiological responses to psychological stimuli. 
As stated elsewhere, one of the basic assumptions of stress 
and illness research is that emotional arousal can produce 
physiological changes which may lead to disease. One 
problem with this assumption is to explain why it should be 
the case that physiological changes accompany emotional 
appraisals of events and situations. 
{There are many problems involved with defining emotions. 
(See Mandler, 1975.) No particular definition of emotion is 
put forward here and the statement above that 
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"physiological changes accompany emotional appraisalsn is 
not intended to indicate any theory of emotion. Rather, 
emotion is seen as a general construct which 
observed relationships between biological 
emerges from 
and social 
antecedent conditions and consequent biochemical, 
physiological and behavioural events (Brady, 1975) .) 
Many of these physiological changes serve to prepare the 
body for threatening situations which involve fear, rage or 
pain. Hormones such as epinephrine (adrenaline) and 
norepinephrine are released which increase the heart rate, 
dialate the bronchi in the lungs, stimulate conversion of 
glycogen to bile by the liver, and generally prepare the 
body for physical action. While this physiological response 
'makes sense' as far as physical responses to threats are 
concerned, it does not seem to be a suitable response to 
psychological threats where no course of physical action 
will remove such threats. 
Cannon (1939) saw the 'fight or flight' response as having 
its origins in "the experience of multitudes of generations 
in the fierce struggle for existence". (p. 227) Many of the 
threats and problems faced were of a physical nature, 
threatening physical life itself, and so required a 
physical response in terms of escaping from the danger 
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(flight) or attacking the source of threat (fight). The 
0 fight or flight 1 response prepares the organism for 
physical danger. 
Such responses are inappropriate given the non<~physical 
nature of most of the threats faced by people in modern 
western societies. Many of the physical thxeats to life 
have been removed and survival is seen as social and 
psychological. There are some problems with this analysis 
of the origins of the fight or flight response. Assumptions 
are made about life in ancient societies which are 
difficult to validate. The analysis implies that our 
ancestors spent a great deal of time fighting off animals 
or human enemies or running away from them. From Cannon 
(1939) to Cox (1978) the same analysis is made. 
"Great fear, with its attendant internal 
preparations for struggle, may be serviceable in 
wild life when the need for physical effort is 
imminent, but in the circumstances of civilized 
existence it may be the occasion for baneful 
disturbance of vitally important functions." 
(Cannon, 1939, p. 241) 
"The question for industrial man is 
adaptiveness of behaviours like fight or 
in the context of civilized environment." 
(Co X , 19 7 8 , p. 7 7) 
that of 
flight 
The fight or flight response is considered to be an 
evolutionary throwback from a time when most threats were 
to our physical life. Although in modern western societies 
we are not faced with the same physical threats, we respond 
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to them as though they are threats which require physical 
action of some sort. 
~In the long history of the race bacteria have 
not been the only living foes of manu and in wild 
lifev perhapsv they have not been the most 
important. There have been savage creaturesv 
human and subhuman, watching with stealth and 
ready to attack without a moments warning •.•. In 
that harsh school fear and anger have served as 
preparation for action. Fear has become 
associated with the instinct to run, to escape, 
and anger or aggressive feeling, with the 
instinct to attack." (Cannon, 1939, p. 227) 
This viewu of the origins of the fight or flight response, 
or more generally the origin of physiological responses to 
threat, is widely held. It is important to see this 
evolutionary perspective as part of the reason for treating 
0 stress' as though it is an inappropriate or incorrect 
response to the environment. Of course stress is mainly 
viewed as inappropriate because it can cause disease, but 
the evolutionary perspective gives additional support to 
the notion that the stress is biologically inappropriate in 
'modern' society. 
"Researchers have been concerned with the 
"stupidity" of these responses, which are 
supposed to be inappropriate to the human 
condition in civilization. This rests on a 
possibly erroneous assumption that primitive man 
was mainly concerned with active and overt 
behaviour like fight or flight.~ (Ursin & 
Murison, 1984, p. 126) 
Whilst a response such as fight or flight undoubtedly has 
great survival/adaptive value in many species, the idea 
that such genetic characteristics evolved or were 
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more appropriate in relat:lvely recent (pre"industrial) 
history are almost certainly incorrecto Fight or flight is 
such a basic physiological mechanismu found in many 
speciesu that it is likely that such a physiological 
mechanism started long ago in evolutionary history and long 
before anything recognizable as human or ape~like emergedo 
any process of natural selection would select for an 
adaptive response such as fight or flight as soon as it 
appearedo 
The view that fight or flight was appropriate when our 
ancestors were 'savages', forever fighting and running away 
from each other and/or animals, and is inappropriate in 
modern societyu leads to another doubtful notiono 
"The physiological response to stress according 
to, say, Cannon, prepares for fight or flight, 
which are suppressed in mano Ther~ results a 
failure to utilize, in an appropriate manner, the 
energy mobilization caused by the physiological 
changes, and this may increase the rate of wear 
and tear on the body, giving rise to the 
pathology of stresso Self=control may take a toll 
in the long runo This is the cost of 'civilized' 
behaviour." (Cox, 1978, Po 76) 
'Self~control' does not really enter into the problem of 
why stress makes people ilL Many stress-provoking 
situations may well be in social and emotional encounters 
where responding by fighting or taking flight may do 
nothing to resolve the situationo Hinkle (1977) suggests 
that "the maintainance of social relationships has a 
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biological importance for men that overrides the importance 
of maintaining their own physical health." {p. 43) There is 
involved in behaving in n 'civilized 0 way, but 
there may well be real costs in terms of health if social 
relationships are not maintained (e.g. Thoits, 1985). 
This view of why stress leads to illness in 'modern 
society' implies that it comes about because we have 
'self-control' and do not hit out at those things that 
anger us, or run away from those things which frighten us. 
Whilst many researchers agree that the fight of flight 
response if prolonged or repeated too often causes serious 
tissue and organ damage (e.g. Frankenhaeuser, 1975; 
Lazarus, 1977; Selye; 1975) it does not follow from this 
that if we respond physically (as the fight or flight 
response prepares us to do) the damage done to our bodies 
will be lessened. 
There are a number of problems with these ideas. First, 
it is not fully known how stress in the form of 
physiological responses such as fight or flight causes 
disease. Zegens (1982) lists seven hypotheses that have 
been put forward to explain how the stress response may 
cause illness in the long term. Most of these are 
consistent with Selye (1956) who suggests that stress 
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causes illness and disease as it increases the general rate 
of wear and tear on the bodyo An analogy can be made with a 
machine that may break down or become damaged due to wear 
and tearo Stress is equivalent to over-working the machineo 
So it is not so much how we respond physically during fight 
or flight reactions which is importantu butv how oftenv how 
prolonged and with what intensity such reactions occuro 
These latter factors are much more likely to be determined 
by the use of cognitive appraisal and coping and/or defence 
mechanisms (Burchfieldu 1979) rather than a simple class of 
behavioural responses such as fight or flighto In additionv 
the level of activation an emergency reponse may produce 
in the body is much more complicated than a straightforward 
fight or flight description suggestso An extreme or intense 
fight or flight response may well prepare the body for 
physical action but lower levels of activation may noto 
Such physiological states are not simply on or off but 
exist on continuums and so may have very different 
physiological effects depending on their intensity and 
durationo They should therefore be considered as complex 
and variable states (eogo Ursin & Murisonu 1984: Jenkins, 
1979) which at their most intense (fear or rage) may 
prepare the body for flight or flight, but at other levels 
may best facilitate other adaptive functions, such as 
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cognitive abilities (Frankenhaeuser, 1980). 
Second, looking at the response to stress in this Hay means 
that the point at which we start looking at the whole 
phenomena of stress begins with the organism 1 s 
physiological reponse or mobilization. This means that 
"factors which lead some individuals but not others to 
respond to a noxious stimulus with mobilization and some 
individuals but not others to remain mobilized for 
prolonged periods are largely ignored." (Coyne & 
Holroyd, 1982, p. 107) In other words if we take as our 
focus the physiological reaction, then individual 
differences in the perception of 1 stimuli 0 as threatening, 
and those factors which may modify the physiological 
response (e.g. social support, coping strategies) are not 
given much attention. This approach to stress has probably 
held back the conceptualization of stress as a whole 
process, which should be studied as a whole, more than any 
other approach. 
In this way, the fight or flight response is simply viewed 
as an inappropriate automatic reaction, out of place in a 
1 modern society 1 , the long-term effects of which (illness) 
can only be avoided if we do as our physiology prepares us 
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forv and fight or take flighto Another problem which is 
ignored in this framework is how social stimuli become 
interpreted as harmful or threateningo Whilst we may assume 
that some responses to some stimuli are innate (such as a 
frightening and sudden loud noise) others are obviously 
more socialv learned responses (eogo divorce, bereavement) o 
This issue raises the question of the 1 first mediator 1 
(Selyev 1956) o If we consider the fight or flight mechanism 
to be a very basic physiological responsev the question 
arises as to how such a response is initiated when so many 
apparently different stimuli produce more or less the same 
response? What could a loud noise and an insult have in 
common that would enable them to influence the same 
physiological 
next sectiono 
mechanism? This will be discussed in the 
The fight or flight mechanism or the alarm reaction are 
important physiological mechanisms if we want to understand 
the way in which stress might cause illnesso For the 
purposes of this thesis however, it is not necessary to 
understand fully how these mechanisms work on a 
physiological levelo It is important to understand how 
these ideas became absorbed into the areas of psychosomatic 
medicine and epidemiologyo Stress provides a useful way of 
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linking psychological phenomena and physiological/medical 
phenomena. There is some disagreement on the nature and 
meaning of such alarm reactions (see next section) with 
some viewing the response as an 'automatic' response to any 
demands of adaptation while others view the response as 
almost entirely dependent on the interpretation or 
appraisal of the situation as threatening. The origins of 
research into the fight or flight (stress) reaction in 
response to emotional stimuli comes from the work of Cannon 
who demonstrated that many bodily reponses are highly 
sensitive to emotional stimuli. (e.g. Cannon & de la Pazv 
1911: Cannon, 1914, 1929) Selye (1956) showed how the fight 
or flight reaction develops over time in the General 
Adaptation Syndrome (see chapter 1). This has three parts 
to itv the fight or flight reaction corresponding to the 
first stage of this General Adaptation Syndrome (G.A.S.) 
which is called the alarm reaction (Selye, 1950). 
The origins of the fight or flight reaction suggest that it 
can be thought of as a fundamental biological process, such 
as homeostasis. Indeed homeostatic mechanisms play an 
important role in fight or flight/emergency reactions by 
maintaining the constancy of the internal environment 
(Selyev 1956). While the fact of some sort of physiological 
reaction to 0 threat' (fight of flightv alarm reaction, 
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emergency reaction) is not much in dispute, the meaning of 
such a response in a social context is a crucial issue in 
stress research and will be discussed in the next section. 
3.4.3 The function of the fight or flight response. 
One of the main problems in assessing the meaning of stress 
reactions is the supposedly non-specific nature of these 
reactions. A wide variety of apparently different stimuli 
seem to produce the same response. For example Selye 
(1937) says that "drugs, surgical injuries, spinal shock, 
excessive exercise, all elicit the same reaction." (p. 187) 
Later, Selye (1950) includes another 1 class 1 of stimuli as 
stressor agents (those agents which elicit the alarm 
reaction). Most of these agents have a 'physical 1 nature, 
that is they are actual physical assults or traumas on a 
living organism. What can such physical stressors have in 
common with psychological (emotional) stressors? 
"Even mere emotional stress, for instance, that 
caused by immobilizing an animal on a board 
(taking great care to avoid any physical injury), 
proved to be a suitable routine for the 
production of a severe alarm reaction." 
(Selye, 1950, p. 34-35) 
The only quality these apparently different agents have in 
common is their ability to produce a physiological stress 
response. 
"By what reasoning is plunging a subjects arm 
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into icy water in the same category of stress as 
being insulted or watching a disturbing movie? 
The empirical link between the two kinds of 
stimulus conditions is the response 0 a• (Lazar us v 
1956 Q p. 333) 
Selye defines stress as the non-specific response of the 
body to any demand, and most of the demands or 
stressors Selye identified experimentally are 'physical 0 
stressorso The result of this is that "there has been a 
widespread assumption that psychological stress merely 
represents one component of a larger unitary category of 
biological stress phenomena which involve common 
integrative mechanisms and which are organised according to 
common principles." (Masonv 1975, Po 22) Psychological 
stressors are seen as a subset to the larger group of 
physical stressors. 
This presents a problem (also see above) as responses to 
psychological stimuli are viewed in the same way as 
responses to 'physical' stimuli. If we are exposed to a 
physical stressor, such as low temperatures, then our 
bodies respond in an °automatic' way in an attempt to 
restore homeostasis. The implications of this view of 
stress are that if, for example, we are insulted then our 
bodies respond in the same automatic wayo Psychological 
stressors become 'like' physical stressors in their ability 
to elicit physiological responseso Obviously the 
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physiological reaction to an insult and low temperatures 
will be different 0 but as Selye defines stress as the 
non-specific response of the body to any dem~nd, or the 
common denominator of all adaptive reactions in the body 
(Selye, 1956) v then there are non-specific or common 
elements to both these physiological responses. 
Selye 1 in his historic letter "a syndrome produced by 
diverse noxious agents" published in Nature (1936) clearly 
shows that he is basically more interested in the G.A.S. 
and stress responses than in the stimuli that can produce 
it. "I could find no noxious agent that did not produce the 
syndrome." (Selye 1 1956, p. 35) He simply describes all 
stimuli that produce a stress response as noxious 1 and 
hence the reponses to them as adaptive. Such responses will 
be made in an attempt to adapt to the noxious agent and 
restore homeostasis. Noxious agents are the extreme end of 
the scale of stressors, any adaptive responses may produce 
some degree of stress. This marks a departure from the 
strict alarm 1 or fight or flight reaction that is often 
considered to be the stress response. 
The stress response can vary greatly in intensity and 
duration. At one extreme the phenomena of voodoo death 
(Cannon, 1942), sudden death (Binik, 1977, 1985, Engel, 
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1971) or psychic death can represent the sudden and 
unexpected death of an organism because of very extreme 
stressors. At the other end, there is the persistent and 
continuous stress caused simply by being alive (e.g. Selye, 
1956) because biological mechanisms are constantly active, 
working towards the maintainance of the dynamic steady 
state (homeostasis). Selye (1974) suggests that stress is 
always with us and is not necessarily good or bad, but 
depends on how we 0 live our lives 0 • 
According to Mason (1975) it was the idea that 
emotional/psychological factors could produce stress 
responses that interested many behavioural scientists in 
stress. Selye 0 s idea of non-specificity states that 
"non-specific changes are those which can be elicited by 
many agents."(Selye, 1950, p.7) Psychological stressors are 
therefore seen as just another noxious agent, capable of 
producing a stress response. This is a problem because, as 
stated above, the nature of the psychological stimulus is 
not taken into account, nor are the intervening processes 
which may appraise such stimuli as threatening or benign, 
and nor are those coping processes which may determine the 
effect of the stress response over time. 
Another major problem associated with viewing emotional 
stressors along with 'physical 1 stressors is the problem of 
the first mediator (see above). tJhat is it that these very 
different stimuli have in common that can produce a 
supposedly similar reaction? Two aspects of Selye's 
formulations are crucial here. The first is non-specificity 
and the second is the primary mediator. These will be 
discussed in the next section. 
The meaning of the fight or flightv or emergency response 
is crucial to the area of stress and illness. The main 
research in this area comes from the work of Hans Selye, 
who first attempted to precisely define the physiological 
response to stressv and how it develops over time. There 
are many criticisms that can be leveled at Selye's work. 
"As one now looks back over the past twenty 
years, it is a curious fact that, while there 
were both strong opponents and proponents of 
Selye's concepts, the main body of 'stress' 
theory still stands largely in the position of 
having been neither conclusively confirmed and 
generally accepted nor conlcusively refuted or 
rejected on the basis of definitive experimental 
evaluation." (Mason, 1971, p. 323) 
Selye's ideas are very influential in the area of 
psychological stress with "a tendency of many workers to 
assumev in a rather vague way, that there is necessarily 
some major link between this area of psychological stress 
research and the work of Selyev which dealt largely with 
physiological responses to physical and humoral stimuli." 
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(Mason, 1915, p. 11) The link that some workers assume 
exists between their research and Selye's concept of stress 
is that the psychosocial stimuli they observe to cause 
stress represent one class of stimuli that are all 
0 noxious 0 in Selye 0 s sense. Such stimuli are responded to 
with various degrees of the fight or flight response as 
they impose change to which the body adapts. 
3.5 Diseases and conditions associated with stress. 
Stress has been implicated in a factor in a great number of 
diseases, illnesses and conditions. As extreme stress 
responses have such a large and widespread effect on the 
physiological systems within the body, it is not surprising 
that some links can be found between nearly all diseases 
and stress. Very often in studies, illness or disorder is 
measured using very non-specific indicies of disorder. 
Also, very general assessments of 1 stress 0 are made using 
life-events inventories which 
sometimes the severity) of 
measure the number 
major life changes 
(and 
that 
individuals have experienced. Such scores are then compared 
with the incidence of symptoms and disorders. Correlation 
coefficients suggest that life events (a measure of stress) 
"may account at best for 9 percent of the variance in 
illness." (Rabkin & Struening, 1976) Physical and 
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psychological changes which result from stress will be 
briefly discussed in turn. 
3.5.1 Physical symptoms and disorders. 
Illness which results partly from stress must be due to the 
effects of the fight or flight, emergency response (or some 
degree of these reactions) , "although evidence is less 
clear and less fully spelled out than is generally 
realised." (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 205) This is 
especially true for evidence about the link between stress 
and illness in the human species. Experiments which expose 
animals to extreme forms of stress are common (see Turkkan 
et al, 1982). Often the animal is in an uncontrollable 
situation and can not escape from the source of the stress, 
so it is not surprising that illness can fairly easily be 
shown to result from stress in an extreme laboratory 
situation (e.g. Richter, 1957~ Seligman & Meyer, 1970; 
Selye, 1936; Brady, 1958). 
Ethical considerations apart, it is much more difficult to 
show how physiological stress reactions can cause illness 
in people. 
" .•. the uniquely human capacity for language and 
symbolic representation demands a whole new 
approach to defining what is 'stressful' to man, 
and to a particular individual, and necessitates 
a style of analysis which gets right away from 
comparisons with lower animals." (Totman, 1979. 
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p. 91) 
There are other factors which make it difficult to 0 prove• 
the link between stress and illness in humans. The 
social environment is complex and changing and people 
manipulate and respond to their environments making it 
difficult to assess the stress an individual is 
experiencing. A laboratory stress can be 'measured' and the 
environment controlled. Indeed the problem of •measuring' 
stress so that it can be related to illness is a major 
problem in stress research. Many conditions that may be 
caused by stress tend to be long term, chronic diseases 
which take a long time to develop, and those stresses which 
may play a causal role can only be assessed by long-term, 
prospective methods. 
Some diseases and conditions such as stomach ulcers and 
coronary heart disease are more directly linked to stress 
as both systems are involved in the basic fight or flight, 
emergency response. Stomach ulceration was one of the triad 
of morphological changes Selye (1936) noticed as a result 
of the General Adaptation Syndrome. Heart rate increases 
when epinephrine (adrenalin) is released into the blood 
stream from the adrenal medulla. This too is part of the 
physiological stress response and repeated stress responses 
put excessive demands on the heart. Obviously a host of 
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other risk factors are involved in the develornent of 
coronary heart disease, such as smoking and diet (Krantz et 
al, 1980} but, compared to some other diseases and 
conditions the causal link between heart disease and the 
physiological stress response is more direct. 
In contrast to heart disease and stomach ulceration it is 
thought that stress can increase the possibility of 
contracting infectious diseases (Ader, 1981~ Ader & Cohen, 
1984) o By affecting the immune system, suseptibility to 
many infectious diseases may be increased during stress 
responseso This means that stress may affect the 
development of a great many diseases, so making the 
causal link between stress and illness even less clear than 
in the case of diseases such as heart disease and stomach 
ulcerso 
So there are some diseases which can be said to result more 
'directly' from 
the mechanisms 
bodily illness 
the stress response than others, where 
and intervening processes which produce 
are better understood. It has been 
pointed out (e.go Deupe & Monroe) that many of the 
checklists that measure a large number of very 0 general' 
symptoms assume a non-specific model of stress-disorder 
interactions. In other words 'stress' will just generally 
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increase all kinds of symtorns, irrespective of the nature 
of the stressors, or the nature of the symptoms. This issue 
will be discussed later. 
Another class of disorders, those involving psychological 
symptoms, have also been associated with stress. 
3.5.2 Psycb~logical symptoms and disorders. 
In this class of disorders we find depression (e.g. Brown & 
Harris 1 1978), neurotic disorders (e.g. Barrett, 1979) v 
schizophrenia (e.g. Rabkin, 1980) v reactive stress related 
syndromesv brief reactive psychosis and post-traumatic 
stress disorder (Rabkin, 1982), as well as a large number 
of non-specific symptoms/indicators of disorder measured by 
symptom checklists which identify emotional disturbance or 
general psychological distress and anxiety. 
The mechanisms by which a physiological response to stress 
can lead to psychiatric disorders is not made explicit by 
researchers in the area. Many of the studies use measures 
of life events to predict psychiatric/psychological 
symptoms and do not explain the intervening mechanisms. The 
causal role of life events in precipitating or forming 
psychiatric disorders is not known, but it appears that 
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"quite different types of life events tend to be involved 
in provoking these (different) conditions, but the kind of 
causal role that the events play in onset is also radically 
different." (Brown, 1974a, p. 165, my brackets) 
For example, Wing & Bebbington (1982) in a review of the 
epidemiology of depressive disorders in the community, 
state that "what is required is a set of testable theories 
explaining how and under what circumstances the mechanisms 
(homeostatic mood-regulating) 'go out of control' and, 
therefore how the normal cycle might be reinstated and 
maintained." (p. 339-340) Many different models are used to 
explain the link between stress and psychological 
disorders. Spring & Coons (1982) identify five models that 
are used to explain the causal link between stress, as a 
precursor, 
points out, 
biological 
and schizophrenic episodes. As Neufeld (1982) 
studies tend to either concentrate on the 
or the psychological/behavioural variables 
associated with stress and so theories as to why and how 
stress can affect psychological functioning are many and 
varied. 
Some of these causal links are more directly related to 
fight or flight type physiological reactions, whilst others 
are not. Weiss et al (1979) carried out a number of studies 
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ltl to lil.e role o ~ br ;:: 1 n C<1 techolami nes in behavioural 
depression. This 'i:Jas out of an interest in "how 
psychological factors affected physiological responses that 
led to pathology." (p. 126) In other wordsv how 
physiological/biochemical changes resulting from stress 
will affect psychopathology. Deupe (1979) & vleiner (1977) 
make an attempt to more carefully explore the 
psychobiologic pathways involved in disease. 
Contrast this approach with the many studies of stress and 
psychological symptoms/disorder which make little attempt 
to relate (other than by correlation) causal links between 
stress as a psychophysiological phenomena and such 
symptoms/disorders. Brown (1981) describes two parts to the 
causal model which he uses to link life events with 
affective disorders. First, it is those life events which 
involve threat or loss which are most likely to lead to 
affective disorders. Second, the feeling of threat or loss 
produced by such events must take on a "secondary meaning" 
whereby the individual places the event in the context of 
their whole life. As Brown (1981) says, "the existence of 
this 'mechanism' is largely speculative." (p 0 46 7) 
Finlay-Janes & Brown (1981) report data which is used to 
argue that "severe loss was a causal agent in the onset of 
depressive disorder." (p. 803) The aetiology of depressive 
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conditions is discussed almost entirely in terms of 
1 factors 1 which statistically increase the probability of 
an individual experiencing psychiatric disorder. Brown & 
Prudo (1981) in explaining the risk of depression in 
Hebridean women suggest that the two important factors make 
the difference. These are church~goingr and inhabiting the 
least integrated type of dwelling. Obviously such factors 
are of great interest and importancer but they do not add 
up to anything like a causal explanation for the 
relationship between the effects of life events and 
depression. 
As is the case with physical symptomsr some particular 
conditions are more directly related to psychophysiological 
stress responses (e.g. hypertension) than others. In the 
case of psychological symptoms/conditions this is also 
true. But in additionr many researchers work exclusively 
with life event measures of stressr so the relationship 
between psychophysiological stress and psychological 
symptoms/conditions may not be assessed. As stated above, 
Mason (1975) has suggested that many researchers assume 
that there must be some kind of link between Selye's 
physiological or biochemical model of stressr and the model 
of stress they are working with. Selye (1982) in a foreword 
to a book about 'psychological stress and psychopathology' 
-110-
suggests a number of ways in which his biochemical model of 
stress may relate to psychopathology. Such links appear to 
be limited, and ~show how little we know and how much must 
still be learned." (p. vii) 
Stress has been nssociated with both somatic and 
psychological symptoms. While such associations are not 
strongr they do appear to exist. Much attention has been 
paid in the literature to overcoming theoretical and 
methodological problems. Some of these problems involve the 
actual assessment of stress, using life events measures 
(which will be dealt with in the next chapter), other 
problems involve the assessment of disorder and symptoms. 
More fundamental to these problems however is the large 
number of factors that must be taken into account, so many 
in fact that many researchers ignore parts of the 
stress-illness interactions. 
"The great majority of studies of life stress and 
illness have been concerned primarily with one 
or another of the three types of constructs .••• 
:stressful life events, personal dispositionsr or 
social conditions. The task now is to integrate 
these constructs into hypotheses about the 
life-stress process". (Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend, 
198la, p. 19) 
Stress-illness research does not take account of enough 
factors when looking for relationships between life events 
and symptom rates. Rahe (1974) identifies six 
transformations that occur in the pathway between stress 
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and illness. These six transformations are carried out by 
the following six factors: Past experience~ psychological 
defences, physiological reaction, coping, illness 
behaviour, illness outcome. 
~There are many intervening variables to be 
considered between a subject 1 s recent exposure to 
life change and his perception of body symptoms 
as well as his possible near-future illness 
reports ••... it is impressive that something as 
simple as a brief questionnaire recording of 
subjects 1 recent life changes shows any 
significant correlation with a criterion as 
distant and unspectacular as subjects 0 minor 
illness reports up to a year later." (Rahe u 1974 6 
p 0 84) 
These comments reveal part of what has been described as 
the "optimistic bias" (Breznitz & Goldbergeru 1982) in 
stress research. This optimism has two main features. The 
first 6 as indicated aboveu is a belief that in factu stress 
is related to illness much more strongly than we can 
actually demonstrater due to the conceptual and 
methodological flaws that exist in the area. The second 
feature of the optimistic bias is the interest shown in 
coping as a positive way of encouraging health 6 not health 
defined by the lack of illness 6 but health as positive 
well-being. 
Despite this optimistic bias there still are very few 
causal explanations which can link stress as a 
psychophysiological phenomena and psychological and somatic 
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phenomena. Since recent research into life stress and 
illness started, marked by the publication of ''Life stress 
and bodily disease" in 1950 (Wolff, Wolf & II~re}, it has 
been known that stress can affect diseases of the eye, 
airways, stomach, colon, cardiovascular system, skin etc. 
However, in nearly all the 
book, short-term bodily 
condition were observed 
studies reported in the above 
changes associated with the 
in subjects who already had the 
particular disease under study. •stress 0 was induced by 
asking subjects questions about conscious and unconscious 
conflicts or simply 'measured' by observing naturally 
occurring stressors. 
For example, in the case of a study reported by Wolf & 
Glass (1950), the subject's secretion of gastric juice and 
changes in the form of the stomach lining were observed 
while they asked the subject questions about a "topic of 
suspected conflict." (p. 666) In this way, many conditions 
were found to be aggravated by short-term stress. Now 
however, the focus is much more on the long-term effect of 
social stressors on long-term health outcomes. For short 
term physiological reponses to stressors, the causal 
mechanisms by which such responses operate are much more 
easy to identify. On the other hand, the process by which a 
great many factors come together to produce a particular 
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health outcome is probably beyond a causal explanationu 
though the search still continues. 
Another complicating factor concerns the hypotheses we make 
about the causal mechanisms involved in stress-illness 
developments. Many measures of symptoms used are very 
general and non-specific. This perhaps reflects Selye's 
idea that stress is a non-specific reponse of the body to 
any demand (1956). If it is non-specifier then many 
different symptoms may be produced by it. If it is the 
reponse to any demand, then it is not the quality of a 
stressor (life event) that is important 1 but the degree to 
which it requires adaptation. The last point will be 
discussed in the next chapter. Non-specific hypotheses 
about the relationship between stress and illness will be 
discussed in the next section. 
3.5.3 Non-specific indicies of disorder. 
There are two issues that arise out of the way in which 
disorder is measured in stress illness research. These will 
be dealt with in turn. 
The first refers back to something mentioned above. 
Stress-disorder associations have been generally quite low. 
One reason for this may well be the nature of the input 
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variable which is assessed by general measures of symptoms 
which may pick up any sort of disorder at all. As Deupe & 
Monroe (1986) point out, about 25 per cent of community 
samples are characterized by a chronic pattern of disorder 
over many years, just the kind of disorders general 
measures of symptoms will pick up. So although there may be 
genuine variance in symptom rates because of stress, the 
sheer number of high-scoring chronic symptom subjects will 
tend to cancel out those individuals who 
to stress. Also, the concern for 
may be responsive 
these non-specific 
measures of stress goes beyond a simple wish to increase 
correlations between stress and illness. If a non-specific 
model of disorders resulting from stress is wrong, then by 
continuing to use non-specific measures of symptoms we will 
not be able to learn more about exactly how stress may 
cause illness, the causal links. 
The second 
researchers 
point 
believe 
follows on from this idea. Some 
that "the principles underlying 
stress-disorder interactions vary across disorders, and, 
hence can only be fully understood by analyzing specific 
disorders." (Depue & Monroe, 1986, p. 36) Rose et al (1979) 
show that in the case of air traffic controllers, they did 
display cardiovascular and endocrine stress responses, but 
these stress responses were not predictive of psycological 
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problems but were predicitve of somatic conditions such as 
hypertension. Hinkle (1977) also follows the same lines. 
~The data from whatever source suggest that one 
cannot simply equate "hardshipsr" "straitsv" and 
"difficulties" with a state of health. It appears 
ratherv that the patterns of illness and the 
frequency of certain kinds of illness change with 
changing circumstances.~ (p. 46) 
As I have tried to indicate aboveu very few causal 
explanations exist to explain how stress might cause 
disease. The tendency for life stress researchers to 
concentrate only on their measures of stress in terms of 
life eventsv has meant that one important part of the 
assessment of the stress-illness relationship has not been 
given equal consideration. (Depue & Monroeu 1986) This may 
well explain the lack of causal explanations. Whilst it can 
be shownu for example, that depression is more likely if 
recent life events have been associated with some kind of 
lossu the psychophysiological mechanisms to explain such 
phenomena are lacking. 
This general non-specific approach can also be seen in the 
assessment of life stress where very often it is the event 
itself that is importantv as it causes change per se. 
(Depue et alu 1979) This will be discussed more in the next 
chapter. 
Much of the research into the relationship between stress 
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and illness is characterized by a general approach to both 
the assessment of stress as any change in the environrnentv 
and illness or disorder as any change in reported symptornso 
As Depue & Monroe (1986) point out, in a historical context 
it is ironic that so many researchers use such general 
measures and ignore many factors such as individual 
differences (coping, personality, social support) when the 
origins of research into stress and illness 1 as I discussed 
at the beginning of this chapter, carne from a rejection of 
general and unitary explanations for diseaseo (For example, 
the idea that all disease must be infectiouso) To conclude 
this chapter I would like to reinforce the importance of 
looking at stress-illness research in a historical contexto 
When this is done, it seems clear, that despite the efforts 
of many researchers, there is still a tendency to simplify, 
ignore individual differences, and generalize about the 
nature of stress-illness relationships, which after all, 
were only suggested in the first place because of the 
dissatisfaction of many people with models of disease which 
did not take enough factors into account, and simplified 
a complex processo 
"Life stress research is at a highly primitive 
level of analysis: although the 
conceptualization and measurement of 
environmental and psychosocial variables is 
becoming more sophisticated, most of the studies 
still generally ask the simplest of questions (is 
stress correlated with disorder?) in the context 
of poorly conceptualized and measured human 
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disorder, and with a design that measures the 
input variables so infrequently that little can 
be concluded about causationo Questions 
concerning the more precise nature of the process 
involved in the interaction between an 
environmental event and psychobiologic 
functioning are seldom entertained and more 
rarely investigatedo" (Depue & Monroe, 1985, Po 
316) 
3o6 Summaryo 
The citing of stress as a causal agent in disease is not 
newo Recent developments arose out of a dissatisfaction 
with unicausal models of disease and the increasing 
popularity of psychsomatic ideaso 
Early efforts to look at the effects of stress on bodily 
disease include Selye's (1936) pioneering work with 
animals, and Wolff (1953) who formulated the link between 
stress and illness in humanso 
Recent developments have moved towards searching for 
correlations beween measures of stress (life events) and 
measures of illnesso There are problems with both these 
types of measureso The correlations obtained are usually 
good enough only to explain about 9 per cent of the 
variance in illness rateso In response to this, researchers 
have worked on refining their measures of stress, assuming 
that the poor predicitve power of these input variables is 
not a reflection of the state of things, but more the 
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insensitivity of their measuring tools. 
While life event measures have been refinedu little 
attention has been paid to measures of disorder. This has 
not occurred as many researchers feel that stress will 
increase general levels of symptoms and so general measures 
of disorder are adequate. In contrast to this view, other 
researchers feel that stress-disorder interactions are 
quite specific, in other words the relationship between 
stress and disorder depends on the nature of the 
-disor~er/symptoms and the type of stressors an individual 
/" 
is exposed to. 
Stress has been used to explain illness in a rather 
imprecise way. Although it is clear that responses to 
extreme stressors causes severe tissue and organ damage, 
how chronic stress may operate over long periods of time to 
cause illness, and what psychobiological mechanisms are 
involved, is far from clear. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ASSESSMENT OF LIFE STRESS 
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~.1 Introduction. 
As suggested ~t the end of the previous chapter, the 
measures we choose to measure life stress will, to an 
extent, determine the strength and nature of the 
relationship we find between stress and illness. This 
chapter will primarily be concerned with the assessment of 
life stress by measuring life events, the problems with 
this approach and possible alternatives. 
It is worth noting here that there are other approaches to 
the assessment of life stress" Measuring events in people 1 s 
lives that require adjustment or adaptation is only one 
possible way of assessing life stress" Other approaches to 
the assessment of life stress usually concentrate on 
chronic stress in people's lives, rather than particular 
types of events" 
Ilfeld (1976, 1977) adopts the idea of "current social 
stressors"" Pearl in uses "role strains" (1983) and "chronic 
life strains" (Pearlin el al, 1981) to assess life stress" 
Weiss et al (1984) have developed the Stress Response 
Rating Scale (SRSS) which can give an estimate of the 
degree of stress a person has experienced in the past week" 
Daily Hassles (DeLangis et al, 1982, Kanner et al, 19811 
Lazarus 1984), chronic stressors (Eckenrode, 1984), minor 
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life events (Monroep 1983) v daily events and daily 
experiences (Stone & Neale, l982p 1981) are various 
attempts to examine the effect of stressful events as they 
occur on a daily basis. Other measures of stress will be 
discussed later in the light of the shortcomings and 
problems of life events. 
4.2 B~c~gr9und to the life events approach. 
There is general agreement on the background to the life 
events approach. Although this background is diverse 
(Perkinsv 1982) v two major figures stand out in the early 
part of this century for their contibutions. 
Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend (1974a) r Holmes (1979), and Sarason 
et al (1982) cite Adolf Meyer as one of these figures. 
Meyer used a life chart as a diagnostic tool. The life 
chart was a biography of the patient and included 
information about previous medical disorders and when they 
occurredr and, changes in the patient's life situation such 
as leaving school, changing jobs, the death of relatives 
and other "fundamentally important environmental 
incidents." (Meyer, 195lv p. 53) The emotional reponses to 
these events was also noted. Meyer believed that an 
important factor in the development of disorders was the 
setting in which it occured, with regard to life changes. 
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In summing up Meyer's contribution, Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend 
(l974a) say~ 
~Thus Meyer taught that life events mAy play an 
important part of the etiology of a disorder and 
that they need not be bizarre or catastrophic to 
be pathogeniCo 11 (Po 3) 
The second figure, often mentioned in reviews of life 
events is Walter Cannono Although mentioned before, it is 
worth restating some of his basic observationso In "Bodily 
changes in pain, hunger, fear and rage" (1929) he outlined 
some of the physiological changes which accompany emotional 
responseso In addition, he suggested why such changes may 
lead to illnesso 
"ooothe persistent derangement of bodily 
functions in strong emotional reactions can be 
interpreted as due to persistence of stimuli 
which evoke the reactionso They may persist 
because not naturally eliminated by completion 
of the emotional impulse, or because completion 
of the impulse is made impossible by 
circumstanceo" (Cannon, 1929, Po 253-254) 
There were other influences in life events researcho Selye 
(1956) outlined more carefully the response to stress and 
the diseases of adaptationo But the publication of "life 
stress and bodily disease" (Wolff et al, 1950) produced 
propositions about stress and disease that "have been 
central to subsequent research on stressful life eventso" 
(Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend, 1974a, Po 4) 
The background to life events research rests on two main 
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assumptionso The first is that life stress is a factor in 
disease causation or illness onseto The second is that 
major life events cause life stresso From these two 
assumptions it follows that the main thrust of life events 
research is to demonstrate that life events are a causal 
factor in diseaseo 
This brief introduction to the background of life events 
research will now be followed by a historical account of 
the measures of life events which have been developed and 
applied. 
4.3 The measurement of life events. 
As stated above, the measures one chooses to assess life 
events may well determine the nature and extent of the 
relationship found between life events and illness. A 
survey of the methods developed over the years (in an 
attempt to improve event-disorder relationships) will help 
to illustrate some of the methodological problems inherent 
in life events research. (This survey will be selective. 
Zimmerman (1983a) has listed some 18 life event 
inventoriesu so time and space do not permit a 
comprehensive surveyo) 
As Depue & Monroe (1985) point out, the statement made in a 
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review article by Rabkin E: Struening (1975) that life 
events account at best for 9 per cent of the variance in 
disorder, still holds true today. The development of life 
events research is marked by the regular appearance of new 
improved inventories, more complex models, and more complex 
statistical techniques. This demonstrates the "reflexive 
style 11 (Depue & Monroe r 1985, p. 303) of researchers in 
this area. The poor predictive power of life events 
measures is 
measurement 
paradigm, so 
viewed as a consequence of inadequate 
rather than a result of an inadequate research 
researchers revert back to the life events 
paradigm, despite its obvious shortcomings. 
4.3.1 The social readjustment rating scale. 
The publication of the SRRS by Holmes and Rahe (1967) 
marked the beginning of life events research. The SRRS was 
a sophistication of a previous measurer the schedule of 
recent events (SRE). The SRE is a list of forty-two events 
which were chosen on the basis of clinical observations 
(Rahe, 1974a). Respondents could record, for specified time 
periods, the frequency of occurence of these events. Also 
illness rates and types were recorded. It was found that 
for a variety of illnesses, the time of illness, or illness 
onset, was significantly associated with a high level 
(or 0 cluster 0 ) of reported life events (e.g. Hawkins et al, 
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l957i Rahe et al, J964). So the SRE simply used the 
frequency of events as an indicator of life stress. 
The SRRS was a significant refinement of the SRE as it 
allowed for an estimate of the magnitude of these events. 
According to Perkins (1982), Holmes and Rahe realised that 
some events on the scale (e.g. death of a spouse) would 
impose a far greater change than other events (e.g. 
Christmas). In order to obtain ratings of the magnitudes of 
these eventsy subjects were asked to rate the degree of 
readjustment they thought the event would require 
"regardless of the des ir abi 1 i ty of this event." (Holmes & 
Rahe, 1967, p. 213) In this conception of life events, it 
is change per se, rather than undesirable change that is 
viewed as stressful. These ratings represent the 'weights' 
given to each event. 
For the list of 
violations of 
events, the scores range from 11 (minor 
the law) to 100 (death of a spouse). These 
scores represent life change units (LCU). Holmes & Masuda 
(1974) report that of those respondents who had LCU scores 
of greater than 300 over the past year 79 per cent had an 
associated episode of illness. For those experiencing 
between 200 and 299 LCUy 51 per cent experienced associated 
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illness. And for those with LCU scores between 150 and ]99, 
37 per cent had an associated illness. These early studies 
vere retrospective, and respondents provided information 
about life events (the SRE) and major health changes by 
year of occurrence over the previous ten years. 
Although the measures and methodology were criticised and 
refined almost right from the beginning (e.g. Masuuda & 
Holmesr 19671 Mechanic & Volkartr 1961) the SRRS has been 
widely used. Holmes (1979) estimates that the SRRS has 
formed the basis of over 1,000 publications. Relationships 
have been found between LCU scores and many health 
variables. For exampler sudden cardiac death (Rahe & Lind, 
1971), chronic illness (Wyler et al, 1971) and clinical 
depression (Paykel et alr 1969). 
Studies which have used the SRRC have been criticised for a 
number of reasons. Firstr they assume that it is change per 
ser rather than undesirable change which produces increases 
in symptoms. Second, many of these studies only collect 
information about illness episodes and life events 
retrospectivelyr despite possible recall bias (Brown, 
1974a), recall accuracy (Jenkins et al, 1979) r and more 
general problems demonstrating cause-effect relations in 
such studies (Hudgens, 19741 Monroer l982a). Third, the 
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weighting of the life events assumes that the stressfulness 
o( such events is best determined by general ratings of 
these events instead of individual ratings. This is by no 
means an exhaustive list of criticismsv those which apply 
generally to life events research will be discussed later. 
These particular methodological and theoretical problems 
are identified here as they explain how and why new 
measures of life events were developed. 
The problem of retrospective studies is easily cured, and 
many studies have used prospective designs (e.g. Hinkle, 
1974; Myers et al, 1974; Theorell, 1974) where future 
illness rates are predicted by present measures of stress. 
However, the two other problems identified above require 
new life events assessments to be developed. 
4.3.2 The life experiences survey. 
The life experiences survey (LES) was developed by Sarason, 
Johnson & Siegel (1978) in response to some of the 
shortcomings of the SRRS. 
The problem of individual versus general (idiographic 
versus normative) ratings of the stressfulness of events 
has been the subject of much study (e.g. Fontana et al, 
1979; Horowitz et al, 1979; Redfield & Stone, 1979). Most 
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of the objections to general scalings of life events were 
based on the observation that clearly certa1n life events 
Hould require more readjustment for some people r.han for 
otherso For example the item "divorce" on the SRRS \·JOuld 
presumably require variable levels of readjustment 
dependent on previous experience of divorce, the amount of 
change in domestic arrangements, whether or not children 
were involved, how predictable the divorce was, and so ono 
To give this life event a LCU value of 73, regardless of 
the actual circumstances surrounding the divorce seems to 
be a very inaccurate way of assessing the amount of 
readjustment this event requires, even if we believe that 
it is the amount of adjustment, rather than the 
undesirability of the event that will determine its 
stressfulnessa 
The issue of whether it is the positive or negative 
(desirable or undesirable) aspects of life events, or the 
change per se involved in readjustment to life events has 
also been the subject of much debate and study (e.g. Brown, 
1974~ Muller et al, 1977~ Ross & Mirowsky, 1979~ Vinokur & 
Selzer, 1975). Although there is evidence that it is the 
undesirability of the events that relates best to health 
outcomes (eogo Gersen et al, 1974~ Vinokur & Selzer, 1975), 
this issue has not been resolved, as other studies have 
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on health (eogo r·Hller et alv :_i_96l) o A.l.i-"0v ··--~;-J_i_~·::. (l~:::L) 
h~s suggested that findings which support the idea that it 
is the undesirabilty rather than change per se that is 
related to health outcomes may be produced by the 
confounding of variablesv and, that undesirable events may 
well be related to changes in psychological healthv whereas 
change per se may be more associated with physical health 
(Thoits, 1983) o According to Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend 
(198la) the most extensively studied issue in the debate on 
the nature of stressful life events has been the 
conceptualization of the stressfulness of life events as 
either determined by change per se or undesirability of the 
evento 
The LES attempted to take account of these possible 
shortcomings by allowing for both the desirability or 
undesirability of each event to be judged by the 
individual, as well as the impact of each even to In 
addition, the LES was tailored to the population being 
studied, so, for example in the case of the "pregnancy" 
item on the SRRS (Holmes & Rahe, 1967) which would only 
apply to a womanv this event was changed to 
"wife/girlfriends preganacy" for a male, and left just as 
"pregnancy" for a female (Sarason et al, 1978) o 
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•rhe LES conlains 4:7 i terns and a scale neJrt to each event 
starting at minus 3 and moving through to plus 3o In 
addition to checking those items they had experiencedf 
respondents were also instructed to "indicate the extent to 
which you viewed the event as having either a positive or 
negative jmpact on your life at the time the event 
occurredo That is, indicate the type and extent of impact 
the event hado A rating of minus 3 would indicate an 
extremely negative impacto A rating 
impact either positive or negativeo A 
of zero suggests no 
rating of plus 3 
would indicate an extremely positive impact." (Sarason et 
al, 1978, Po 943) The LES also contains space to include 
three life experiences of the respondent's choosingo 
It was found that the negatively rated items on the LES 
correlated better with some dependent measures of stress 
(psychological screening inventory, Beck depression 
inventory) than the LCU scores from the SRRS (Sarason et 
al, 1978) o A slightly adapted form of the LES developed for 
children and adolescents, called the life events checklist 
(LEC) gives additional support to the idea that it is the 
undesirability of the events, rather than the change per se 
entailed by the events that is stressful (Johnson & 
McCutcheon, 1980) o 
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It appears that the LES has not been w1dely used in life 
events rescarcho Despite this~ some researchers feel it 
represents an improvement over the SRRS (Sarason et al, 
1982) o The LES is only one attempt that has been made to 
construct a different type of life events scale. Other 
modifications of life events scales have generally involved 
increasing the numbers of events in the list, or 
classifying the events into 1 types 1 (eog. Paykelu 1969, 
1974, Tausig, 1982; Dohrenwend et al, 1978, 1987.) o 
Before a general discussion of life events research, one 
further development in life events measurement will be 
discussed. 
4o3.3 The psychiatric epidemiology research interview. 
The psychiatric epidemiology research interview has been 
developed by Barbara Dohrenwend, Bruce Dohrenwend and their 
colleagues (Dohrenwend et al, 1978, 1982). This measure has 
been chosen as the Dohrenwends are possibly the best known 
researchers in the area of life events (for example, 
Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend, 1974, 1981) and their view 
perhaps best represents those researchers who are committed 
to life events research. 
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The PERI contains 102 life event items which draw on 
previous life events inventories and the ~researchers 0 own 
experiences". (Dohr.enwend et alu 1978, p. 209) These events 
were then rated by judges using the same instructions 
Holmes & Rahe (1967) used for the SRRS, again giving the 
item "marriage" a value of 500, so the other events could 
be compared, and accordingly weighted. 
A great deal of time has been devoted to methodological 
issues in constructing the PERI. Desirability of the events 
was rated simply in terms of gain, ambiguous or loss. The 
event was rated for its setting as either universal 
(occuring independently of any particular setting) or 
limited (to particular sociocultural settings). Other 
factors such as controllability over the event, and 
possible pathological consequences were also taken into 
account. 
For all the sophistication of this measure, it is not clear 
why some classifications of the events have been chosen and 
others have been missed out. In fact, the only advantages 
the PERI has over other life events inventories are those 
that Dohrenwend et al (1978) identify. They propose 
procedural improvement for three aspects of life event 
scale construction. These aspects are "construction of a 
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life event list, selection of judges, and tests of whether 
judges agree on their ratings. 0 (p. 20~) Although such 
improvements are important, the three problems they 
identify can not be considered as the most important, even 
if one basically accepts the life events hypothesis. 
Dohrenwend et al (1978) say in conclusion that the PERI 
life events scale does have technical weaknesses, these are 
no greater than in other scales, but are simply more 
visible in the PERI because of the methodological rigor 
used in its construction. "We believe, therefore, that 
despite its technical weakness the PERI scale will provide 
an improved measure of stressful life events. At the same 
time, we want to emphasize that, like any other scale, it 
is neither universal nor timeless. In contrast, we hope 
that the procedure we propose will lead to a general and 
permanent methodological gain in studies of stressful life 
events." (Dohrenwend et al, 1978, p. 228) 
4.3.4 General comments about life events measures. 
Since the publication of the SRRC in 1967 by Holmes & Rahe 
there has been considerable development in life event 
assessment techinques. Despite this, little more is known 
about the relationship between life events and illness and, 
as mentioned elsewhere, the predictive power of life events 
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in accounting for the variability of health outcomes has 
remained low at about 10 per cent. 
A major problem with life events scales is the problem of 
weighting. Lorimor et al (1978) suggest that no useful 
information is provided by applying different weights to 
life events. In other wordsu a simple frequency count (as 
originally used in the SRE (Rahe et alu 1964)) can provide 
correlations of the same magnitude as weighted life events 
scores. Rahe (1974) reports that correlations between 
weighted life event scores (LCU) and non-weighted scores_ 
(simply giving each event the value of 1) have reached as 
high as .89 giving further support to the idea that ranking 
and giving weights to life events gives little more 
information than a simple frequency count. 
It is often difficult to understand the enthusiasm shown by 
many researchers for life events. Increases in the 
sophistication of techniques does little for the predictive 
power of life events. Some researchers do however feel that 
life events researchu as suchu has gone about as far as it 
can go. "It is now time to stop replicating and 
embroidering the basic life events finding and to push on 
to generating and testing systematic theories of stress 
processes." (Thoits, 1983u p. 87) 
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4.~ The neaning of life events as stressors. 
It is clear that in recent yearsv methodological 
problems have become a central feature of life events 
research. These problems focus on the methodsu proceduresr 
and statistical analysis which should be used. 
" •••. differences about what procedure is best 
often seem to emerge from an underlying 
difference as to whether the measure should be 
designed to maximise the strength of its 
relationship with indicators of illness and 
disability or whether it should be designed to 
test hypotheses about relations between specific 
aspects of life stress and illness. The former 
aim dictates packing as much infomation as 
possible that might be relevant to occurrences 
of illness into life event measures. The latter 
aimv in contrastr dictates using measures that 
indicate as cleanly as possible single aspects or 
dimensions of life events." (Dohrenwend & 
Dohrenwendv 198lav p. 6) 
The tendency in a great deal of life events research is to 
judge the 'accuracy' of life event measures in terms of how 
well they account for variability in illness rates. 
Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend suggest in the above quotev that 
only those who pack as much information as possible into 
their life event measures are guilty of judging the 
accuracy of their 'life stress' measures by how well they 
predict illness rates. However, the problem for nearly all 
life events research is how else can the accuracy of life 
events measures be judged? 
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As Brown (19Dla) points out ~most life-event researcl1 has 
been based on a dictiOI!ary approach to ~eaning. A bjrth is 
considered a birth and no more." (p. 187) In other words, 
meaning is simply ascribed on the basis of a value (e.g. 
LCU), irrespective of the 1 kind 0 of birth experienced by 
the woman (were there complications?, or twins?), or by the 
context in which the event occured (was the child wanted? 1 
will the mother receive support?). Given this very 
quantitative approach to life-events assessment, it is 
hardly surprising that the success of these measures have 
to be judged in quantitative terms (illness rates). 
The problem with this attitude to the measurement of life 
events ("if the life events measure predicts illness rates 
more accurately then it must be a better measure of life 
stress") is that it makes assumptions about the 
stress-illness relationship which in fact it is setting out 
to demonstrate by using life events measures. The a priori 
assumptions made by some researchers are that: 
1. Life stress causes significant health changes. 
2. Life events are stressful. 
3. Measures of life events should therefore predict health 
changes. 
4. If life event measures do not predict health changes 
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very accurately, the measure needs refinement. 
Very rarely are the first three assumptions challenged 
however, and the focus for life events research has been to 
refine the measures of life events used. The assumption 
which is most problematic is number 2, that life events are 
stressful. 
Whilst it is clear that dramatic events in people's lives 
such as the death of a spouse may well have effects on 
health, the processes involved are far more complex than 
life events models of stress~disorder relationships 
suggest. Neglected variables have always been a problem in 
life events research. This is possibly because life events 
have in themselves become synonymous with stress and 
assumed a status which they were not intended to have. 
Kessler et al (1985) state that life events are 
"methodological expedients" {p. 539) and are not in 
themselves more 'stressful' than, for example chronic 
stress. 
The simple idea that life events can relate to illness has 
generated a great deal of research. Most of it, 
unfortunately concentrating solely on the life events 
themselves as easily measurable entities. The development 
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and increasing sophistication of life event measures and 
statistical analysis has almost become more important than 
demonstrating the nature of the stress~ illness 
relationshipo For nearly all research in life eventsr the 
strengthening of the life events-illness correlation has 
assumed primary importanceo 
"In spite of the repeatedly observed trivial 
relationships between measures of change in life 
events and illnes onset (or care-seeking 
behaviour) v many investigators continue to focus 
on the linear relationship between independent 
and dependent variables without consideration or 
control of intervening and mediating variablesv 
some of which easily lend themselves to standard 
measurement procedureso To advance the accurate 
prediction and understanding of illness onsetu 
the design of empirical studies must take into 
accountv as Mechanic and others have stressedv 
the complexity of the phenomena being studied." 
(Rabkin & Strueningv 1976v p. 1019) · 
As stated in the quote above, many researchers feel that 
life events measures are an over~simplification of a very 
complex processv or set of processes which play a part in 
determining the relationship between the environment and 
health. For examplev Aagaard (1984) suggests that life 
event studies do not take enough variables into accountv 
and that a move towards a qualitative approach is requiredo 
Pearlin et al (1981) agree that stress is a complex 
process, and that research into social stress should "be 
raised to a level that matches the richness and intricacy 
of what it strives to explaino" (Po 352) Rahe (1974) 
considers that given the number of intervening variables 
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that exist between a stressful life event and health 
outcomes 'lit is impressive that something as simple as a 
brief questionnaire recording of subjects recent life 
changes shows any significant correlation with a criterion 
as distant and unspectacular as subjects minor illness 
reports up to a year later." (p. 81) 
Within the context of a complex set of variables that 
play a part in the stress-disorder relationship (e.g. 
social support, coping responses, personality factors, 
psychophysiological responses, organic predispositions, 
etc) it is difficult to examine the meaning of life events 
as stressors. 
One issue in gauging the meaning of life events concerns 
the ipsative versus normative method of scaling such 
events. Some researchers believe that the meaning of life 
events should be considered as emerging from the perception 
of that event by the individual (in a social context). "A 
causal link between stress and illness makes theoretical 
sense only when considered in terms of the meaning of life 
events for particular individuals." (Brown, 1974, p. 235) 
"What is important for their consequences (life events) is 
the subjective meaning of the event rather than its 
objective character." (Antonovsky, 1974) This position 
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leads to personal scaling of life events (Zjmmermanu 1983). 
On the other hand u some researchers think that the best v1ay 
of judging the meaning of life events as stressors is by 
general, normative weightings of the stressfulness of (or 
amount of readjustment required by) events (Holmes & Rahe, 
1967) 0 
One problem with weighting events by general ratings (the 
means of weight ings given by panels of judges) is that 
different groups may well have very different perceptions 
of the stressfulness of events. Many factors have been 
shown to significantly alter the perception of events. For 
example cultural and ethnic factors contribute to 
variability in weighting events (Thoits, 1983). 
However, problems exist with subjective ratings of events. 
Subjects who are depressed, and psychiatric patients tend 
to rate events as more stressful (e.g. Paykel, 1971) thus 
causing confounding (Dohrenwend, 1979) o The finding that 
confuses the whole issue of the weighting and meaning of 
life events is (as said above) that little "predictive 
power is gained from the use of either objective or 
subjective weights" (Thoits, 1983, Po 55) o Although 
'predictive power' may not be a good way to judge the 
uaccuracy' of life events weightings, it is clear that if 
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different scaling methods are used and produce little 
difference in predicive power of life events scores (eogo 
McFarlane et al, 19801 Ross & Mirowsky, 1979) the meaning 
of life events as stressors is very unclearo 
More recent theories about the meaning of life events 
(reviewed by Thoits, 1983) attempt to take account of other 
factors that may lead to disordero Resistance factors such 
as coping and social support (see next chapter) are being 
incorporated into stress-disorder modelso It is thought 
that it is the consequences of a life event, rather than 
the event itself which produces stress. Getting away from 
the non-specific idea of stress and illness, that stress in 
the form of life events lowers general resistance to all 
illness (eogo Holmes & Masuda, 1974), it has been proposed 
that particular types of life events may be associated with 
particular health outcomes. Gersten et al (1974) and Thoits 
(1983) suggest that total amount of change involved in the 
life events (eog. the SRRS) is more related to physical 
disorder, whereas undesirable change may be more associated 
with psychological disturbanceo If this is the case then 
the nonspecific notion of the stress-illness relationship 
needs to be reexamined, and measurements of disorder should 
be more carefully conceptualized (Depue & Monroe, 1985) o 
-142-
The meaning of life events as stressors is difficult to 
determine, mainly because of the lack of research that has 
been directed at this questiono But, as indicated above, 
research is perhaps moving towards addressing this crucial 
question although the evidence for such moves is not yet 
apparent in published studieso The reason why the meaning 
of life events as stressors is difficult to grasp is 
perhaps because they were not designed to have 1 meaning 1 as 
sucho They are best seen simply as an epidemiological 
research tool whereby simple measures of life events can 
account for some (but not much) of the variance in health 
outcomeso Although, as Thoits (1983) makes clear, life 
events research has methodological limitations and an 
atheoretical approach, it still has a fundamental 
importance in that it adds weight to the view that health 
and disease are the product of a complex interaction 
between social, psychological, environmental and biological 
factors where disease 1 causation' as well as health 
1 causation' is multifactoralo A fact that life events 
research, in its enthusiasm to show the predictive power of 
life events, appears to have forgotteno 
Other approaches to the measurement of stress do indicate 
some of the shortcomings in life events researcho A brief 
and selective review of these will now follow to conclude 
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this chapter. 
4.5 Othe~ approaches to measuring stress. 
The assessment of chronic stress has recently becoDe a 
concern of a number of researchers (e.g. Eckenrodev l~BAJ 
~onroer 1983~ Lazarus, 1984). The idea that 'stress' can be 
measured as an independent variable is challenged in much 
of the work on chronic stress (Lazarus et alv 1985). 
In life events research it is assumed that stress is 'out 
there' in the environment and puts strain on people when it 
'hits' them in the form of life events. The individual's 
response to the eventv and how that response unfolds over 
time has not been the concern of most life events research. 
Because of this approachv stress has been seen as an 
independent variable and disorder as the dependent 
(outcome) variable. If we view stress-disorder 
relationships as complex and multifactoral then a 
independent variable approach to stress is unacceptable. 
Dohrenwend et al (1984) suggest that: 
" .•.••• some life events, some hassles, some 
networks, and some types of social support are 
consequences of personal dispositions in general 
and psychopathology in particularv whereas 
others are independent of such characteristics." 
(p. 229) 
What Dohrenwend· et al (1984) go on to propose is that 
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measures of life stress should take these factors into 
account. This is what Lazarus et al (1985) describe as an 
attempt to clean up the independent variable, so that the 
relationship between stress (the independent variable) and 
disorder (the dependent variable) can be demonstrated more 
positively, and measures are not confounded. 
The alternative view is expressed by Lazarus et al (1985) 
who state that stress does not exist in the absence of the 
person-environment relationship. How can one speak of an 
independent variable (stress) when stress only exists when 
it is perceived and exerienced as such. The definition of 
stress is circular and can not be defined independently of 
the individual's reactionv which in turn will be determined 
by social support, coping responses and so on. 
"Thus some of the confounding ••..• reflects the 
fusion of variables in nature rather than being 
merely the result of measurement errors of 
researchers. If we try to delete the overlap in 
variables of genuine importance, we will be 
distorting nature to fit a simpler, mythical 
metatheory of seperable antecedent and 
consequent variables. We urge researchers to be 
very wary of throwing out the baby with the bath 
water in their efforts to objectify stress as an 
event in the environment." (Lazarus et al, 1985, 
p. 778) 
This view reflects a concern that stress should be seen as 
the result of a complex interaction between the person and 
their environment. This has been referred to as a 
transactional view of the stress-disorder relationship 
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(Caplan et al, 198~; Fleming et al, 1984; Lazarus et al, 
1982; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984i Lazarus & Launier, 1978). It 
also views stress as a process, rather than a response to 
external environmental events (Folkman & Lazarus, 1986, 
Pearlin et al, 1981), with this process also being dynamic 
(Folkman et al, in press). (See next chapter for further 
discussion of the transactional view.) 
Kessler et al (1985) claim that the diverse strands of 
research to be found in stress research are beginning to 
converge on a common conception of the stress process. 
"At its center is the notion that 
sets off a process of adaptation. 
that this process unfolds over 
acknowledges that this process 
structural factors as well 
dispositions and vulnerabilities." 
(Kessler et alu 1985 1 p. 565) 
stress exposure 
It recognises 
time, and it 
is modified by 
as personal 
Given this view of the stress processu the development of 
measures to assess chronic stress is an obvious step, as 
life event measures tell us little or nothing about the 
process of stress and how it might be modified over time. 
Although, compared to life events, relatively few studies 
of chronic stress have been published, early results are 
encouraging. various measures have been developedu 
including daily hassles (Kanner et al, 1981) and minor life 
events (Monroe, 1983). Such measures are better associated 
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(than major life events) with psychological symptoms 
(Kanner et al, 1981; Monroe, 1983), daily reports of mood 
(Eckenrode, 1984~ Stone & Neale, 1984) and somatic health 
(DeLangis et al, 1982). (See next chapter.) 
Such frequent assessments of stress also provide an 
opportunity to study mediating variables such as social 
support and coping. These will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
The recent moves towards the assessment of chronic stress 
suggest that major life events give a very rough picture of 
stressful person-environment transactions. Stressful life 
events may well exert their influence on a daily basis in 
terms of chronic stressors. A life event is not an isolated 
environmental event, rather it imposes changes in daily 
living, and the way individual's perceive, organise and 
attempt to operate on the environment. Individuals could be 
experiencing considerable stress which would 
life events inventories. From the vast 
never show on 
number of 
situations, experiences and events that could be 
experienced as stressful, life events probably represent 
only one small part of the total. They have the added 
disadvantage of encouraging a view of stress as external 
and objective (engineering analogy) whereas in fact stress 
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can not be said to e~ist independently of peorle perceiving 
it as such. 
Research into chronic stress is an encouraging development 
in the assessment of stress where life events research is 
dominant. However, there are many conceptual and 
methodological problems involved with the development of 
chronic stress measures, so while they are a welcome 
departure from crude life events assessments of stress, 
they should be viewed critically and with caution. If this 
is done, some of the problems encountered in life events 
research as a result of over-enthusiasm and non-critical 
acceptance, may well be avoided. 
4.6 Conclusion. 
Life-events are the most widely used measure of stress. 
They have not proved very successful either in terms of 
accounting for variance in illness rates or in terms of 
providing adequate explanations for the stress-disorder 
relationship. Part of the problem is that researchers in 
the area have very different aims. Whilst some look for 
epidimiological factors, which can explain variability in 
general illness rates for groups of people, and how they 
can be readily measured for the large groups involved, 
other researchers are much more psychologically oriented, 
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looking for psychological factors such as coping responses 
or social support to explain the variability in disorder. 
These researchers are more interested in the processes 
involved than being able to predict disorder for large 
groups of people. Although these two different aims may 
never be resolved, there is no doubt that factors such as 
social support and coping responses play an important role 
in a multicausal model of health, disease and adpatation. 
It is these mediating factors I will go on to consider in 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE ASSESSMENT OF MEDIATING VARIABLES 
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5.1 Introduction. 
In this chapter I will briefly discuss two factors that are 
thought to play a part in the complex interaction between 
person and environment in the production of both health and 
disease. I have chosen to look at coping responses and 
social support. The reason for this choice is not because 
these two factors are the most important, or most 
interesting (see 5.2) g but because they provide a good 
example of the kind of factors that must be taken into 
account when considering the effects of stress on health. 
Also, these two factors are often examined together (e.g. 
Andrews et al, 19781 Billings & Moos, 1981, 1984, Hirsch, 
1980, 1981) as social support and coping are often 
interdependent. For example social support can lead to 
effective coping, and coping itself can mean the successful 
mobilization of social support. 
In this chapter I will discusss these two factors 
separately, althoughg as indicated above there can be a 
large degree of overlap in these variables. 
Before starting the discussion of coping and social support 
it is worth looking at some of the other factors which have 
been found to be important in the stress illness 
relationship. 
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5.2 Other mediat1ng ractors. 
The factors which are said to play a part in the complex 
interaction between person1 environment and health are 
referred to in a number of ways. 
Jenkins (1979) calls such factors "psychosocial modifiers" 
which are " .. various biological, psychological, and social 
variables ••.••• suggested to act in powerful ways to modify 
the relation between stress inputs and psychiatric 
outcomes." (p. 15) Cronkite & Moos (1984) use the term 
"moderating factors" to describe social supports and 
coping. Billings & rlJoos (1982, 1984au 1985) refer to the 
multidimensional aspects of social networks as "social 
resources". Norris & Murrell (1984) define resources as 
"those relatively stable conditions and supplies that are 
appraised by the person as available for use in meeting 
life changes" (p. 424). Berkman & Syme (1979} report that 
"people who lacked social and community ties were more 
likely to die •...• than those with more extensive contacts." 
(p. 186) They refer to the idea of "host resistance" to 
explain these different death rates, as "social and 
community ties may be protective against wide variety of 
disease outcomes". (p. 202) Cohen & Wills (1985) review the 
"stress-buffering" model of social support. It is called 
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"buffering" as it is suggested that social support 
11 1:Juffersn or protects the person frcm the "potentially 
pathogenic influence of stressful events.~~ (Cohen & Wills, 
1985~ p. 310) 
All these termsu 'modifiers' u 'moderating factors', 0 social 
resources', 'host resistance 0 u 0 buffers' somehow suggest 
that stress is a physical force. This goes back to the 
engineering analogy discussed in chapter 1. It is as if 
there is a battle being fought against the external enemy, 
stress. We use 'resources' to put up 'resistance' to, or 
'buffer' this external force. The effect of the 'input 0 of 
stress is so modified by the buffers and resisting forces. 
Seward (1984), an engineeru has suggested that there are 
ways in which "structural engineering concepts could be 
used to build and analyse realistic mental models." (p. 4) 
Terms such as stress, strainu fatigue and collapse are 
common to both psychology and engineering. It appears as 
though many researchers picture the effects of stress in 
the same way as an engineer might picture the effects of 
stress on an object. The problem with this approach, which 
is rarely made explicit, is that it tends to allow 
researchers to talk of 'stress', 'buffers' and 'resistance' 
without having to look too closely at the processes 
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involved. For example, we can say that social support 
buffers the effects of stress, as those people who have 
higher rates of social support are less likely to fall ill 
than those with lower rates. The use of the term ubufferu 
here neatly allows us to 'explainu how social support may 
play a part in the stress=illness relationship without 
actually explaining anything. 
Although Cox (1978) suggests that the engineering analogy 
is too simplistic, this is probably because he uses a very 
simple idea of structural engineering. Seward (1984) uses 
more sophisticated models of structural engineering which 
would allow us to "go beyond simpler deterministic attempts 
to explain behaviour". (p. 6) Such models can analyse 
thousands of inter-related variables and stress within 
continuous structures (such as car bodies). 
The main problem with the engineering 
permeates and restricts the ways in which 
stress and its possible relationships 
analogy is that it 
we think about 
with health and 
illness. In general, stress is thought of as an external 
force, which has to pass through certain buffers, filters, 
or mediators. "In sum, a subject's recent life change 
experience passes through several steps of perception and 
defense before bodily symptoms are perceived and perhaps 
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reportecL" (Raheu 1974) Rahe also pictorially represents 
life change in terms of a beam of 1 ight \vbich passes 
through lenses and filters before it is focused on an 
iillness rulei. This uni-directional idea of stress is 
common in most stress research, and most imoderating' 
variables are seen as filters, modifiers, or buffers in 
between the environment and the person. 
Personality factors have been the subject of much research. 
The two main personality traits, or dimensions that have 
been examined are the hardy personality, and the type-A, 
type-B distinction, although other personality variables 
have been studied (Minter & Kimball, 1980). 
Kobasa (1979) developed the idea of the hardy personality. 
The main hypothesis is that those who have hardy 
personality characteristics are less likely to become ill 
than those who do 
periods of life 
not have such characteristics during 
stress (Kobasa, 1982). The hardy 
personality characteristics include commitment to self; 
vigorousness towards involvement in one's environment; a 
tendency to meaningfully evaluate the impact of life events 
in terms of a general life plan; internal locus of control; 
and the ability to perceive relatively little stress 
emerging from personal or inner-life concerns (Kobasa, 
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1979a). It has been shown that "stressful life events and 
predisposition increase illnessv whereas personality··b&sed 
hardiness decreases illness.~ (Kobasa et alv 1981) 
The type~Af or coronary-prone behaviour pattern has been 
described as containing the following characteristics~ An 
intense drive to achieve poorly-defined but self-selected 
goals~ an eagerness to compete, persistent desire for 
recognition and advancement: continuous involvement in 
diverse activities subject to time restrictions~ habitual 
tendancy to accelerate the rate of excecution of mental and 
physical functions, and extraordinary mental and physical 
alertness (Taggart & Carruthers, 1977). The type-B 
personality displays the 
type-A behaviour pattern 
opposite 
is also 
characteristics. 
described as 
The 
the 
coronary-prone behaviour pattern as studies have shown that 
those individuals who display type-A characteristics are 
more likely to develop coronary heart disease than those 
who display type-B characteristics (e.g. Rhodewalt et alp 
1984). It has been found that type-A persons show 
significant rises in serum cholesterol and enhanced 
discharges of catecholamines (Rosenman & Chesney, 1982), 
and is a source of risk for coronary heart disease 
independent of traditional risk factors (Carver & 
Humphries, 1982) such as diet, smoking and obesity. 
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Although personality characteristics do play a part in 
determining health outcomes, such distinctions as type-A, 
type-B have been criticized for being too simplistic in the 
sense that they do not take into account other factors such 
as hardinessr coping skills and environment. Friedman et al 
(1985) comment that "we no longer need additional studies 
that simply divide people in terms of type-A and type-B and 
then relate this classification to a dependant variable. 
Rather a multidimensional classification of people 
..•• should be employed." (p. 1313). This statem~nt is 
typical of many researchers who find the epidemiologically 
useful type-A, type-B distinction psychologically 
unsatisfying as it does not examine the processes involved, 
such as coping (Rhodewalt & Davison, 1983). 
Personality factors, social support and coping are the 
three main 'groups 0 of modifiers studied in relation to 
stress and health. However, other factors must be involved 
in the stress illness relationship, although such factors 
have certainly not been studied as extensively as they 
should be. 
Cohen et al (1982) identify at least ten other potential 
mediators of the relationship between stress and illness. 
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These includeu on an individual levelu past experiences~ 
genetic predispositions to illnessi biological factors such 
as diseased organsu diet. On a social and envionmental 
levelr they list 
characteristics~ social 
geographic 
prejudice 
and 
and 
architectural 
expectations; 
cultural belief systems, environmental stressors such as 
war and economic upheaval. Mechanic (1974) suggests that 
many stressors are "ambiguous and intangible; they are 
created out of the social fabric and the social climate 
that exist at any time.~ (p. 35) This perspective sees 
stress as arising in large part from the social structure 
in contrast to the life events approach which measures 
stress as easily identifiable, discrete events. 
There is growing recognition that although stress is 
related to illness, the way it does so is subject to great 
individual variation. For many researchers (e.g. Garrity & 
Marx, 1985; Gentry & Kobasa, 1984) fuller consideration of 
the intervening variables is 
the way in which stress is 
disease. 
vital if we are to understand 
related to both health and 
In this section I have only mentioned some of the factors 
which help to produce health and disease. Obviously in any 
fully comprehensive model of stress and illness a great 
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many factors would have to be taken into accountr far more 
than researchers have even begun to consider. I will now go 
on to discuss briefly two of these areas of studyr coping 
and social support. 
5.3 Coping. 
Coping has been widely studied in a rather non-systematic 
way. The result of this is that many definitions, 
conceptions, and measures of coping exist. It is not the 
purpose of this chapter to give a complete account of these 
different formulations, but rather, to selectively show 
the background to concepts of coping, and some of the 
important issues in this area. 
5.3.1 Background to coping concepts. 
According to Lazarus & Folkman (1984) the concept of coping 
has origins in two different research traditionsv animal 
experimentation and psychoanalytic ego psychology. 
From the animal experimentation tradition, coping is 
closely related to the idea of adaptation in evolution 
(Hamburg et al, 1974). Because of the biological basis of 
work in this area, coping tends to be defined in biological 
terms. Ursin et al (1978) have a definition of coping which 
is "based on the ultimate reduction of the physiological 
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arousal produced as a consequence of the novelty or threat 
of any given stimulus compleJfo" (Po 13) As P1i.1Jer (J.980t!) 
points out, the definition of coping as anything which 
reduces arousal is perhaps better described as the ~coping 
effect" (Po 3~~) of a coping response, rather than coping 
itself. Whilst coping is related to health, and therefore 
must in some way affect psychophysiological responses, we 
do not know anything like enough about the nature of such 
responses, especially as they relate to long-term health 
outcomes to be able to say what a coping response must do, 
on a physiological level, to ensure healtho 
Coping defined in this way has mainly been used in animal 
experiments (e.g. Miller, 1980) or studies in humans where 
the task-demands can be defined by the the experimenter, 
such as parachute training and jumping (Ursin et al, 1978). 
As the scope of this discussion is limited to coping 
responses in naturalistic, non-experimental situations, the 
influence of this approach to the definition of coping is 
not extensive in the literature which deals with health, 
stress and coping. 
The psychoanalytic background to coping on the other hand 
has had a large influence in determining coping concepts as 
they are used today. The main difference between the former 
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approach and the psychoanalytic, is that the psychoanalytic 
approach takes more intere~t in cognitions, thoughts, and 
feelings as coping responses, rather than overt behavioural 
responses, or measurable physiological changeso 
It is interesting to note here, as mentioned in chapter 1, 
that Freud outlined the signal function of anxiety, which 
alerts the individual to the conflict or potential 
conflict, so they can respond in adaptive ways, or copeo 
This is in fact similar to the idea of biological coping 
outlined above, where coping acts to reduce physiological 
arousalo 
Ego psychologists, such as Haan (1977), Vaillant (1977), 
Shapiro {1965) and Menninger {1954b) have been responsible 
for developing classifications of ego processes such as 
coping, defense and neurotic responseso Such work draws on 
Freud's earlier work on the functions of the ego, and more 
particularly on the conflict-free ego sphere (Hartman, 
1958) where the ego deals with, and processes threatening 
information which is not involved with potentially 
pathological mental conflictso In other words, everyday 
stressors, threats and tensionso Also, ego psychologists 
introduced the idea that coping responses form a 
repertoireo Some reponses are appropriate in terms of 
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reducing stress or threatu whilst others are not. This 
allows the coping response itself to be kept distinct from 
the effectiveness of that reponse and so to examine if and 
how coping responses might make a difference to 
adaptational outcomes (e.g. Ilfeldu 1980; Menaghanr 1982; 
Pearlin & Schooler, 1978). 
One of the most important figures in the area of coping is 
Richard Lazarus, whose book ~Psychological stress and the 
coping process" (1966) first discussed the idea of 
'cognitive appraisal' which has become a key element in 
many conceptions of coping. The work of Lazarus will be 
discussed later in this section. Although cognitive factors 
play a large part in coping responses, it is important to 
understand that the term coping refers to other phenomena 
as well. 
Menaghan (1983) distinguishes three categories of coping 
variables. These categories provide a useful way of 
assessing the broad way in which coping has been 
conceptualized. Each category will be considered in turn. 
5.3.2 Coping resources. 
The first, coping resources, are defined as "generalized 
attitudes and skills that are considered advantageous 
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across many situations". (p. 159) Such resources inclucle 
attitudes about selfv (such as esteem) r attitudes about the 
world (e.g. coherence, mastery) v intellectual skills (e.g. 
cognitiver analytic abilities) and interpersonal skills 
(e.g. ability to communicate). Attitudes about self may 
also include locus of control. It has been found that 
subjects with an external locus of control appear to show 
greater mood disturbance to negative life events than those 
with an internal locus (Lefcourt et alr 1981). Alsor those 
with external locus of control have significant levels of 
trait anxiety and depression in response to negative life 
change (Johnson & Sarasonr 1979), and appraise stressful 
episodes differently (Parkesr 1984). These generalized 
attitudes and skills have not been formally examined in any 
depth in relation to stress. Such skills represent the 
background on which particular coping strategies will be 
developed. Personality factors such as type-A (see above) 
may well contribute to these background skills. The finding 
by Friedman et al (1985) that the non-verbal expressive 
style of some type-A men was repressed and tense indicates 
the complex way in which personality and situation may 
interact to produce general skills (or in this case, lack 
of such skills) that are part of resources. The repressed 
and tense non-verbal expressive style of some type-A 
individuals may well make it more difficult for other 
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people to talk and relate to them with ease, so reducing 
supportive social interaction which may well facilitate 
copingo 
Also, factors such as social class, gender, and education 
will determine the level of these generalized resources and 
the coping responses available (Pearlin & Schooler, 1978) o 
It has been suggested that the higher rates of 
psychological distress found in groups with lower 
socioecomomic status may well be due, in part, to the less 
effective coping responses used by members of such groups 
(Kessler, 1979, 1982) o As said above, little direct 
research has been undertaken in this area, although general 
skills will obviously have a major effect on the limits of 
coping abilityo 
5o3.3 Coping styleso 
The second category of coping variables described by 
Menaghan (1983) are coping styles. These are generali~ed 
coping strategies which remain fairly consistent over 
different stressful episodeso For example, Lazarus & 
Folkman (1984) give the example of flexibility and 
complexity as two possible coping styleso Flexibility 
refers to whether a person uses the same coping strategy or 
set of stratgies in different situations, or whether they 
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vary the strategies they use depending on the situation. 
Complexity refers to the range of coping strategies used in 
stressful encounters. A complex style would be one where 
the person uses multiple strategies or combinations of 
strategies. A simple style might be one 
tries only one coping strategy. As 
( 1984a) note v the idea of coping 
where the person 
Lazarus & Folkman 
styles comes from 
psychoanalytic ego psychology (e.g. Shapirou 1965) the 
current usage of the term, like the current usage of the 
term coping, is widened to include many other factors such 
as situational demands, behavioural responses, and 
conscious cognitive appraisal. 
A number of studies have looked into the use of coping 
stylesu although each study uses different measures of 
coping, and di~ferent conc~ptualizations of styles. Ilfel~ 
adults finds that three major patterns of coping style. 
These are taking direct action, rationalization avoidance 
of the stressor, and acceptance of the stressful situation 
with no attempt to change the situation. In this study the 
coping styles were assessed accross the particular social 
roles involved in marriagev parentingu finances and job. It 
was found that the styles used varied across the social 
role situations which "suggests that coping styles are tied 
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more to the situation than to the manifestations of a 
particular personality typeo" {Ilfeldv l980av Po 5) 'l'his 
contrasts with other conceptions of coping style where 
personality and coping styles are intrinsically linked and 
so remain constant across situations {eogo Vaillant, 1977) o 
Such differences in the conception of coping style arise 
out of different notions of what coping is, rather than 
conflicting or contradictory empirical evidenceo Folkman & 
Lazarus {1980) found that the context of the stressors 
tends to determine the copingo For examplev work contexts 
were more associated with problem-focused coping" Stone & 
Neale (1984a) found that similar types of problems produced 
similar coping responses within individualso Situational 
determinants appear to be stronger than personality or 
individual determinants of coping resposnes (McCraev 1984) o 
So it would appear thatv based on non-psychoanalytic 
conceptions of coping responses, individuals do not have a 
consistant 'coping style', although some strategies may be 
used more often than others (Sidle et al, 1969) o 
Furthermore it is not clear that these favoured coping 
strategies represent a 'style', and more likely, strategies 
will vary accross situations {Moos & Billings, 1982) o 
Psychoanlytic conceptions of coping, on the other hand, see 
individuals as displaying certain styles or traits of 
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characteristic patterns of coping responses 
Vaillant). In additionu psychoanalytic conceptions of 
coping place coping responsesu or ego processes in a 
hierarchy (e.g. Haan, 1977) which to a degree assumes that 
coping processes can be defined as adaptive or maladaptive 
independently of the situation in which they are used. 
The evidence for coping styles, (that indivduals use 
similar patterns of coping responses across different 
situations) is not very strong if our conception of coping 
includes cognitive and behavioural efforts, as well as ego 
processes. The idea of coping styles has been popular in 
the past, but with a general move towards the 
conceptualization of coping as a dynamicu changing process, 
situational factors are seen as more important in 
determining the type of coping reponse produced. Also, 
researchers realise that psychoanalytic conceptions of 
coping responses are limited. If we only count 
relatively few responses as coping responses, then the 
limited repertoire will make it much easier to characterise 
responses as styles (Lazarus & Folkmanu 1984a). Another 
factor leading researchers away from coping styles is the 
move towards more detailed assessment of coping over a 
larger range 
Limiting the 
of stressful person-environment transactions. 
number of coping responses sampled 6 by 
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limiting the number over timev restricting the number of 
situations observedv and summarizing coping responses over 
time will blur the distinction between 
coping and will more likely lead one 
different types of 
to conclude that 
consistent coping styles are being observedo 
5o3o4 Co,eing effortso 
The third category of coping variable Menaghan (1983) 
describes is coping effortsv which are "specific actions 
(covert or overt) taken in specific situations that are 
intended to reduce a given problem or stresso" (Po 159) 
This is the most important category of coping variable, as 
it is at the heart of how coping is conceptualized and 
measuredo There is a great deal of debate surrounding the 
conceptualization of coping (Kessler et al 0 1985, Ray et 
al, 1982, Moos & Billings, 1982, Haan , 19821 White, 1974) o 
Only some of this debate can be covered hereo 
One of the central problems, which 
problems involved in conceptualizing 
emerges from the 
coping, is that of 
measurement or assessmento Most measurement has focused on 
the appraisal and/or the response to stressful situationso 
P~arlin & Schooler (1978) developed a measure of coping 
from a series of open-ended interviewso They identified 17 
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different coping themesv or coping responsesv which sample 
three major types of coping. These areg "(1) responses that 
change the situation out of which strainful experience 
arises, (?.) responses that 
strainful experience after 
control the meaning of the 
it occursv but before the 
emergence of stress, and (3) responses that function more 
for the control of stress itself after it has emerged." 
(Pearlin & Schoolerv 1978v p. 6) An example of an item from 
the scale developed is as follows. For marital coping 
responses, on the 1'controlled reflectiveness vs. emotional 
discharge" scale we find items such as. "How often do you: 
(1) Yell or shout to let off steam, (2) Find yourself 
thinking over marital problems, (3) Have you read any books 
or magazines recently about getting along in marriage." 
(Pearlin & Schooler, 1978u p. 20) Even though this is only 
a partial listing, the type of questions asked in this 
measure can be seen. This measure has been criticized as it 
does not give us any information about the way in which 
people actually cope in specific stressful episodes, nor 
does it give information about sucessful coping, rather it 
only finds out about coping with persistent and structural 
life strains (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980). 
Another measure of coping developed by Folkman & Lazarus 
(1980) and othersv attempts to overcome these problems, and 
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introduce the idea of cognitive appraisal, which is a major 
concept in coping theory. The 1 Ways of Coping ChecklistQ is 
probably the most widely used measure of coping strategies 
(Kessler et al, 1985) 0 Lazarus (e.g. 1966, 1977a) 
distinguishes between appraisal and coping. Appraisal is 
"the cognitive process through which an event is evaluated 
with respect to what is at stake (primary apprais~l) and 
what coping resources and options are available (secondary 
appraisal." (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980) In other words, 
primary appraisal determines the significance of the event. 
There are three major types of primary appraisals: 
Harm-loss, where damage has already occured~ threat, ~hich 
is the anticipation of harm or loss; and challenge, where 
the significance of the event is seen in terms of an 
opportunity for mastery or gain. Secondary appraisal is 
where the person considers the coping options available to 
them. According to Lazarus, primary appraisal and secondary 
appraisal interact to determine the degree of stress, and 
the degree and quality of the emotional reaction. The Ways 
of Coping Checklist contains 68 items "describing a broad 
range of behavioural and cognitive coping strategies that 
an individual might use in a specific stressful episode." 
(Folkman & Lazarus, 19 80, p. 224) These i terns are 
classified as problem-focused or emotion-focused. 
Problem-focused items describe cognitive problem-solving 
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efforts and behavioural strategies for alt~ring or managing 
the source of the problem. (e.g. Made a plan of action and 
followed it. Got the person responsible to change his or 
her mind.) Emotion-focused items describe cognitive and 
behavioural efforts to reduce or manage emotional distress. 
(e.g. Accepted sympathy and understanding from someone. 
Tried to forget the whole thing.) Usuallyv subjects are 
asked to consider the most stressful event that had occured 
that month (Coyne et al, 1981) or week (Folkman et al, 
1986, in press). In most of these studiesv primary and 
secondary appraisal were assessed also. Primary appraisal 
was measured with items that described the stake people 
might have in a specific encounter involving harm~loss, 
threat, and challenge. Secondary appraisal was measured 
with items which described the range of options for coping 
involved. 
This checklist has been used several times. Coyne et al 
(1981) have used it to look at the coping of depressed vs. 
non-depressed persons in stressful episodes. It has also 
been used to look at emotion and coping during a college 
examination (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985), the relationship 
between appraisal, coping, and symptoms (Folkman et al, 
1986) v and the relationship between appraisal, coping, and 
stressful encounter outcomes (Folkman et al, in press). 
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Another measure developed 
items which are broadly 
to assess coping contains 87 
similar to the Ways of Coping 
Checklist (Stone & Neale~ 1984a). An important difference 
here is that coping was recorded on a daily basisu as a 
response to the "most bothersome event or issue of the 
day". (Stone & Neale, 1984au p. 897) The significance of 
the event (appraisal) was also recorded. In this study much 
more attention is given to the problem or stressful 
encountero For exarnpleu respondants are asked how often (if 
at all) the problem or situation had occured beforeo 
These measures of coping share more or 
conceptualization of copingo Lazarus & 
define coping as "constantly changing 
behavioural efforts to manage specific 
less the same 
Folkman (1984) 
cognitive and 
external and/or 
internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding 
the resources of the person." (po 141) Stone & Neale 
(1984a) define coping as "those behaviours and thoughts 
which are consciously used by an individual to handle or 
control the effects of anticipating or experiencing a 
stressful situationo" (Po 893) Pearln & Schooler define 
coping as "any response to external life-strains that 
serves to prevent, avoid, or control emotional distresso" 
(p. 3) 
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5o3o!:5 Coping as a mediatOE_o 
Although three types of coping variable have been 
identified, resources, styles, and efforts, it is the 
coping efforts or responses I have given most attention in 
this sectiono Earl.y conceptions of coping focused on 
psychoanalytic ideas, where coping and defense are seen 
more as unconscious responses to conflicts. More recent 
ideas emphasise the very conscious nature of coping 
responses, indeed the measures of coping outlined above 
assume that people have knowledge of the coping strategies 
they are using. However, this assumption has been 
challenged (Haan, 1982~ Ray, 1982) as many coping efforts 
may not be deliberate or conscious, and so not accessible 
by direct means. 
A problem with all the above measures of coping is that 
they limit the number and type of coping responses an 
individual can record. Although these measures agree that 
coping responses can by categorized as emotion or problem 
focused, they do not agree on finer categories which more 
closely describe the functions of particular coping 
responses. 
The popular conceptions and measures of coping outlined 
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above do not really apply to coping with life events" 
They apply to stressors that are likely to occur on a 
weekly, monthly or daily basis, or chronic life strains 
(Pearlin & Schooler, 1978)" There is a large gap between 
the measurement of stress in terms of life events, and 
these measures of copingo Although both these phenomena are 
interrelated, as part of the process which leads to health 
and illness, the conceptualization of stress made by 
researchers in the area of coping, is quite different from 
that of life events researchers" Both Stone & Neale (1982, 
1984) and Lazarus (1984) have developed measures of stress 
that are quite different from life events measures. Stone & 
Neale have studied the effects of daily events on mood 
(1982), and Lazarus and his collegues use daily hassles as 
a measurement of stress (DeLangis et al, 1982~ Kanner et 
al, 1981). The significance of this different approach to 
stress measurement amongst those researchers who also have 
an interest in the assessment of coping will be discussed 
later. 
"."despite the enthusiasm ahd interest that have 
been shown for the construct of coping, we have 
just barely begun to scratch the surface. There 
is debate about how coping strategies should be 
conceptualized, and little progress has been made 
in developing objective, reliable, and valid ways 
of capturing the coping process. Although it is 
widely assumed that choice of coping strategies 
can ameliorate the impact of stressful 
experiences, there is surprisingly little sound, 
empirical research bearing on this assumption." 
(Kessler et al, 1985, p. 559) 
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As jndicated by Kessler above. research into coping is not 
well advanced. We do not have the answers to basic 
questions about stress and coping. The reason for this may 
well be because of the dominance of life events research, 
and the idea that life stress is best represented by life 
events. For those who view coping as a dynamic, ongoing 
process, a transaction between the individual and stressful 
encounters, life events approaches to stress offer little 
chance to study coping as a dynamic process. Although 
research into specific life events has been undertaken 
(Kessler et al, 1985), the findings from such studies tell 
us little about coping processes and strategies in general. 
Also, if we ask questions about coping with the 'whole' 
life event, then we may well find out very little about the 
coping processes involved if the life event was stressful 
because of the chronic, day to day stresses it produced. 
For example, in the case of death of a spouse, the actual 
death might be 'coped with' very well. However, the loss of 
income such a death might bring about, may well cause a 
great deal of chronic stress, which is not 'coped with' 
very well at all. Assessing coping to life events alone is 
not an adequate way of "capturing" the coping process. From 
this, is also follows that assessing life events is not an 
adequate way of assessing life stress, as many of the 
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problems and situations which people have to cope with are 
not picked up by gross life events assessments. 
5.4 Social support. 
The literature on social support is very large (e.g. 
Caplan, 19741 Gottlieb, 19811 House, 1981, Sarason & 
Sarasonv 1985). According to Wilcox & Vernberg (1985) v 
more attention has been paid to social support than all 
the other stress 1 moderator-s 0 (e.g. coping, personality 
factors) combined. Even a brief review of the literature is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. Many reviews of the 
effects of social support on health already exist (e.g. 
Broadhead et a1v 1983, Henderson, 1984, Kaplan et al, 19771 
Sarason et a1, 1985a, Turner, 1983). This section will be 
limited therefore to a discussion of some issues in 
research on social support which are seen as important 
generally in the literature, and which are relevant to this 
thesis. 
Social relationships have long been known to play a large 
part in health and disease. For a long time however, the 
negative aspects of social relationships have been 
emphasised in the clini~al literature. The benefical 
aspects of informal social support systems have only been 
systematically studied in detail for the last twenty years 
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or so (SuJ.s, 1982). The emphasis on the positive aspects of 
social support has tended to overshadow the fact that many 
social relations also involve a good degree of conflict 
(Abbey & Ravine, 1985; Kessler et al, 1985). The term 
1 social support 1 "prejudges an effect of social ties that 
empirically is still only putative, since whether or not 
social supports are in fact supportive is still at issue." 
(Pearlin & Schoolerr 1978) The negative aspects of social 
relations should be borne in mind during the following 
discussion of two pertinent issues in the area of social 
support, and its relation to health. 
5.4.1 Conceptualization and measurement of support. 
Although there is little agreement on the conceptualization 
of social supportr many researchers see social support as a 
multidimensional concept (Thoits, 1983) and that the 
assessment may involve both the quantity and quality of 
support (McFarlane et al, 1984). 
As in the case of coping 
theoretical conceptualization 
determine 
developed. 
the nature of 
(or any construct), the 
of social support will 
the measuring instruments 
Many different measures of social support exist. One result 
~177-
of this is that ~the task of empirically demonstrating the 
effects of social support has barely begun.~ (Sarson et al, 
1983) Early measures used scales with a few items to assess 
support. Lin et al (1979) used nine items in their scale 
which included information about respondent 1 s feelings 
about the local community as well as quantitative 
infomation about the frequency of talking to neighbours. 
Miller et al, (1976) determined who their subject 1 s friends 
and confidants were in order to assess social support. Such 
early studies were marked by "hastily constructed (or 
worse, post hoc) conceptualizations of social support and 
relatively superficial conceptualizations of the 
construct." (Vaux, 1982, p.2) 
Since this time however, many new scales and measures have 
been developed. The Interview Schedule for social 
Interaction (Henderson et al, 1980) attempts to measure the 
number of people in different categories of relationship 
the respondent has contact with, as well as a detailed 
assessment of what each relationship provides for the 
respondent. Also deficiencies in social relationships were 
assessed in terms of availability and adequacy. An 
individual may have high levels of available relationships, 
but they may be inadequate. This measure contains 52 items 
and is administered during an interview. Such a measure 
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provides very 
networl<u and the 
provjdeso 
detailed analysis of the respondents social 
quantity and quality of social support it 
Vaux (1982) views social support on three levels, namely, 
resources, behaviours, and feelings. The measure developed 
from this asks respondents to list ten people who are 
important to them in each of five areas (e.g. emotional 
support givers; advice givers). Then, for each person on 
this list, nine questions are asked 1 such as what social 
sector the support-provider comes from (e.g. workplace; 
family), and how complex the relationship is. The next 
section of the measure, dealing with behaviours, asks 45 
questions about how likely friends, or, family are to give 
various support. (e.g. would listen to my feelings; would 
co to a movie or concert vJi th me.) The third sect ion ,;ea7:::; 
statements which the respondent has to rate for the degree 
to which they agree with them. (e.g. My family cares for me 
very much, people admire me.) The social support appraisals 
scale has been subjected to tests for reliability and 
validity and was found to be as good in these respects as 
other measures of support appraisals (Vaux et al, in 
press). Using these measures the relationship between 
social support satisfaction and network characteristics has 
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been studied. This relationship was shown to be a com9lex 
one {Vaux & Harrison 1 198~). 
Sarason et al (1983) have developed the Social Support 
Questionnaire. This measure gives scores for the perceived 
number of social supportsr as well as the satisfaction with 
these supports. Other measures have made a distinction 
between effective 
(McFarlane et alv 
and ineffective 
1984) q assessed 
social 
the 
supports 
objective 
determinants of perceived social supports (Cutronav 
1986), studied the relationship between levels of social 
support and social skills and attractiveness (Sarason et 
al, 1985b). 
Such changes show an increasing sophistication in 
researchers 1 conceptualizations of social support. Many 
problems encountered in demonstrating the relationship 
between social support and health occur because of 
confounded measures. For example in life events 
inventories, loss items 1 such as death of a spouse may have 
health effects that are due as much to the loss of social 
support as the stress associated with loss of a spouse 
(Thoits, 1982). This type of confounding leads to problems 
in assessing the effect of social support on °buffering 1 
stress (Turner, 1983) 1 which will be discussed in the next 
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section. 
Henderson (1984) outlines six requirements for the 
measurement of social support. Such measurement must 
specify exactly what is meant by social support. The 
indices used must be reliable and valid. The sampling 
procedure used should take account of the possibility that 
social networks may undergo changes. Symptoms should not 
affect the measure of support as confounding would occur. 
The measurement should not be confounded by life events, 
social support and life events may influence each other as 
indicated above. Finally, social support measures should 
not be confounded by personality traits. Social support may 
be the product of social competence (Sarason et al, 1985b), 
and individuals may vary in their requirements for social 
support, depending on personality variables. Such 
requirements have not yet been met by any measure of social 
support. It is clear from the requirements that Henderson 
(above) gives, such a measure of social support would be 
impossible to obtain, because of the confounding of 
variables. Such confounding means that causal relationships 
between social support, stress, and disorder well may prove 
difficult to demonstrate. 
" ••• it seems likely that future studies of the 
aetiological hypothesis will fail because social 
support and personality are inextricably linked." 
(Henderson, 1984, p.51) 
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Establishing causal links between disorder, stress and 
social support is dependent on the conceptuali7.ation and 
measurement of social support. If current, sophisticated 
conceptions of social support remainu the measurement we 
wish to make of social support will be confounded by other 
variables, and so any simplistic, general causal links we 
may wish to demonstrate will remain unproven. Social 
support is only one factor which is intertwined with many 
others in determining health outcomes. 
5.4.2 Buffering versus main effects. 
This issue has been the subject of much discussion and 
research (Aneshensel & Stone, 1982; Cohen 
Cohen et al, 1985: Gore, 1981; Lieberman, 
Shapiro, 1986; Thoits, 1982; Turner, 
& Wills, 1985; 
1982; Parry & 
1981). A full 
discussion will not be attempted here, but the main 
problems in this debate will be briefly sketched. 
The focus of the debate is the effect social support has on 
well-being. The main or direct effect model states that 
social support has an overall benifical effect 
independently of the effects of stress. The buffering model 
states that social support exerts its effects on well-being 
through 0 buffering 0 or protecting persons from the harmful 
effects of stressful events. In other words, is social 
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support beneficial irresepective of life stressu or is it 
only beneficial in that it provides protection against 
stressful events? 
This debate appears to be unnecessaryu why could not both 
processes operate? The theoretical level of this debate is 
typical of the simplistic and crude approach to 
concepualizing social support (and to other variables in 
life stress research). Although it is important to know how 
social support operates, to set up only two possible 
options severely restricts possible outcomes. Lieberman 
(1982) lists six ways in which social support may play a 
part in well-beingv and there are probably many more. 
Where this debate has been consideredv we find the 
following kind of conclusions. " •. it does not seem 
currently possible to resolve the direct - versus buffering 
effects question ••. social support tends to matter for 
psychological well -b~ing independent of stressor 
level .•• support tends to matter more when stressor level is 
relatively high." (Turnerv 1983v p. 142) "The buffering 
hypothesis suggests that social support can moderate the 
impact of life events upon mental health. However several 
problems have yet to be resolved •.• Social support has been 
inadequately conceptualized and operationalized; therefore, 
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the specific dimensions of support that reduce event 
impacts can not be identified." (Thoits, 1982, p. 145) 
~ •.• studies comparing the main effect and buffering models 
have opened an important area of psychological research. 
With the accumulated knowledge from a decade of work, there 
is no longer a need to ask which model is correct. Both 
models contribute to the understanding of the relationship 
between social support and health." (Cohen & Wills, 1985, 
p. 353) 
The buffering versus main effect 
larger problem faced by all areas 
look at so~called 1 mediators 0 
debate is only part of a 
of stress research that 
of the stress-disorder 
relationship. A brief discussion of this will conclude this 
chapter. 
5.5 Modifiers, assets, resistance resources, and stress. 
In this chapter I have presented a very brief sketch of two 
factors which are sometimes taken into account when 
considering the relationship between stress and disorder. A 
recurrent problem in all attempts to measure variables 
such as coping and social support is that these measures 
inevitably become confounded with other modifiers, assets 
and resistance resources. 
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Some measures of coping include measures of social support. 
Life events measures may be contaminated with social 
support measures. Disorder may predispose people to view 
their social relations negatively, so support measures 
become confounded with disorder. Personality factors 
may determine perception of social support, as well as 
predispose people towards certain coping responses. The 
list could be continued. 
The relationship between stress and disorder is not 
unilinear. An overwhelming number of processes, traits, 
environmental situations, dispositions, and many other 
factors together contribute towards what we might call 
health outcome. Any efforts made by researchers to examine 
what factors may be related to health outcomes can only 
begin to scratch the surface. This is especially true if 
large correlational studies are undertaken which often 
preclude careful consideration of the processes involved, 
and unduly limit the conception and measurement of both the 
independent and dependent variables involved. 
Correlational, epidemiologic studies of this kind have to 
suppose the simplest kinds of causal relationships between 
variables in order to discover any relationships at all. It 
is interesting to note that throughout research into stress 
and health, many of the methodological problems examined 
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are statistical in nature (eogo the scaling of life 
events) o It is assumed that the methods of research adopted 
are suitable for the phenomena under studyu and it is just 
a matter of adjustingu or adapting such research methods to 
the additional complications that stress -disorder research 
imposes a 
The argument put forward in this thesis is that traditional 
research methods and designs are almost wholly unsuited to 
examining and exploring the phenomena under studyo A major 
problem with this criticism is that research alternatives 
can not be offered to replace the current oneso 
Modifiersv assets, and resistance resources are obviously 
involved in the production of health and illnesso As soon 
as we try to measure such discrete variablesv we soon 
discover that the conceptualizations we have of such 
modifying variables are simplistic and naive, as 
confounding between such variables occurso One response to 
this problem is to refine and purify such variablesv as the 
new measures of coping and social support discussed in 
this chapter bear outo However, such attempts to purify 
these variables may be misguidedo They assume that stress 
is an external force in the environment (engineering 
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analogy) and that it acts unidirectionally upon usu 
therefore all moderating factors become predictor 
variablesu and measur.es of health become the predictedu 
dependent variableo 
"Thus some of the confounding ooooreflects the 
fusion of variables in nature rather than being 
merely the result of the measurement errors of 
researcherso If we try to delete the overlap in 
variables of genuine importance, we will be 
distorting nature to fit a simpler, mythical 
metatheory of separable antecedent and consequent 
variableso We urge researchers to be very wary of 
throwing out the baby with the bathwater in their 
efforts to objectify stress as an event in the 
environmento The positivist position has, over 
the past fifteen years, repeatedly failed to 
demonstrate its usefulness in stress and coping 
researcho" (Lazarus et al, 1985 8 p. 778) 
5.6 Summary and conclusions. 
In this chapter I have attempted to show some of the 
problems involved with the measurement of two factors which 
play a part in producing health. 
The first, coping, has been assessed in various ways. But 
the move towards more detailed measurements of coping which 
examine many more coping responses for weekly or daily 
events was noted. The second factoru social support, has in 
a similar way moved from simple assessments to more complex 
oneso 
The reasons for these more sophisticated measures are 
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two-fold. Firstly 
demonstrate that 
researchers were finding it difficut to 
such variables actually made any 
difference to health outcorneso The same problem has been 
experienced in measures of life eventsu as was noted in the 
last chapter. Secondly; researchers realised that their 
conceptualizations of these factors were simplisticu and 
did not explain the processes by which social supportu or 
coping may in fact affect health outcomes. 
Finally; it was argued that traditional correlational and 
epidemiological research methods were not suited to 
exploration of a complex set of interacting factors which 
intersect to produce health and disease. Traditional models 
of stress-disorder relationships are simplistic and 
unidirectional, drawing heavily on engineering ideas of 
forces, stresses and resistances. No alternative to 
traditional research methods has been proposed, and this is 
acknowledged as a problemo Such issues will be taken up in 
the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
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6 o 1 Summary and __ c_C?~c],; __ l:l~~~ o 
In this chapter I will give arl overview of each chapter in 
this thesis and attempt to offer some conclusions and 
possible alternative approacheso Throuqhout this thesisy I 
have tried to give the reader a 0 feel 1 for some of the 
issues involvedy rather than produce an exhaustive review 
of research findingso This approach can be criticized as by 
being selectivey one is also inevitably being biased in the 
results and findings which are selectedo Howevery the 
issues, and the historical and conceptual background to 
them, discussed here, do not depend for their strength on 
particular research findingso They are fundamental to the 
areas of research that examine the relationships between 
1 stress and health, and are unlikely to be changed by any 
I 
\} new research findings, no matter how dramatico Because of 
this, a selective approach is not likely to bias discussion 
of the issueso 
The main aim of this thesis is to examine some of the 
problems and issues involved in studying the relationship 
between stress and healtho Two major sources of these 
problems are the definition of stress, and conceptualizing 
the nature of the processes whereby many factors come 
together (including stress, whatever it might be) to 
produce health and diseaseo 
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6.2 Summary. 
Chapter 2 examined the background to stress concepts, and 
how this background determined the considerable conceptual 
and definitional problems that have always been associated 
with stress. Such definitional and conceptual problems are 
thought by many to hold back progress as reseach findings 
can not be integrated, and research design has to depend on 
badly formulated concepts of stress. 
Hans Selye is responsible for popularising the term stress. 
The development of his ideas was heavily influenced by two 
other researchers, who 
conceptions 
environment, 
of 
or 
stress. 
the 
also 
The 
milieu 
influenced many other 
idea of the internal 
interieur, developed by 
Claude Bernard, is a necessary prerequisite for many ideas 
of stress, including Selye's. 
The function of the internal environment was to keep 
conditions inside the organism steady, so that the vital 
functioning of the internal organs could continue, despite 
large fluctuations in the external environment. The 
mechanisms which maintain this state were studied later in 
detail by Walter Cannon. 
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Cannon coined the term homeostasis to refer to the 
reldtively steady state of the internal environment. He 
suggested that many homeostatic functions operate to 
work towards the maintainance of this state. Many later 
researchersf including Selye failed to make the distinction 
between homeostasis and homeostatic mechanisms. It is 
suggested that this blurring resulted in identifying 
homeostatic mechanisms as internalv physiologicalv 
chemicalf and automatic. Cannon himself sugested that 
behavioural 
mechanisms. 
acts 
Selye 
could be 
however 
considered homeostatic 
considered that adaptive 
reactions occur only internallYv and in fact defines stress 
as the common denominator of all these reactions. 
In this wayv the first conceptualization of stress located 
it as an internal physiological reaction. Adaptation to 
stress would occur in an automatic wayf inside the body. 
Selye also included in his concept of stress the General 
Adaptation Syndromef which is the way in which stress 
affects the organism over time. Although Selye's concept of 
stress popularised the term stress as a wholev many 
researchers have used the term in different ways. 
Freud's dynamic conception of mental life made it almost 
inevitable that Freudians would at one time or other refer 
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to the term stress, along with other physically dynamic 
~ords such as strain and tension. Although Freud did not 
use the term stress, ego-·psychologists who followed 
psychoanalytic ideas did, and started to use the term 
around the same time as other researchers who had more 
physiological conceptions of the term stress. In addition, 
ego psychologists developed taxonomies of defense 
mechanisms (or coping mechanisms) which describe the ways 
in which people respond in emotionally stressful 
situations. This development was important as the 
conception of stress used here included the idea of coping, 
just as the idea of coping includes the idea of stress. 
The first laboratory experiments into stress (apart from 
Selye's where he produced organ and tissue damage in rats 
by exposing them to 'stressors' such as extreme cold, and 
poisons) were performed by ego psychologists who were 
interested in the use of defense mechanisms. Ego 
psychologists later looked at adaptation life stress in 
individuals over long periods of time. 
A third major area where the term stress is used is in 
relation to human performance. Many of these early 
experiments were closely connected with performance as it 
related to the functioning of soldiers. Other experiments 
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were designed to look at how stress would disrupt skilled 
performance. It was noted that experimentation in this 
tradition was still widespread today. The conceptualization 
of stress in this area has never been as important as it is 
in othersv as it is the disruption of performance that is 
of key interest, rather than the nature of the phenomena 
that can act to disrupt it. 
The fourth area where 
is in areas such 
the concept of stress is widely used 
as psychosomatic medicinev health 
psychology and other areas where the effect of social and 
psychological factors on health and disease are examined. 
This area most critically has problems in conceptualizing 
and defining stress as it cuts across both the 
physiological and the psychological conceptions of stress 
mentioned above. 
There are many different and confusing uses of the word and 
concepts of stress. This is mainly due to the different 
interests of researchers who use the term. The first 
chapter finished by suggesting that these different 
definitions of stress can be integrated by using a more 
general notion of adaptation. Using adaptaton as a 
frameworkv it can be seen that these diverse research 
traditions are looking at ada~tation at different stages 
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and on different levels. They all use the term stress to 
refer to stages of the adaptive process. In Selyeus 
bichemical modelu stress is a state within the body induced 
by adaptive responsesv and to which adaptive responses must 
respond to restore homeostasis. In psychoanalytic 
ego-psychologyr stress is defined variouslyv but most 
importantly it is linked with adnctiv2 ~es~o~ses in the 
ior1J o£ e~o ~2fen~e or corins responses. ~his js adartation 
on tl1e psychological level. In stress and performancev 
stress disrupts performance and researchers are interested 
in how those processes which control skilled performance 
adapt to the stress. In stress and healthv stress can also 
mean different things, but in general it refers to those 
factors which are likely to tax both physiological and 
psychological adaptive resources as they attempt to 
preserve health. 
Chapter 3 was an attempt to show how stress became 
implicated as a factor in disease, both historically and 
conceptually. 
Theories of disease play a crucial role in determining if 
stress will be implicated as a factor in disease. 
Historically we find that in the ancient past physicians 
accepted the role of the emotions in disease. The 
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dicoveries of Pasteur and others encouraged a unicausal 
model of disease causation where psychological or social 
factors were thought not to play a part. Howevero one 
general conception of medicineo psychosomatic medicinev has 
always considered stress as a crucial factor in disease 
causation. 
Early psychosomatic thinking was greatly 
dualistic notions of the mind and the body. 
restricted by 
In the more 
recent pastv 
medicine and 
Freud reawoke interest in psychosomatic 
influenced Dunbar and Alexander who related 
certain personality characteristics to particular organic 
diseasev and suggested that unconscious conflicts could 
play a role in the development of diseases. The term stress 
was not yet used in these explanations. 
Psychoanalytic approaches to psychosomatic medicine 
suffered as no adequate psychophysiological mechanisms were 
put forward to explain how thoughts and emotions could 
produce diseases. 
The idea of stress became very important in psychosomatic 
medicine as it provided an explanation of how psychological 
phenomena could express themselves in bodily responses. 
Selye 1 s ideas about the General Adaptation Syndrome and the 
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diseases of adaptation had obvious applications to the 
(ield of psychosomatic medicine. It is it1teresting to note 
that both Bernard and Cannon had suggested many years 
before the rise in psychosomatic medicine in the J950°s 
that emotional experiences produced both psychological and 
physiological responses. 
Psychosomatic medicine now had an adequate scientific 
explanation of how psychological factors could cause 
diseasev and it 0 s popularity rose considerably as a result. 
Also, now that stress and disease had been linked together, 
research into stress and disease became an area of study in 
its own right, and was no longer linked so strongly to 
psychosomatic medicine. 
The key link then, between stress and illness is the way in 
which psychological or emotional 'stimuli' can induce 
physiological change. Cannon described the fight or flight 
response, which was the first attempt to establish the 
functional relationships of physiological responses and 
psychological stimuli. Although such responses are useful 
in preparing us for physical action, they can be damaging 
if repeated or too prolonged. 
A major problem is explaining why such physiological 
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responses occur when physical action (which the response 
prepares us for) is often an inappropriate and unhelpful 
course of action to take. Although some people have 
suggested that such responses remain as an evolutionary 
throwbacku there is little evidence for this. 
Another 
between 
major problem in 
external stimuli 
explaining the 
and internal 
relationship 
physiological 
responses is that so many differnt stimuli seem to produce 
the same response. How does the nervous system detect such 
stimuliv what can they all have in common to produce a 
similar reponse? 
Selye mainly used 'physical' stimuli (such as low 
temperatures and poisons) to produce stress in laboratory 
animals, so for a long time it has been assumed that 
emotional stimuli are somehow 'like 1 physical stimuli in 
their ability to produce a physiological stress response. 
However Mason has suggested that the common denominator in 
all these different stimuli is the psychological perception 
of threat. Physical stimuli such as cold have a large 
psychological component, as being exposed to inescapable 
low temperatures may well produce a fear reaction, and a 
perception that the situation is harmful or threatening. In 
this wayv it may be the case that the common denominator of 
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these different stimuli is threat, and so physical stimuli 
are more 0 1 i l<e 1 emotional st ).mul i, and not the other way 
around. 
The relation between imprecisely described reactions such 
as fight or flight and particular illnesses is very 
complex. Relatively little is known about physiological 
responses to different types of threat. Although it is 
clear in animal experiments that exposure to extreme 
stressors will produce illness, the link between stress and 
illness in humans is not so clear. Evidence suggests that 
responses to psychological stimuli are highly complex, and 
may be more specific than Selye suggested. 
Some diseases are more obviously linked to stress responses 
such as fight or flight than others (e.g. heart disease, 
stomach ulceration). The causal link between stress 
responses and other diseases is harder to demonstrate. It 
is thought that stress might affect the immune system and 
so lower resistance to infectious diseases. One problem 
with checking the nature of the link, is that many studies 
make no attempt to distingish between different illnesses 
and use very general measures of disorder. 
Psychological disorders and symptoms have also been linked 
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with stress. The intervening mechanisms involved here are 
even harder to conceptualize. 
The associations found between measures of stress and 
various illnesses are not strong. Because of this, and 
conceptual shortcomings in research, an increasing amount 
of attention is being paid to theoretical issues. One 
problem involves the assessment of stress which is normally 
made through life events measures. Other problems involve 
the number of variables taken into account in the 
relationship between stress and illness. Very often studies 
are correlational, and use only a few variables. Also, 
those variables that are studied are crudely 
conceptualized. 
The very general approach to both the measurement of stress 
and the measurement of illness has been criticized. Some 
researchers now believe that the relationship between 
stress and illness is not the same for all forms of stress 
and all forms of illness and so can only be understood by 
looking at specific disorderso 
Stress-illness research is at a crude levelo Little is 
known about the mechanisms involved, and the measures and 
research techniques used do not usually allow for 
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consideration of such mechanisms. The term and concent of 
stress have been very imprecisely used in this area. Stress 
is normally seen as a stimulus in terms of a stressful 
eventQ and illness as non~specific measures of disorder. 
The processes and mechanisms involved in stress and illness 
are largely unknown. It is clear that the measure of stress 
we use will help to determine the strength of the 
relationshp we find between stress and illness (if one 
exists). 
Chapter 4 was 
conceptualized 
concerned with how life stress has been 
and measured. The main approach has been 
to use life events inventories. 
The background to this approach is diverse. Meyer used a 
life chart as a diagnostic tool as he believed that major 
events in people's lives could play an important part in 
causing illness. Cannon also provided evidence that major 
events could produce physiological responses. 
Life events research assumes that life stress is a factor 
in disease causation or illness onset, and that major life 
events cause stress. 
In general, life events have been able to account for no 
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more than 9 per cent of the variance in disorder. With this 
in min~, many different life events inventories have been 
produced with the hope of increasing this figure. The poor 
predicitve power of life events is viewed as a consequence 
of inadequate measurement, rather a result of an inadequate 
research paradigm. In life events research, scores for any 
individual in terms of life events are then related to 
subsequent illness scores. 
The first life events inventory to appear was the Schedule 
of Recent Events. The SRE was simply a list of events which 
required some form of adjustment or adaptation. Life 
stress was measured simply by the frequency with which such 
events were experienced. The Social Readjustment Rating 
Scale gave these events different weightings by asking a 
panel of people to judge how much adjustment they felt each 
event would require. 
The assumptions of these measures are that change per se is 
stressful, rather than just negative life change, as the 
inventories included events that were both positive and 
negative. Many studies which used these measures collected 
information retrospectively, which is subject to recall 
bias. A third problem involves the weighting of events for 
the relative adaptive demands they impose. It is assumed 
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that the stressfulness of a life event is best determined 
by general ratings rather than individual ratings. 
The Life Experiences Survey attempted to resolve some of 
these problems by allowing for desirable and undesirable 
ratings to be givenv and individual weightings. 
More recentlyv the Psychiatric Epidemiology Research 
Interview has been developed. The PERI contains more events 
and more factors about the meaning of the eventu for the 
individualu are taken into account. 
Despite these developments, in terms of measurementu the 
predictive power of life events has not been increased. 
Little more is known about the nature of the relationship 
between life events and disorder. 
Another problemu is that the weighting of life events 
appears to give no more predictive power than a simple 
frequency count. This makes it almost impossible to 
determine the meaning of life eventsu as stressors. 
Life events measures can only take in very little 
information about the stress being experienced by an 
individual. They gather the minimum of information about 
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the event itself, and can not assess the response to the 
event, and so can not really judge how stressful it is at 
allo 
Two responses to this unsatisfying level of progress in 
life events research can be identifiedo The first is to try 
and consider many more factors along with life events, such 
as social support and copingo The second is the development 
of alternative measures of life stresso 
These alternative approaches involve the measurement of 
chronic stress, or stress as it occurs on a day to day, 
week to week basiso The assumptions of such research are 
that much of the stress people are exposed to can not be 
picked up by life events assessments, and that life events 
themselves are stressful in that they impose changes and 
demands in daily living which can only be measured by 
frequent observationso 
The implications of this for stress research in general 
will not be summarised from chapter 3 here as a discussion 
of such issues will form the conclusion to this chaptero 
Life events are the most widely used measure of life 
stresso Despite their lack of success in predicting 
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illness, they are still used. This may well be due to a 
model of stress which conceptualizes stress as an external 
event in the environment. Another reason for the persistent 
use of these crude measures is that the epidemiological 
approach, adopted by many researchers in this area, is more 
concerned with establishing general relationships between 
easily measurable social variables and health outcomes, 
rather than understanding the nature of such relationships 
and the processes involved. 
Chapter 5 looked at two variables which are thought to 
play a part in stress-illness relationships. Social support 
and coping were used as examples of the complex assessment 
that is required when looking at the effects of stress on 
health. 
Factors such as social support and coping are often 
referred to as moderating factors, or resistance resources 
in the stress-illness relationship. These phrases have a 
physical meaning and almost treat stress as though it was a 
physical force. This is like an engineering analogy, where 
stress is an external force, and the individual under 
stress is like a material, which may collapse or buckle as 
a result of the strain. The problem with this analogy is it 
restricts the way we think about stress. It implies that 
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stress is external and objective. And that the direction of 
the relcltionship between stress and a person is one way. No 
allowance is made for the way in which people actively 
operate in their environments as much as their environments 
operate on them. 
Apart from social support and coping 1 personality factors 
are often studied as mediators. The hardy personality and 
the type-A/type~B distinction have been studied. Other 
possible variables which might play a part in the 
relationship between stress and health include such things 
as genetic factors 1 diet, cultural belief systems, and many 
others that we may choose to consider. 
Research and theory about coping with stress comes from two 
traditions. Animal research and ego psychology. In animal 
research 1 the idea of coping is closely related to 
adaptation, hence successful coping is seen as coping which 
is biologically advantageous. This often means reducing the 
physiological arousal associated with stress 1 as prolonged 
elevation of arousal levels is damaging. 
The ego-psychology concept of coping has had a larger 
influence on stress research. Ego defense mechanisms form 
an important part of many coping conceptualizations. 
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However, many conceptualizations exist. These can be best 
discussed in terms of coping variables. 
Coping resources refers to general skills that may help an 
individual cope. For example locus of control is thought to 
play a part in the perception of life events. Personality 
factors also contribute to these background skills. 
The non~verbal style of type-A men may put them at a 
disadvantage when coping by asking others for advice. 
Class, gender and education have also been found to alter 
coping skills. 
The second coping variable, coping styles involves the 
consistent use of particular coping strategies across 
different situations. As an example, a flexible coping 
style might be one where many different strategies are 
used, depending on the situation. Although many different 
measures of coping style are used, it appears that people 
do not have particular coping styles, but vary the coping 
responses they make across situations. The concept of 
coping styles is becoming less popular as coping is now 
viewed as a dynamic and changing with the situation. 
Coping efforts are the third class of coping variable. 
These are actions (overt or covert) which are taken with 
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the intention of reducing a given problem or stress. This 
variable is at the heart of how coping is conceptualized. 
Measures of coping efforts usually decribe thoughts or 
actions which the respondent has to check if it applies to 
them. One of the most important ideas in concepts of coping 
is that of primary and secondary appraisal. Primary 
appraisal is where the significance of the situation is 
determinedu and secondary appraisal involves calculating 
what coping resources and options are available. 
Measures of coping recently developed take account of this 
distinction, such as the Ways of Coping Checklist. This 
contains items which cover behavioural and cognitive coping 
strategies. These items are divided as either 
problem-focused or emotion-focused. 
It is interesting to note that nearly all measures df 
coping are not directed towards life events as the source 
of stress. Although coping is probably one of the most 
important factors mediating the relationship between stress 
and health, there is little evidence to support this. 
Social support is a large area of research. There are many 
conceptualizations of social supportu with most viewing it 
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as a multidimensional concept. 
Measurement problems are dominant in this area. Early 
measurements were simplistic and naive. Later measurements 
make a distinction between resourcesv behaviours, and 
feelings surrounding social support. Very often the 
individuals network of family and friends is built up, so 
that the characteristics of the network as a whole in 
relation to health can be assessed. 
is very difficut to measure as it is Social support 
confounded with so many other factors such as coping, 
simplistic causal 
will be difficult 
personality, and illness itself. Any 
links between social suppport and health 
to prove. 
A current debate in social support research involves 
conceptualizing the effects of social suport on health. The 
buffering hypothesis suggests that social support plays a 
part in well being by protecting or buffering the 
individual from the harmful effects of stressful events. 
The main effect hypothesis states that social support is 
beneficial to health independently of the effects of 
stress. This debate reflects the simplistic level on which 
many researchers are operating, as an alternative to this 
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buffering versus main-effect dichotomy is to suggest that 
social support may operate in both waysv depending on a 
host of factors, and is likely to operate in many other 
ways as well. Such a debate only gives two possible options 
for the action of social support. 
In this chapter, it can be seen that when these modifiers 
are considered in any depthv they are no longer isolated 
variablesv and can no longer be clearly thought of as 
independent variables in the stress disorder relationship. 
All measures taken in stress research are contaminated or 
confounded. Alsov stress can no longer be seen as if it 
were an external, objective event. 
The measurement of modifiers has proceeded from simplistic 
assessments, to more and more complicated procedures, 
reflecting more sophisticated conceptualizations of these 
variables. This is indicative of the area of stress-health 
research as a whole. The move towards new research methods 
will be discussed later in this chapter. 
6.3 Overview. 
Stress has been carelessly defined and conceptualized. One 
of the major reasons for this, apart from oversights on the 
part of researchers, is that an analogy exists which makes 
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it sound as if we have good explanations when we talk of 
stress, strain and buffers. The engineering analogy has 
RJ.Jmwe. us to use these vords, .:::m<J ta)_!~ 2CU\l'.:-. tl!t::Se 
concepts 1r1i thou t having to 1ool' too c }_ os0Jy f1 t 'J·1F.l. "C U12V 
really mean. Researchers have hastily completed studies 
using what are really very vague notions, 
conceptualizations, and measures of the phenomena under 
study. One of the consistent coping strategies researchers 
have used in reponse to the low predictive power of stress 
in explaining illness is to refine measures. This reflexive 
coping style has not achieved an increase in predictive 
power. What it has done, is demonstrate that poor 
definitions and poor conceptualizations can not be improved 
simply by refining the measurement, in the hope that in the 
process, the conceptualizations will become more accurate. 
What may well be required is a complete rethink of the 
concepts of stress, health, and the other factors which may 
play a part in the production of illness and well-being. 
Before this can be done however, we have to try and 
understand the concepts we are currently working with, so 
that we can begin to rethink them. One way of doing this is 
to look at the ways in which such words and concepts carne 
to be used, and how measurements derived from such concepts 
have developed and changed. This thesis represents a very 
small part of such an effort. 
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6.4 New directions. 
New directions in theoretical perspectives have become 
apparent in the literature. These new perspectives are 
partly summarized by Kessler et al (1985) 
~At its center is the notion that stress exposure 
sets off a process of adaptation. It recognises 
that this process unfolds over timep and it 
acknowledges that this process is modified by 
structural factors as well as personal 
dispositions and vulnerabilities." (p. 565) 
There are a number of ideas here. The first is the idea 
that stress exposure does not simply cause a responsep such 
as copingp or a physiological response, but it causes a 
process to be started. Actually, whatever processes are at 
work here will probably not simply "start" as Kessler et al 
(above) suggest. As Stone (1985) has suggested for coping, 
anticipated and past problems will be just as likely to set 
off coping processes, this is also true for other factors. 
It is probably the case that we are nearly always engaged 
in some form of coping activity, either anticipating future 
problems, reappraising past problems, or responding to 
current demands, and possibly all three together. In a 
sense, such processes of adaptation never start or stop, 
but they vary in rate of activity, or intensity. As Vaux 
(1982) has suggested, social support can be considered as 
having three levels, resources, behaviours, and feelings. 
Whilst our social support behaviours may be switched on and 
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off by stress exposure, social support resources and 
feelings continue to operate without exposure to stress. 
Others agree that stress or responses to stress are best 
viewed as processes (e.g. Casapi et al, in press; Fleming 
et al, 1984~ Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Pearlin et al, 1981). 
This is in recognition of the view that "a stressful 
encounter should be viewed as a dynamic, unfolding process, 
not as a static unitary event." (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985) 
This contrasts with the life events approach which more 
often than not has conceptualized stress as a "static 
unitary event". 
The idea that stress unfolds over time is well accepted 
among many researchers who suggest that research into 
stress must be longitudinal. Any research into stress can 
only ever sample a small slice of the process of 
adaptation. Some ego-psychologists such as Vaillant (1977) 
have attempted to study long term adaptation" The methods 
involved in this are impractical for more cognitive and 
behavioural researchers. The increasing trend towards 
fine-grained analysis of stress and health demonstrates 
that researchers are trying to capture the processes 
involved, even if they only do so over a period of weeks or 
months. 
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The assessment of stressful experiences which occur on a 
frequent daily or weekly basis is becoming increasingly 
popularo The Unpleasant Events Schedule (Lewinson et alv 
1983) was generated from daily diary data and contains 160 
itemso This has been found to be sensitive to clinical 
improvement in depression level (Lewinson & Talkingtonu 
1979) 0 Eckenrode (1984) examined the effect of chronic and 
acute stressors on moodo Chronic stressors were assessed by 
daily diary data which asked respondents to report any 
thing that had ••gone wrong" during the dayo These chronic 
stressors were found to partly determine moodo Daily 
stress as assessed by daily diaries, has been found to 
increase the use of health services (Roghmann & Haggerty, 
1973). Minor events (hassles) have been found to be better 
predictors of psychological distress than major life events 
(Monroe, 1983). Stone & Neale (1982) have developed a 
methodology for assessing daily experience. Negative events 
on this assessment have been found to be associated with 
reports of mood. The best developed measure of minor 
stressful events is probably daily hassles (DeLongis et al, 
1982; Kanner et alu 1981, Lazarus, 1984). The Hassles Scale 
consists of a list of 120 hassles and respondents indicate 
if they have experienced any of the listed hassles in the 
previous montho They are also asked to rate each hassle 
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they have experienced for severity on a three point scaleo 
Hassles scores have been shown to be better predictors of 
concurrent and subsequent psychological symptoms (Kanner et 
al, 1981) and more strongly associated with somatic health 
(DeLangis et al, 1982) than life events scoreso 
In addition to the assessment of stressful experiences on a 
daily, weekly or monthly basis, measures of coping have 
been developed which apply to these minor eventso Stone & 
Neale (1984a) have developed a measure of daily coping 
which gathers information about the event and coping 
strategies employedo Folkman et al (1986~ in press) have 
used the Ways of Coping Checklist to examine coping with 
the most stressful event respondents had experienced in the 
past weeko This measure uses Lazarus's idea of primary and 
secondary appraisalo 
The findings of these studies which assess chronic stress 
and coping are not dramatico They are encouraging, in that 
measures of chronic stress have been found to be related to 
health measureso Although, as said above in the case of 
life events inventories, better correlations between the 
measure and health outcomes does not mean that the measure 
of stress is better or more accurateo They are more 
encouraging in that they suggest a viable alternative to 
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the life events approach in the' study of stress and 
adaptational outcomeso 
Another reason for supporting these attempts is that they 
adopt a transactional approach to stress and disordero 
Disease is the product of a complex relationship between 
the person and their environmentso Stress is just one 
factor in that relationship which, according to the 
transactional view, is neither situated in the person or in 
the environment but is a product of the interaction between 
the twoo Frequent measures of coping, and the assessment of 
minor events are one way of observing the continuous 
interactive processes between 
environmentso 
the person and their 
A number of researchers have adopted models of stress which 
could generally be described as transactionalo For example, 
the notion of person-environment fit (French et al, 1974, 
1981) views adjustment as "the goodness of fit between the 
characteristics of the person and the properties of his 
environmento" (French et al, 1974, Po 316) This model takes 
into account the interactive nature of stress and 
adjustmento Cox (1978) puts forward a "transactional model 
of stresso" (Po 19) He suggests that "stress can be most 
adequately described as part of a complex and dynamic 
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system of transaction between the person and his 
environrnenL" (Po 18) Howeverv one problem \·Jith both these 
models is that they still attempt to make a clear 
distinction between the person and their environmento A 
truly transactional model would have to acknowledge that 
properties of the person and their environments can not be 
clearly separatedo 
fJJore recent transactional approaches have tried to 
acknowledge these difficultieso Lazarus & Folkman (1984) 
define their model in this wayo 
"In contrast to the unidirectional, static, 
antecedent-consequent model, the transactional 
model views the person and the environment in a 
dynamicv mutually reciprocal, bidirectional 
relationshipo What is a consequence at Time 1 can 
become an antecedent at Time 2; and the cause can 
either be in the person or the environmento This 
transactional model forms the metatheoretical 
foundation on which our cognitive theory of 
stress restso" (Po 293) 
Although many researchers claim to be transactionalv some 
are more transactional than others, as the above quote 
shows" The move away from traditional research methods, and 
traditional ways of thinking about stress is a slow 
process" One reason for this is the number of practical 
problems involved in moving from a new modelv to new ways 
of testing that modelo It is these problems I will go on to 
discuss in the next section" 
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6 0 5 Problef!l~_~vi th,_th_e new approaches o 
Despite the admirable theoretical soundness of these new 
approachesu and their attractiveness to the author, they 
have been severely criticised for a number of reasons. Not 
surprisingly, their main critics are major researchers in 
the area of life events. 
Dohrenwend et al (1984) report that the hassles scale is 
heavily confounded with psychological distress. For 37 of 
the 117 items on the hassles scale, a panel of 500 clinical 
psychologists rated these items as more likely than not to 
be symptoms of psychological distress. 
They 
"The use of measures such as these almost 
guarantees positive correlations between stress 
and illness outcomes, but contibutes little to 
our understanding of the role of environmentally 
induced stress in psychological distress and 
disorder." 
(Dohrenwend et al, 1984, p. 2~8) 
propose as an alternative, that measures of 
life-stress variables take into account the fact that "some 
life events, some hassles, some networks, and some types of 
social support are consequences of personal dispositions in 
general and psychopathology in particular, whereas others 
are independent of such characteristics." (Dohrenwend et 
alv 1984) In other words, life stress variables should be 
as free as possible from confounding with other variables. 
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Lazarus et al (1905) respond to this by arguing that 
confounding is inevitable in stress research. 
"One must conclude that stress is an "unclean" 
variable in that as a concept it de~ends on the 
interaction of two complex systemsv the 
environment and the person. There is no way to 
separate them without destroying the concept of 
stress as a relational and cognitively mediated 
variable." 
(Lazarus et al, 1985v p. 778-779) 
Dohrenwend & Shrout (1985) respond to this reply by 
claiming that "the hassles scale is even more confounded 
than we had originally supposed.'' (p. 780) They also claim 
that "the strategy that Lazarus and his colleagues have 
chosen to measure hassles is far from the best way to 
pursue their own theoretical formulations with empirical 
research." (p. 785) 
This debate is highly significant for current research in 
stress and disorder. One way of explaining these 
differences is in terms of the goals these two different 
groups of researchers have. Dohrenwend & Shrout (1985) 
state as their aim "to evaluate the role of environmentally 
induced stress in the occurance and distribution of various 
types of psychological symptomology and disorder in 
communities." (p. 783) 
On the other hand, Lazarus (1984) suggests that examining 
daily stress will "yield a better understanding of how and 
~219-
why people, looked at individually or as groups, get along 
will yield better wel1. or poorly, and, ultimately, 
suggestions for interventions to facilitate more effective 
coping ••. " (p. 388). 
Given these different research aims, it is hardly 
surprising that these two methodologies are in conflict. 
Dohrenwend takes a quantitative, epidemiological approach 
to stress and disorder. The conceptions of stress used 
never go beyond the measuring instruments available. If 
measures are contaminated with other variables, then the 
measures have to be improved. There is no suggestion that 
the models being used are incorrect. Lazarus, on the other 
hand, takes a more qualitative, psychological approach. The 
conceptions of stress adopted by Lazarus (and others who 
share his 
virtually 
views) are 
unexplorable 
very complex, interactive, and 
by traditional contamination-free 
conceptions of independent variables. In a way these two 
approaches should not be in conflict, as they are not 
trying to achieve the same aims. 
This mistake has been made in stress research almost since 
it first 
research 
t·alking 
started. It 
which used 
about more 
has often been assumed that any 
the term 'stress' necessarily is 
or less the same thing. This tendency 
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cnn be observed in 
Hamilton 
conceptualizations 
research areas are 
books of collected papers about stress 
& Warburton, 1979) where the 
of stress used in different papers and 
completely incompatible. There is a 
feeling that these different strands of research somehow 
'contributeu to a general effort that is being made to 
understand stress. Unfortunately attempts to integrate 
these very different concepts of stress are rare. The first 
chapter of this thesis was an attempt to show what the 
different uses of the term stress might have in common, if 
anything at all. 
Apart from these different research aims of the two 
approaches, there are 
are in conflict. These 
section. 
other reasons why these approaches 
will be outlined in the next 
6.6 The integrative concept of adaptation. 
Time and space prevent a detailed discussion of the idea of 
adaptation in integrating and analysing stress research. 
Such arguments are beyond the scope of this thesis, but any 
detailed discussion would take account of the following 
points. 
As suggested elsewhere, adaptation can describe all kinds 
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of homeostatic mechanismsu which operate on different 
levelsu the socialu the psychologicalu the physiological 
and the chemical., to work towards the maintainance of a 
dynamic steady stateu oru to work towards the attainment of 
new or different levels of dynamic steady states. Viewed in 
this way 1 many of the adaptive functions of people 1 and 
other organisms 1 are not viewed as reponses to stimuliu but 
more part of a much largerv ongoing concernu of general 
adaptation. Disease represents only one possible phenomena 
which may appear during this continuous process of 
adaptation. One factor involved in disease may in fact be a 
vside-effectv of the more general homeostatic mechanisms 1 
namelyu stress. Whilst adaptive/homeostaic mechanisms will 
generally work towards maintaining health 1 the concept of 
health in itself needs to be examined in its social 
context. Health on one level may take priority over h~alth 
in another sense 1 and on a different level. Occasionally 1 
physical and psychological health may deteriorate as 
adaptive/homeostatic mechanisms are directed towards the 
maintainance of other dynamic steady states or the 
attainment of new or different levels of such steady 
states. 
This view of adaptaion fits in closely with Lazarus's 
relational or transactional conception of coping. However, 
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the idea of a transactionalu relational approach to stress 
has many other sources o White ( 19 71) suggests that 
adaptation is nthe only firm platform" (Po 49) on which to 
build a classifiaction of coping responseso Hamburg et al 
(1974) state that "the study of adaptation links biological 
sciencesf social sciences and the clinical professionso" 
(Po 439) Howard & Scott (1963) in a proposed framework for 
the analysis of stress in the human organism say that 
"stress may only be properly understood in terms of the 
total organ ism responding to the total environment o" ( p o 
158) Hinkle & Wolff (1957) present an analysis of illness 
in terms of "mans adaptation to his total environment" 
(p.442). The idea of person-environment fit (French et alp 
1974, 1981) assumes that adjustment is the goodness of fit 
between the characteristics of the person and the 
properties of their environment. 
The recent trend towards the assessment of chronic stress 
and copingf in an ongoing context, and the acknowledgement 
by some researchers that the variables involved are 
inextricably linked and hence always subject to 
contamination and confoundingp shows that the above ideas 
concerning the nature of stress and adaptation are, for the 
first time showing through in terms of empirical studies of 
stress. 
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There are considerable problems with this approacho ~he 
major problem is finding ways of testing or demonstrating 
the phenomena under studyu when it is assumed that they are 
very complexv dynamicv and interlinked with a host of other 
factorso Not until researchers can begin to formulate some 
reasonable hypotheses concerning these adaptive/homeostatic 
mechanisms will these ideas begin to be acceptedo In 
additionv new research methods will have to be devisedo In 
a scientific environment where research involves measuring 
independent and dependent variables and testing hypothesesu 
it is unlikely that these broad integrative ideas will ever 
be accepted as anything more than unhelpful speculationo 
6o7 Conclusiono 
In this thesis, I have attempted to present a broad sketch 
of stress research, mainly in relation to illnesso This 
broadness has included looking at the developmerit of the 
different uses and concepts of stress, as well as the 
theoretical background to the use of stress as an 
explanation in disease causationo 
The complexity of the relationship between stress and 
illness was demonstrated by looking at some methodological 
problems involved in stress-illness researcho The 
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measurement of life stress, and two other variables, social 
support and coping were used to make very general points 
about the relationship between stress and illness and 
shortcomings in current researcho Alternative research 
strategies were presented, and their shortcomings notedo 
This thesis was written with the conviction that progress 
in stress-illness research, with its obv iot1s rr :cl.r.:U_caJ 
is slow, and wiJ1 continue to be slow if 
reG~archers adopt simplistic models of stress, and make no 
attempt to solve the many conceptual and theoretical 
problems that existo One reason for these problems is the 
term stress itself, and the power it has to 1 explain 1 
without explaining very mucho Another reason for such 
problems is that new models are not put forward, and so new 
research methods are not developedo My intention in this 
thesis was to show that the methodological and conceptual 
problems are resolvable if one takes a broad and historical 
viewo 
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